Analysis of Temporary Injunctions under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 CPC

Dec 24, 2024
EDITORIAL BOARD Legal Editor Dec 24, 2024

An Analytical Study of Temporary Injunctions under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

Introduction

The grant of temporary injunctions is a critical aspect of civil litigation in India, designed to preserve the subject matter of the suit and prevent irreparable harm to a party pending the final adjudication of the dispute. Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) are the primary provisions governing the issuance of such interlocutory reliefs. These rules empower the court to grant temporary injunctions under specified circumstances, ensuring that the ends of justice are not defeated. This article undertakes a comprehensive analysis of Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2, examining the statutory framework, the well-settled jurisprudential principles guiding their application, procedural intricacies, and the role of judicial discretion, drawing extensively from landmark judgments and relevant statutory provisions.

The Statutory Framework: Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 CPC

Section 94(c) of the CPC empowers courts to grant temporary injunctions in order to prevent the ends of justice from being defeated, and further provides that such injunctions shall be granted in the manner prescribed by the rules, which are primarily contained in Order XXXIX (Purna Chandra Digal v. Tube Digal & Sila Digal & Another, Orissa High Court, 1991).

Rule 1: Grounds for Temporary Injunction

Order XXXIX, Rule 1 CPC specifies the circumstances under which a court may grant a temporary injunction. It provides that where in any suit it is proved by affidavit or otherwise:

(a) that any property in dispute in a suit is in danger of being wasted, damaged or alienated by any party to the suit, or wrongfully sold in execution of a decree, or
(b) that the defendant threatens, or intends, to remove or dispose of his property with a view to defrauding his creditors, or
(c) that the defendant threatens to dispossess the plaintiff or otherwise cause injury to the plaintiff in relation to any property in dispute in the suit,

the court may by order grant a temporary injunction to restrain such act, or make such other order for the purpose of staying and preventing the wasting, damaging, alienation, sale, removal or disposition of the property or dispossession of the plaintiff, or otherwise causing injury to the plaintiff in relation to any property in dispute in the suit as the Court thinks fit, until the disposal of the suit or until further orders. An order directing parties to maintain 'status-quo' with respect to the suit property is generally considered to fall under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 CPC (Ritesh Agrawal v. Commissioner, Devi Patan Mandal, Gonda And Others, Allahabad High Court, 2024; M/S. Manthan Broadband Services Pvt. Ltd. v. Executive Officer, Puri Municipality & Ors., Orissa High Court, 2011).

Rule 2: Injunction to Restrain Repetition or Continuance of Breach

Order XXXIX, Rule 2(1) CPC allows the plaintiff in any suit for restraining the defendant from committing a breach of contract or other injury of any kind, whether compensation is claimed in the suit or not, to apply to the court for a temporary injunction to restrain the defendant from committing the breach of contract or injury complained of, or any breach of contract or injury of a like kind arising out of the same contract or relating to the same property or right. Rule 2(2) further empowers the court to grant such an injunction on such terms as to the duration of the injunction, keeping an account, giving security, or otherwise, as the court thinks fit.

Guiding Principles for Grant of Temporary Injunctions

The Supreme Court of India and various High Courts have consistently articulated a three-pronged test for the grant of temporary injunctions. The grant of an injunction is a discretionary relief, and the court must be satisfied that these conditions are met (Dalpat Kumar And Another v. Prahlad Singh And Others, 1992 SCC 1 719; NEW METAL VISION PRIVATE LIMITED v. JITENDER KUMAR KHARBANDA & ANR., Delhi High Court, 2024). The object of the interlocutory injunction is to protect the plaintiff against injury by violation of his right for which he could not be adequately compensated in damages recoverable in the action if the uncertainty were resolved in his favour at the trial (Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. And Others v. Coca Cola Co. And Others, 1995 SCC 5 545).

Prima Facie Case

The applicant must first establish a prima facie case. This does not mean a case proved to the hilt but rather that there is a serious disputed question to be tried in the suit and that, on the facts before the court, there is a probability of the applicant being entitled to the relief asked for (Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. And Others v. Coca Cola Co. And Others, 1995 SCC 5 545; Seema Arshad Zaheer And Others v. Municipal Corpn. Of Greater Mumbai And Others, 2006 SCC 5 282). The Supreme Court in Dalpat Kumar (1992 SCC 1 719) clarified that satisfaction of a prima facie case by itself is not sufficient to grant an injunction. However, the Allahabad High Court in Babadeen & Another v. Addl. District Judge Court No. 3 Bahraich & Others (Allahabad High Court, 2014), citing Supreme Court precedents, observed that if a party fails to prove a prima facie case to go for trial, it is not open to the court to grant an injunction in his favour even if he has made out a case of balance of convenience and would suffer irreparable loss.

Balance of Convenience

The court must then consider whether the balance of convenience lies in favour of granting the injunction. This involves weighing the mischief or inconvenience likely to be caused to the applicant if the injunction is refused against the mischief or inconvenience likely to be caused to the opposing party if the injunction is granted (Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. And Others v. Coca Cola Co. And Others, 1995 SCC 5 545; Wander Ltd. And Another v. Antox India P. Ltd., 1990 SCC SUPP 1 727). The court needs to assess the comparative hardship or mischief which is likely to occur from withholding the injunction will be greater than that which would be likely to arise from granting it (NEW METAL VISION PRIVATE LIMITED v. JITENDER KUMAR KHARBANDA & ANR., Delhi High Court, 2024).

Irreparable Injury

Finally, the applicant must demonstrate that they would suffer irreparable injury if the prayer for interlocutory injunction is disallowed. Irreparable injury means such injury that cannot be adequately compensated by way of damages (Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. And Others v. Coca Cola Co. And Others, 1995 SCC 5 545; Seema Arshad Zaheer And Others v. Municipal Corpn. Of Greater Mumbai And Others, 2006 SCC 5 282). The court's interference is necessary to protect the party from the species of injury that cannot be undone or for which monetary compensation would not be an adequate remedy (Dalpat Kumar And Another v. Prahlad Singh And Others, 1992 SCC 1 719).

Discretionary Nature of Relief

The grant of a temporary injunction is an equitable relief and is purely discretionary. The court must exercise this discretion judiciously, reasonably, and on sound legal principles (Dalpat Kumar And Another v. Prahlad Singh And Others, 1992 SCC 1 719). The Supreme Court in Seema Arshad Zaheer (2006 SCC 5 282) emphasized that judicial discretion should not be exercised in a manner that perpetuates illegality or undermines statutory provisions, citing M.I Builders (P) Ltd. v. Radhey Shyam Sahu (1999) 6 SCC 464. The conduct of the party seeking the injunction is also a relevant consideration (Dalpat Kumar And Another v. Prahlad Singh And Others, 1992 SCC 1 719). Furthermore, temporary injunctions should not be granted on sympathetic grounds if legal prerequisites are not met (Laxmikant V. Patel v. Chetanbhai Shah (2002) 3 SCC 65, as cited in Seema Arshad Zaheer).

Procedural Aspects and Judicial Scrutiny

Ex-Parte Ad-Interim Injunctions and Order XXXIX, Rule 3

Order XXXIX, Rule 3 CPC mandates that the court shall, in all cases, except where it appears that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by the delay, before granting an injunction, direct notice of the application for the same to be given to the opposite party. The proviso to Rule 3 allows the court to grant an ex-parte injunction if it is satisfied that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by delay. In such cases, the court must record its reasons for such opinion. The Supreme Court in Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund v. Kartick Das (1994 SCC 4 225), referencing Shiv Kumar Chadha v. Municipal Corporation Of Delhi (1993 3 SCC 161), highlighted the necessity of recording reasons for ex-parte orders to prevent misuse and emphasized that ex-parte injunctions should only be granted in exceptional circumstances. Compliance with Order XXXIX, Rule 3 is crucial (Smithkline Beecham Plc v. Sunil Singh, Delhi High Court, 2001).

Order XXXIX, Rule 3-A CPC further stipulates that where an injunction has been granted without notice to the opposite party, the court shall make an endeavour to finally dispose of the application within thirty days from the date on which the injunction was granted. If it is unable to do so, it must record its reasons for such inability (Purna Chandra Digal v. Tube Digal & Sila Digal & Another, Orissa High Court, 1991). Non-compliance with these procedural safeguards, while not rendering the ex-parte order non-est, may lead to an inference of arbitrariness (Purna Chandra Digal, Orissa High Court, 1991).

Vacation of Injunction: Order XXXIX, Rule 4

Order XXXIX, Rule 4 CPC provides a remedy for the party against whom an injunction order has been passed, allowing them to apply to the court to discharge, vary, or set aside the order. An application for vacation of an injunction can be treated by the court as a reply to the plaintiff's application under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 (Smithkline Beecham Plc v. Sunil Singh, Delhi High Court, 2001). The Delhi High Court in Punam Laroia v. Sanjeev Laroia (Delhi High Court, 2004) noted the disposal of an application under Order XXXIX, Rule 4 CPC alongside the main injunction application.

Appellate Review of Injunction Orders

An order granting or refusing an injunction under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 is appealable under Order XLIII, Rule 1(r) CPC (Ritesh Agrawal v. Commissioner, Devi Patan Mandal, Gonda And Others, Allahabad High Court, 2024; Purna Chandra Digal, Orissa High Court, 1991). The mere mention of Section 151 CPC along with Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 in an application does not change the character of the application, and an order passed thereon remains appealable (Prabhu Narain Khati And Anr. v. Daulat Ram Verma, Rajasthan High Court, 1987).

However, the scope of appellate interference is limited. The Supreme Court in Wander Ltd. And Another v. Antox India P. Ltd. (1990 SCC SUPP 1 727), reiterated in Seema Arshad Zaheer (2006 SCC 5 282) and Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. (1995 SCC 5 545), held that an appellate court should not interfere with the exercise of discretion by the court of first instance unless it is shown that such discretion has been exercised arbitrarily, capriciously, perversely, or where the court has ignored settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions.

It is also pertinent to note that an order merely directing the issuance of notice to the defendants on an injunction application, without either granting or refusing the injunction, is generally not considered an appealable order under Order XLIII, Rule 1(r) CPC. Such an order does not amount to an 'order' within the meaning of Section 2(14) CPC as no part of the case or proceeding is disposed of (Nanda Roy & Ors. v. Gynanidhi Trust & Ors., Calcutta High Court, 2015; Sajjan Kumar Tharad & Anr. v. Deoris Marbaniang, Gauhati High Court, 2010; Purna Chandra Digal, Orissa High Court, 1991).

Observations are Tentative

It is a well-established principle that any observations made by the court at the stage of deciding an application for temporary injunction are tentative and based on a prima facie view of the matter. Such observations do not bind the court at the final hearing of the suit, which is decided on the merits after a full trial and adduction of evidence (Dalpat Kumar And Another v. Prahlad Singh And Others, 1992 SCC 1 719; Punam Laroia v. Sanjeev Laroia, Delhi High Court, 2004).

Inherent Powers (Section 151 CPC) and Injunctions

While Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 are specific provisions for temporary injunctions, courts also possess inherent powers under Section 151 CPC to issue injunctions in circumstances not covered by Order XXXIX, if the interests of justice so require. The Supreme Court in Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bhadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal (AIR 1962 SC 527), as referenced in SWAPAN MALAKAR v. PUSHPA MAJUMDER AND ORS (Calcutta High Court, 2024), affirmed this inherent jurisdiction. However, if an application is specifically made under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2, the mere addition of Section 151 CPC does not oust the applicability of Order XXXIX or the appealability of orders passed thereunder (Prabhu Narain Khati And Anr. v. Daulat Ram Verma, Rajasthan High Court, 1987).

Specific Applications and Considerations

Injunctions against Unauthorized Constructions

In cases involving alleged unauthorized constructions, courts are generally cautious. The Supreme Court in Seema Arshad Zaheer And Others v. Municipal Corpn. Of Greater Mumbai And Others (2006 SCC 5 282) emphasized that judicial discretion should not be exercised to perpetuate illegality. If petitioners fail to establish a prima facie case that structures were authorized or pre-existing as per relevant regulations, temporary injunctions restraining demolition are unlikely to be granted, as this would undermine municipal laws.

Enforcement of Negative Covenants

Temporary injunctions are often sought to enforce negative covenants in agreements, particularly in commercial contracts like franchise agreements. The Supreme Court in Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. And Others v. Coca Cola Co. And Others (1995 SCC 5 545) upheld an interim injunction to enforce a negative covenant, finding that such a covenant, operative during the period of the agreement, was not in restraint of trade under Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. The usual tripartite test for injunctions applies in such cases.

Distinction from Other Provisions

Order XXXIX contains other rules dealing with interlocutory orders. For instance, Rules 6, 7, and 8 deal with interim sale of movable property, detention, preservation, and inspection of subject matter of the suit. These provisions, while part of the same Order, serve distinct purposes and have their own procedural requirements, such as the mandate for notice under Order XXXIX, Rule 8(3) before making orders under Rule 6 or 7, unless the object would be defeated by delay (Vij Kamagar Sahakari Paisanstha Limited v. Ramkrushna Dhondiram Thorat & Ors, Bombay High Court, 2008). It is also important to distinguish proceedings under Order XXXIX from those under other orders, such as Order IX (Appearance of Parties and Consequence of Non-appearance) (Sankara Pillai v. Balakrishnan Nair, Kerala High Court, 1988). For example, the provisions of Order IX, Rule 13 CPC (setting aside ex-parte decree) do not apply to proceedings under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 (Mididodi Saraswathi And Another v. Mandal Revenue Officer, Andhra Pradesh High Court, 2004). Similarly, Order XIX CPC, dealing with evidence by affidavits, has its own scope and applicability distinct from the substantive grant of injunctions (Ram Ekwal Thakur v. State Of Bihar And Others, Patna High Court, 1993).

Conclusion

Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, provide a robust mechanism for granting temporary injunctions, a vital tool for preserving the rights of litigants and ensuring the efficacy of the judicial process. The application of these rules is guided by the well-entrenched principles of prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury. Judicial discretion plays a paramount role, requiring a careful balancing of competing interests and adherence to legal principles. The procedural safeguards, including provisions for notice and appellate review, aim to ensure fairness and prevent abuse. The jurisprudence evolved through various judicial pronouncements, including those discussed herein, consistently underscores the judiciary's commitment to exercising this power judiciously to uphold justice and equity, ensuring that the relief serves its intended purpose of preventing further harm while the substantive rights are adjudicated.