Mandatory Nature of Referral

The Supreme Court in Gundaji Satwaji Shinde v. Ramchandra Bhikaji Joshi (1979 SCC 2 495) unequivocally affirmed the mandatory nature of Section 85A. In this case, the plaintiff sought specific performance of a contract for the sale of agricultural land. The defendant contended that the plaintiff was not an agriculturist, and thus, the sale was barred by Section 63 of the BTAL Act. The question of whether the plaintiff was an "agriculturist" (defined under Section 2(2)) was an issue to be decided by the Mamlatdar under Section 70(a). The Supreme Court held that the Civil Courts (trial court and High Court) erred in deciding this issue themselves and were obligated under Section 85A to refer it to the Mamlatdar. The judgment emphasized that the combined effect of Sections 70, 85, and 85A is that where such an issue arises in a civil suit, "the jurisdiction of the civil court to settle, decide or deal with the same is not only ousted, but the civil court is under a statutory obligation to refer the issue to the competent authority."

This principle was reiterated in SHRI DATTATRAY GANPATRAO SURVE v. HEERABEN D/O DECEASED BHAGVANBHAI M PATEL (2022 GUJ HC), which further clarified, citing Joshi Chaganlal Garbaddas v. Raising Khodasing (1986 1 GLR 69), that the Civil Court cannot insist that a party must first establish a prima facie case in support of its tenancy plea before making a reference. Once the issue is framed based on pleadings, referral is mandated.

Binding Nature of Tenancy Authority's Decision

The Bombay High Court in Bapu Sitaram Adsule v. Appa Mhadgonda Patil (1973 SCC ONLINE BOM 88) dealt with the consequence of a reference. It held that once a Civil Court raises an issue and refers it to the tenancy court under Section 85A, the tenancy court is bound to determine that issue. The tenancy authority cannot then claim it has no jurisdiction to decide the referred issue. The Court reasoned that a contrary interpretation could lead to an absurd situation where neither the Civil Court nor the tenancy court would be competent to decide the issue. This ensures finality and prevents a jurisdictional vacuum. The Civil Court, upon receiving the decision, must dispose of the suit "in accordance with" that decision, highlighting its binding nature on the specific issue referred.

"Competent Authority" and Appellate Process

A practical question that arose was whether the "decision" of the competent authority referred to in Section 85A(2) meant only the initial decision of the Mamlatdar or included decisions from the appellate/revisional hierarchy under the BTAL Act. The Gujarat High Court in Baroda Borough Municipality v. Soma Bhaiji (1967 ILR GUJ 882) addressed this. It was held that the Civil Court is bound to stay the suit until the *final* decision of the competent authority, which includes the decisions of appellate authorities like the Collector or the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal. The Court reasoned that if the Civil Court proceeded after the Mamlatdar's decision, and that decision was later overturned on appeal, it would lead to complications. Thus, the stay should continue until the issue is conclusively determined within the tenancy adjudication system.

Scope of Issues Referable

The issues referable under Section 85A are those "required to be settled, decided or dealt with" by authorities under the BTAL Act, primarily detailed in Section 70. This includes determining if a person is an agriculturist, a tenant (present or past, as amendments to Section 70 clarified – see PANDURANG RAMCHANDRA MANDLIK), protected tenant, or permanent tenant.

The case of Alimiya Mirumiya Saiyed v. Kasai Mohmedhusen Ibrahim (1974 GUJ HC), referencing the Supreme Court's decision in Mussamiya Imam Haider Bax Razvi v. Rabari Govindhai Ratnabhai (1969 SC 439), illustrates how the interpretation of what constitutes a referable issue (particularly concerning past tenancy) can evolve with judicial pronouncements and statutory amendments. In *Alimiya Mirumiya*, the Deputy Collector had held a reference incompetent based on *Musamia*, which had clarified the scope of Section 70(b) at the time. The Gujarat Revenue Tribunal modified this, directing the Mamlatdar to return the reference unanswered, indicating that the Civil Court would then have to proceed based on the understanding that the specific issue, as framed, might not be decidable by the Mamlatdar post-*Musamia*. This underscores the importance of correctly identifying whether an issue truly falls within the exclusive domain of the tenancy authorities.

When Section 85A is Not Attracted

Section 85A is triggered when an issue within the exclusive competence of tenancy authorities arises in a suit otherwise cognizable by the Civil Court. However, if the plaint itself, on its face, discloses a cause of action or seeks relief that is entirely barred by Section 85 of the BTAL Act (e.g., a landlord directly suing a tenant for possession in Civil Court on grounds covered by the Act), the suit may be dismissed for want of jurisdiction without invoking Section 85A.

Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Abdulla Bin Ali And Others v. Galappa And Others (1985 SCC 2 54) clarified that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is determined by the allegations in the plaint. In that case, the suit was for possession based on a registered sale deed (title). The defendants pleaded tenancy. The High Court had held the Civil Court lacked jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed, stating that the suit, as framed by the plaintiffs based on title, was cognizable by the Civil Court. If a plea of tenancy was raised, then the issue of tenancy would need to be referred under the relevant tenancy law (in that case, Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950, which had similar provisions). This implies that the mere raising of a tenancy plea does not automatically oust the Civil Court's jurisdiction over the entire suit from its inception if the suit is primarily based on other grounds, but it does trigger the referral mechanism for the specific tenancy issue.

Cases involving exemptions under the BTAL Act (e.g., Sections 88, 88A, 88B, 88C, as discussed in Shrimant Jagdeorao Anandrao Pawar v. Kisan Namdeo Pawar And Others (Bombay High Court, 1979) and Ishverlal Thakorelal Almaula v. Motibhai Nagjibhai (Supreme Court Of India, 1965)) also present complexities. If the core issue is whether the land is exempt, and the Act provides a specific mechanism for determining that exemption (e.g., a certificate under S.88B(2) or S.88C), then the procedure under S.85A might be modulated by or give way to that specific mechanism for the exemption question.

Applicability to Execution Proceedings

The question of whether "suit" in Section 85A includes execution proceedings is complex. Generally, an executing court cannot go behind the decree. However, if the decree itself is challenged as a nullity because the Civil Court decided a tenancy issue that it ought to have referred under Section 85A, then the executing court might have to consider this. The Supreme Court in Noor Mohd. Khan Ghouse Khan Soudagar v. Fakirappa Bharmappa Machenahalli And Others (1978 SCC 3 188), while dealing with Section 133 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act (which has similarities to S.85A regarding referral of issues to the Tribunal), noted that Section 133 pertained primarily to "suits" and its applicability to execution proceedings required careful statutory interpretation.

The Bombay High Court in Ratanchand Balaram Shaha v. Jijabai Shetgonda Nana Patil (1972 BOM HC) discussed the equivalent Section 125 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act, 1958. The court considered arguments on whether "suit" should be given a restricted meaning or a wider one to include execution proceedings, referencing Section 124 (bar of jurisdiction, similar to BTAL Act's S.85). The primary aim of S.85A is to ensure correct adjudication *during the suit stage* to prevent decrees that are void for lack of jurisdiction on specific tenancy issues.

Analogous Application of the Principle

The procedural wisdom embodied in Section 85A has been judicially recognized to such an extent that its principles have been applied analogously even to statutes lacking an explicit provision for referral. In Koli Sona Deva Deceased By His Heirs Koli Hasur Sona And Ors. v. Shah Somalal Mathurdas (1967 GLR 8 297), the Gujarat High Court, dealing with the Bombay Merged Territories and Areas (Jagirs Abolition) Act, 1953, which made the State Government's decision on "permanent holder" status final but lacked a specific referral section like 85A, adopted the S.85A procedure. The Court observed that the proper procedure would be to stay the suit and direct the party to obtain a decision from the competent authority, rather than dismissing the suit outright. This underscores the judicial endorsement of the referral mechanism as a fair and effective way to handle jurisdictional overlaps.