An Exposition of Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: Procedural Imperatives and Judicial Scrutiny in the Administration of Justice in India
Introduction
Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC)[11, 17, 18] stands as a critical provision aimed at safeguarding the sanctity of judicial proceedings and upholding the administration of justice in India. It outlines the procedure to be followed when a court is of the opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice to inquire into certain offences affecting the administration of justice, primarily those enumerated in Section 195(1)(b) of the CrPC.[18, 21] These offences typically include perjury, fabricating false evidence, and offences relating to documents given in evidence. This article undertakes a comprehensive analysis of Section 340 CrPC, delving into its statutory framework, the key legal principles enunciated by the judiciary, the nature and scope of the preliminary inquiry, and the overarching objective of this provision. It draws upon landmark pronouncements of the Supreme Court of India and various High Courts to elucidate the procedural nuances and the careful balance that courts must strike between preventing abuse of judicial process and ensuring that genuine offenders are brought to justice.
The Statutory Framework: Section 340 CrPC and its Interplay with Section 195 CrPC
Section 340 CrPC is not a standalone provision; its operation is intrinsically linked to Section 195 CrPC. Section 195(1)(b) CrPC bars a court from taking cognizance of certain offences—such as those under Sections 193 to 196, 199, 200, 205 to 211, and 228 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC), when such offence is alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any court, or any offence described in Section 463, or punishable under Section 471, Section 475 or Section 476 of the IPC, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any court—except on the complaint in writing of that court, or of some other court to which that court is subordinate.[16, 18, 21]
Section 340(1) CrPC lays down the procedure for making such a complaint. It states:
"When upon an application made to it in this behalf or otherwise, any Court is of opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice that an inquiry should be made into any offence referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 195, which appears to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding in that Court or, as the case may be, in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in that Court, such Court may, after such preliminary inquiry, if any, as it thinks necessary,— (a) record a finding to that effect; (b) make a complaint thereof in writing; (c) send it to a Magistrate of the first class having jurisdiction; (d) take sufficient security for the appearance of the accused before such Magistrate, or if the alleged offence is non-bailable and the Court thinks it necessary so to do, send the accused in custody to such Magistrate; and (e) bind over any person to appear and give evidence before such Magistrate."[11, 17]The provision can be invoked by any court, be it civil, criminal, or a tribunal, where the alleged offence has occurred.[13] The proceedings under Section 340 CrPC are considered independent of the original case in relation to which the offence is alleged.[12]
Key Principles Governing the Application of Section 340 CrPC
Judicial interpretation has crystallized several key principles that govern the invocation and application of Section 340 CrPC.
Expediency in the Interests of Justice
The foremost consideration for a court acting under Section 340 CrPC is whether it is "expedient in the interests of justice" to initiate an inquiry.[1, 19] This is not a mere formality but a substantive requirement demanding careful judicial application. The Supreme Court in Amarsang Nathaji v. Hardik Harshadbhai Patel[1] emphasized that the court must determine the expediency of filing a complaint, focusing on the impact on the administration of justice rather than the magnitude of personal injury, a principle also highlighted in Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah.[1, 8] The court is not bound to lodge a complaint in every case where an offence appears to have been committed; it must consider the overall circumstances, including the minimal effect of the alleged falsehood on the administration of justice.[18] The power should be used with utmost care and after due consideration.[3, 19] As observed in K. Karunakaran v. T.V Eachara Warrier[4, 19], expediency is one of the two preconditions, the other being a prima facie case.
Preliminary Inquiry: Nature and Scope
Section 340(1) CrPC empowers the court to conduct a "preliminary inquiry, if any, as it thinks necessary." The use of the words "if any" signifies that such an inquiry is not mandatory but discretionary.[1, 12] The purpose of this inquiry is to ascertain whether a prima facie case is made out for an offence referred to in Section 195(1)(b) CrPC and whether it is expedient to proceed further.[1, 6]
A significant question that has arisen is whether the person against whom proceedings are contemplated has a right to be heard during this preliminary inquiry. The Supreme Court in Pritish v. State of Maharashtra[1, 6, 27] clarified that Section 340 CrPC does not mandate a prior hearing for the prospective accused before the court decides to make a complaint. The Court reasoned that the preliminary inquiry is not a trial, and the accused gets a full opportunity to defend themselves once the complaint is filed before the Magistrate.[6] This view reinforces that the focus of the preliminary inquiry is on the court's satisfaction regarding the expediency of prosecution. However, some High Courts have suggested that, in accordance with principles of natural justice, the accused should be issued a show-cause notice to afford a reasonable opportunity.[12] The Bombay High Court in Union Of India v. Haresh Virumal Milani[10] also framed an issue regarding the obligation to give an audience at this stage. Despite the Supreme Court's clear stance in Pritish, the practice may vary, and providing an opportunity, though not statutorily mandated, might align with broader principles of fairness, especially if the court is delving deep into factual assessments.
Prima Facie Case
Before making a complaint, the court must be satisfied that a prima facie case exists for the commission of the alleged offence.[1, 4, 13, 19] This means the materials on record should establish a sufficient basis to presume that an offence under the relevant sections has been committed.[1] The court should refrain from making definitive findings on guilt or innocence at this stage; the inquiry is only to see if there is a reasonable likelihood of establishing the specified offence if unrebutted.[6, 19] Mere contradictory statements or discrepancies may not suffice; there must be evidence of intentional falsehood or fabrication.[1, 3]
Offences Covered: Focus on Perjury and Forgery
The offences typically attracting Section 340 CrPC include giving false evidence (Sections 193, 199, 200 IPC) and forgery of documents used in evidence (Sections 463, 471 IPC).[1, 15, 16] For perjury, the Supreme Court in Chajoo Ram v. Radhey Shyam[3, 7] emphasized that prosecution requires clear evidence of deliberate falsehood with an intention to deceive. Mere inaccuracies in an affidavit, without such intent, are insufficient.[3]
Forgery of Documents: "In Custodia Legis" v. Pre-Court Forgery
A crucial distinction has been drawn by the Supreme Court concerning offences of forgery under Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC. In Sachida Nand Singh v. State of Bihar[5, 8], and affirmed by a Constitution Bench in Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah[1, 8], the Court held that the bar on taking cognizance without a court complaint applies only when the document is forged *after* it has been produced or given in evidence in court (i.e., when it is "in custodia legis"). If the forgery was committed *before* the document was produced in court, the bar under Section 195(1)(b)(ii) does not apply, and a private complaint is maintainable.[5, 8, 16] This interpretation prevents the misuse of Section 195 by offenders who might introduce a pre-forged document into court proceedings to shield themselves from private prosecution.[5, 8] The Kerala High Court in A.V. John v. Ashraf @ Raveendran[16] reiterated this principle, stating that Section 340 does not apply if the allegation is not that forgery was committed after its production in court.
Procedural Safeguards and Natural Justice
While the preliminary inquiry stage under Section 340 CrPC might not mandate a hearing for the prospective accused as per Pritish[6], the overall process must adhere to procedural fairness. The Supreme Court in M.S Ahlawat v. State of Haryana[7] underscored the importance of adhering to statutory procedures, holding that even the Supreme Court cannot bypass the requirements of Sections 195 and 340 CrPC when dealing with offences like perjury. The Court emphasized that these procedures are mandatory and protect the right to a fair trial under Article 21 of the Constitution.[7] Once a complaint is filed by the court, the Magistrate proceeds with the trial where the accused is afforded all rights of defence.[6]
Application to Different Courts and Proceedings
Section 340 CrPC can be invoked by any "Court," which includes Civil Courts, Criminal Courts, and Revenue Courts or Tribunals.[13] The nature of the jurisdiction exercised by the court making the complaint (e.g., civil or criminal) can influence the appellate forum under Section 341 CrPC. For instance, an appeal from an order under Section 340 by a Munsiff's Court (a civil court) would lie to the District Court, whereas an appeal from such an order by a Chief Judicial Magistrate would lie to the Sessions Court.[13, 24]
Analysis of Judicial Pronouncements
The reference materials provide a rich tapestry of judicial thought on Section 340 CrPC.
Amarsang Nathaji[1] serves as a modern reiteration of the stringent procedural requirements: a prima facie case, expediency in the interest of justice, and adherence to procedural norms, including a potential preliminary inquiry and a written complaint. It underscores the provision's role in preventing arbitrary complaints and protecting individuals from harassment.
Pritish v. State of Maharashtra[6] is seminal in clarifying that the preliminary inquiry stage does not necessitate hearing the prospective accused. The Court balanced procedural efficiency with natural justice by noting that the accused's rights are fully protected during the subsequent trial by the Magistrate. This ensures that the preliminary stage remains focused on the court's satisfaction rather than becoming a mini-trial.
The decisions in Sachida Nand Singh[5] and Iqbal Singh Marwah[8] have critically shaped the law on forgery. By limiting the bar of Section 195(1)(b)(ii) to documents forged *after* their introduction in court, the Supreme Court prevented a significant loophole that could have been exploited to stifle genuine prosecutions for forgery committed outside the court's immediate purview but later brought into proceedings.
Chajoo Ram[3] and K. Karunakaran[4] highlight the substantive elements for perjury: deliberate intent to deceive and the formation of a prima facie opinion by the court about both the commission of the offence and the expediency of prosecution. These cases emphasize that mere falsehood or discrepancy is not enough; a culpable state of mind and a significant impact on justice are necessary.
N. Natarajan v. B.K Subba Rao[9] provides an important perspective on the application of Section 340 CrPC to public prosecutors. The Supreme Court cautioned against an overzealous application that could impede the fearless discharge of duties by prosecutors, thereby protecting them from vexatious litigation stemming from their conduct in court, unless it clearly amounts to an offence affecting the administration of justice.
M.S Ahlawat[7] is a strong reminder from the apex court itself about the indispensability of the procedure under Sections 195 and 340 CrPC, reinforcing that no court, however high, can bypass these statutory safeguards when dealing with the specified offences.
High Court decisions, such as those from Bombay[10, 20, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27], Delhi[13, 21, 28], Orissa[12], Kerala[16, 17, 24], Allahabad[18], and Calcutta[15, 19], reflect the application of these Supreme Court principles. They discuss issues like the registration of Section 340 applications,[22] the right of strangers to apply,[20, 25] the nature of the inquiry,[10, 23] and the appellate process.[13, 24]
The Objective and Caution in Invoking Section 340 CrPC
The fundamental objective of Section 340 CrPC is to preserve the purity of judicial proceedings and ensure that the stream of justice is not polluted by offences like perjury or the use of forged documents.[3, 27] However, this power is not meant to be a tool for private vengeance or harassment.[1, 9] Courts are repeatedly cautioned to exercise this power with utmost care and circumspection, only when it is genuinely "expedient in the interests of justice."[1, 3, 19] The provision aims to address serious attempts to subvert justice, not trivial errors or inconsequential falsehoods.[18] The Orissa High Court in Laxminarayan Deepak Ranjan Das[12] noted that the legislative intent was to simplify the procedure and ensure that only cases where courts, on objective consideration, form an honest belief that prosecution is required in the interest of justice, should proceed.
Conclusion
Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, is a vital instrument in the hands of the courts to uphold the majesty of law and the integrity of the judicial process. The judiciary, through a series of pronouncements, has meticulously delineated the procedural contours and substantive considerations that must guide its application. The emphasis on "expediency in the interests of justice," the establishment of a prima facie case, and the careful, albeit discretionary, conduct of a preliminary inquiry are central to its operation. While ensuring that those who attempt to defile the course of justice are brought to book, the courts must also remain vigilant against the misuse of this provision for collateral purposes. The nuanced interpretation, particularly concerning the timing of forgery and the rights of the prospective accused at the preliminary stage, reflects a judicial commitment to balancing the imperatives of justice with the principles of procedural fairness. Ultimately, the judicious and cautious application of Section 340 CrPC is essential for maintaining public confidence in the administration of justice in India.
References
- [1] Amarsang Nathaji As Himself And As Karta And Manager v. Hardik Harshadbhai Patel And Others (2017 SCC 1 113, Supreme Court Of India, 2016)
- [2] Sharad Pawar v. Jagmohan Dalmiya And Others (2013 SCC CR 2 197, Supreme Court Of India, 2010)
- [3] Chajoo Ram v. Radhey Shyam And Another (1971 SCC 1 774, Supreme Court Of India, 1971)
- [4] K. Karunakaran v. T.V Eachara Warrier And Another (1978 SCC 1 18, Supreme Court Of India, 1977)
- [5] Sachida Nand Singh And Another v. State Of Bihar And Another (1998 SCC CRI 660, Supreme Court Of India, 1998)
- [6] Pritish v. State Of Maharashtra And Others (2002 SCC 1 253, Supreme Court Of India, 2001)
- [7] M.S Ahlawat v. State Of Haryana And Another (2000 SCC 1 278, Supreme Court Of India, 1999)
- [8] Iqbal Singh Marwah And Another v. Meenakshi Marwah And Another (2005 SCC 4 370, Supreme Court Of India, 2005)
- [9] N. Natarajan v. B.K Subba Rao . (2003 SCC CRI 437, Supreme Court Of India, 2002)
- [10] Union Of India And Others Petitioners. v. Haresh Virumal Milani . (Bombay High Court, 2017)
- [11] Narendra Kumar Srivastava v. State Of Bihar And Others (Supreme Court Of India, 2019)
- [12] Laxminarayan Deepak Ranjan Das v. K.K Jha And Others (Orissa High Court, 1999)
- [13] Weizmann Ltd. v. Shoes East Ltd. & Ors. (Delhi High Court, 2013)
- [14] K. Vidyanand v. Erramma And Another (Andhra Pradesh High Court, 1961)
- [15] KAMAKHYA SINGHDEO v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ANR (Calcutta High Court, 2023)
- [16] A.V.JOHN, v. ASHRAF @ RAVEENDRAN (Kerala High Court, 2023)
- [17] Jose John v. K.C Kuruvilla & Others (Kerala High Court, 1995)
- [18] Rajesh Manchanda v. State Of Uttar Pradesh (Allahabad High Court, 2017)
- [19] PROCHY N. MEHTA AND ORS v. RUSTOM E DAROGA AND ORS (Calcutta High Court, 2023)
- [20] Madhukar Vishwanath Sonawane v. State Of Maharashtra (2001 SCC ONLINE BOM 988, Bombay High Court, 2001)
- [21] Gulshan Sethi & Ors. Petitioners v. Government Of Nct Of Delhi & Ors. S (2015 SCC ONLINE DEL 11073, Delhi High Court, 2015)
- [22] Kenneth Desa S/O Late John Desa Another v. Gopal S/O Leeladhar Narang (2007 ALLMR CRI 2281, Bombay High Court, 2007)
- [23] Pritish Ramrao Tayde And Another v. State Of Maharashtra And Others (2000 SCC ONLINE BOM 789, Bombay High Court, 2000)
- [24] Rocky v. Pavunni . (2014 SCC ONLINE KER 25961, Kerala High Court, 2014)
- [25] Madhukar Vishwanath Sonawane…Applicant; v. State Of Maharashtra And Others…Non-Applicants. (Bombay High Court, 2001) - (First instance from provided text)
- [26] Madhukar Vishwanath Sonawane…Applicant; v. State Of Maharashtra And Others…Non-Applicants. (Bombay High Court, 2001) - (Second instance from provided text, noting different arguments)
- [27] J.I.K. Industries Co. Ltd. v. Maruti Nashik Mene (Bombay High Court, 2017)
- [28] Abdul Mueed & Ors…. S v. Hammad Ahmed S (Delhi High Court, 2010)