Analysis of Section 8(1)(g) of the RTI Act, 2005

Guarding Life, Safety, and Confidential Sources: An Analysis of Section 8(1)(g) of the Right to Information Act, 2005

Introduction

The Right to Information Act, 2005 (hereinafter "RTI Act") heralded a paradigm shift in Indian governance, empowering citizens with the ability to access information held by public authorities, thereby fostering transparency and accountability. However, this right is not absolute and is subject to certain reasonable restrictions enumerated in Section 8 of the Act. Among these, Section 8(1)(g) carves out a crucial exemption aimed at protecting individuals and sensitive law enforcement information. This provision exempts from disclosure information that would endanger the life or physical safety of any person or identify the source of information or assistance given in confidence for law enforcement or security purposes.

This article undertakes a scholarly analysis of Section 8(1)(g) of the RTI Act, examining its legislative intent, judicial interpretation, and practical application. Drawing upon key pronouncements of the Supreme Court of India, various High Courts, and decisions of the Central Information Commission (CIC), this paper seeks to delineate the contours of this exemption, its absolute nature, and the balance it strikes between the public interest in disclosure and the imperative of safeguarding individuals and confidential sources. The analysis will particularly focus on the "endangerment" clause, which has been frequently invoked in contexts such as public examinations and selection processes.

The Legislative Mandate: Section 8(1)(g) of the RTI Act, 2005

Section 8(1) of the RTI Act begins with a non-obstante clause, "Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act," signifying its overriding effect over other provisions of the Act that mandate disclosure (Poorna Prajna Public School Petitioner. v. Central Information Commission & Others S, Delhi High Court, 2009). This underscores the legislative emphasis on the sanctity of the exemptions provided therein. Section 8(1)(g) specifically states that there shall be no obligation to give any citizen:

"information, the disclosure of which would endanger the life or physical safety of any person or identify the source of information or assistance given in confidence for law enforcement or security purposes;"

This clause has two distinct prongs:

  1. Disclosure that would endanger the life or physical safety of any person.
  2. Disclosure that would identify the source of information or assistance given in confidence for law enforcement or security purposes.

The Madras High Court in Er.T.K.Kumar v. The Tamil Nadu Information (Madras High Court, 2023) clarified that clauses (a), (b), (c), (f), (g), and (h) to sub-section (1) of Section 8 provide an absolute exemption from the obligation of disclosure. Unlike qualified exemptions such as those under Section 8(1)(d) or 8(1)(j), Section 8(1)(g) does not contain a proviso allowing disclosure in the "larger public interest." This absolute nature signifies the high degree of protection the legislature intended to afford under this clause.

Judicial Interpretation and Application of Section 8(1)(g)

The judiciary has played a significant role in interpreting the scope and application of Section 8(1)(g), particularly the "endangerment to life or physical safety" aspect.

Protection of Examiners, Interviewers, and Officials in Sensitive Processes

A seminal pronouncement on this aspect is Bihar Public Service Commission v. Saiyed Hussain Abbas Rizwi And Another (2012 SCC 13 61, Supreme Court Of India, 2012). The Supreme Court was tasked with determining whether the Bihar Public Service Commission (BPSC) was obligated to disclose the names and addresses of its Interview Board members. The Court, setting aside the High Court's judgment, held that such information was exempt under Section 8(1)(g). It reasoned that "The disclosure of names and addresses of the members of the Interview Board would ex facie endanger their lives or physical safety. The possibility of a failed candidate attempting to take revenge from such persons cannot be ruled out." (Bihar Public Service Commission v. Saiyed Hussain Abbas Rizwi, 2012 SCC 13 61). The Court further observed that such disclosure would serve no fruitful public purpose and that transparency in selection processes does not extend to revealing individual names of interviewers, which is relatable to their safety and effective discharge of duties.

This principle was earlier echoed in Central Board Of Secondary Education & Anr. v. Aditya Bandopadhyay & Ors. (2011 SCC 8 497, Supreme Court Of India, 2011). While primarily dealing with access to evaluated answer-books and the fiduciary exemption under Section 8(1)(e), the Supreme Court acknowledged the need to protect examiners. It stated that information as to the names or particulars of examiners, coordinators, scrutinizers, or head examiners is exempted from disclosure under Section 8(1)(g) because "if such information is disclosed, it may endanger their physical safety." Consequently, access to answer-books should be given only to the non-exempted part, with details identifying examiners severed under Section 10 of the RTI Act (CBSE v. Aditya Bandopadhyay, 2011 SCC 8 497, as quoted in Bihar Public Service Commission v. Saiyed Hussain Abbas Rizwi, 2012 SCC 13 61 and Amit Kumar Srivastava v. CPIO, IGNOU, CIC, 2018).

Central Information Commission (CIC) decisions have consistently applied this ratio. For instance, in Krishna Kumar R v. Cpio (Central Information Commission, 2019) and Amit Kumar Srivastava v. Central Public Information Officer, Ignou (Central Information Commission, 2018), the CIC upheld the denial of information related to examiners, citing CBSE v. Aditya Bandopadhyay and the exemption under Section 8(1)(g). Similarly, in P MALINI v. National Institute of Technology, Puducherry (Central Information Commission, 2025 [sic, likely an earlier year]), the CPIO denied lists of scrutinizing and selection committee members citing Section 8(1)(g) and 8(1)(e).

Scope of "Endangerment" and Burden of Proof

The term "endanger" implies a potential for harm. The apprehension of danger must be reasonable and not merely speculative. In Raghunath Rath v. Cpio, Punjab National Bank (2018 SCC ONLINE CIC 7672, Central Information Commission, 2018), the CPIO claimed exemption under Section 8(1)(g) for a sketch map, arguing its disclosure would endanger the life and physical safety of officers dealing with such matters due to references to vital information. While the CIC's decision focused on other points, this illustrates the types of information for which such claims are made.

However, the exemption cannot be invoked casually. The Delhi High Court in Union Of India v. R.S Khan (2010 SCC ONLINE DEL 3566, Delhi High Court, 2010) dealt with a case where the Controller General of Defence Accounts (CGDA) denied access to notings in a disciplinary proceeding file, citing, inter alia, Section 8(1)(g) on the grounds that disclosure "might antagonize the charged officer" and "lead to the danger of the life of the officials who have made those remarks." The CIC had rejected this, and the High Court upheld the CIC's decision, finding the reference to Section 8(1)(g) misplaced in that context. This suggests that a mere possibility of antagonism may not suffice; the endangerment must be more direct or probable concerning life or physical safety.

Although not directly on Section 8(1)(g), the Delhi High Court's reasoning in B.S Mathur v. Public Information Officer Of Delhi High Court (2011 SCC ONLINE DEL 2592, Delhi High Court, 2011) concerning Section 8(1)(h) (impeding investigation) is instructive. The Court emphasized that the onus is on the Public Information Officer (PIO) to demonstrate how disclosure would result in the harm stipulated in the exemption clause. A similar burden would lie on the PIO when invoking Section 8(1)(g) to show a credible threat to life or physical safety.

The "Confidential Source" Prong

The second limb of Section 8(1)(g) protects the identity of sources of information or assistance given in confidence for law enforcement or security purposes. This is vital for the effective functioning of law enforcement and security agencies, as individuals might be unwilling to provide crucial information if their identities are at risk of exposure. The provided reference materials focus more extensively on the "endangerment to life or physical safety" aspect. However, the principle remains that if disclosure of certain information would lead to the identification of a confidential informant or someone who assisted in a law enforcement or security matter under an assurance of confidentiality, such information is exempt. The rationale is to protect these sources from potential retribution and to ensure the continued flow of information necessary for maintaining law and order and national security.

Interplay with Other Exemptions and Provisions

Section 8(1)(g) is often invoked by PIOs, sometimes alongside other exemptions like Section 8(1)(e) (information available to a person in his fiduciary relationship) and Section 8(1)(j) (personal information). However, the Supreme Court in Bihar Public Service Commission v. Saiyed Hussain Abbas Rizwi (2012 SCC 13 61) specifically found that BPSC did not share a fiduciary relationship with interviewers, thereby negating Section 8(1)(e) as a ground in that specific context, while upholding the exemption under Section 8(1)(g).

As seen in CBSE v. Aditya Bandopadhyay (2011 SCC 8 497), Section 10 of the RTI Act, which provides for severability, plays a crucial role when applying Section 8(1)(g). If a part of the requested information falls under this exemption (e.g., names of examiners), while another part does not, the PIO is obligated to provide the non-exempt part after severing the exempt portion, provided it is reasonably feasible to do so.

The overarching principle, as stated in Poorna Prajna Public School (Delhi High Court, 2009), is that Section 8 is a complete code in itself. Information as defined in Section 2(f) must be furnished unless a case squarely falls under one of the clauses of Section 8(1).

Challenges and Considerations

While Section 8(1)(g) serves a vital protective function, certain challenges and considerations arise in its application:

  • Potential for Overuse: There is a potential for public authorities to broadly invoke this exemption without specific justification, merely to avoid disclosure. The requirement for the PIO to demonstrate a credible threat, as implicitly supported by judicial review, acts as a check.
  • Absolute Nature and Absence of Public Interest Override: As highlighted in Er.T.K.Kumar (Madras High Court, 2023), Section 8(1)(g) is an absolute exemption. Unlike sections like 8(1)(d), 8(1)(e), or 8(1)(j), there is no provision for disclosing information covered by 8(1)(g) even if a larger public interest warrants it. This underscores the paramount importance attached by the legislature to life, physical safety, and the protection of confidential law enforcement sources.
  • Balancing Act: While the exemption itself is absolute, the initial determination of whether disclosure *would* endanger life or identify a confidential source involves a careful assessment of facts and potential consequences. This inherently involves a balancing consideration by the PIO, subject to appeal. The general spirit of the RTI Act, which promotes transparency (Central Board Of Secondary Education & Anr. v. Aditya Bandopadhyay & Ors., Supreme Court Of India, 2011 – extract on Chapter II), must be kept in mind, ensuring exemptions are not applied mechanically.

Conclusion

Section 8(1)(g) of the Right to Information Act, 2005, serves as an indispensable safeguard within the transparency regime. It acknowledges that the right to information, while fundamental for democratic accountability, cannot extend to jeopardizing the life or physical safety of individuals or compromising the integrity of law enforcement and security operations by revealing confidential sources. The Supreme Court's interpretation in Bihar Public Service Commission v. Saiyed Hussain Abbas Rizwi and CBSE v. Aditya Bandopadhyay has firmly established the applicability of this exemption to protect identities of individuals involved in sensitive roles like examination and selection processes, where a tangible risk of harm can be perceived.

The absolute nature of this exemption, devoid of a public interest override, signifies the high premium placed on human safety and the operational efficacy of law enforcement. However, its application demands a careful and reasoned assessment by public authorities, ensuring that the claim of endangerment or identification of a confidential source is credible and not a pretext to withhold legitimate information. The continued vigilance of Information Commissions and the Judiciary is essential to maintain the delicate equilibrium between the citizen's right to know and the state's duty to protect, ensuring that Section 8(1)(g) fulfills its intended purpose without unduly constricting the flow of information vital for a transparent and accountable governance structure in India.

References

(Note: The following list is based on the primary reference materials provided and discussed. Full case citations are generally provided inline in the text.)