Analysis of Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955

Permanent Alimony and Maintenance under Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955: A Judicial Exposition

Introduction

Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (HMA) stands as a cornerstone of matrimonial law in India, providing a statutory framework for the grant of permanent alimony and maintenance to either spouse upon the disturbance or dissolution of marital ties. This provision empowers courts exercising jurisdiction under the HMA to make financial arrangements intended to support a spouse who may be economically disadvantaged as a consequence of matrimonial proceedings. The legislative intent underpinning Section 25 is not merely to provide sustenance but to ensure a semblance of the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage, contingent upon various factors including the means of the parties and their conduct. This article undertakes a comprehensive analysis of Section 25, delving into its statutory contours, judicial interpretations of its key phrases, the factors influencing the quantum of maintenance, conditions for its grant and cessation, and its interplay with other maintenance laws in India. The analysis draws significantly from landmark pronouncements of the Supreme Court and various High Courts, which have shaped the contemporary understanding and application of this vital provision.

The Statutory Framework of Section 25, Hindu Marriage Act, 1955

Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, provides for permanent alimony and maintenance. The text of the section, as elucidated in various judicial pronouncements, is pivotal for understanding its scope.[1]

Section 25 states:

“(1) Any court exercising jurisdiction under this Act may, at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto, on application made to it for the purpose by either the wife or the husband, as the case may be, order that the respondent shall, while the applicant remains unmarried, pay to the applicant for her or his maintenance and support such gross sum or such monthly or periodical sum for a term not exceeding the life of the applicant as, having regard to the respondent's own income and other property, if any, the income and other property of the applicant and the conduct of the parties and other circumstances of the case, it may seem to the court to be just, and any such payment may be secured, if necessary, by a charge on the immovable property of the respondent.

(2) If the court is satisfied that there is a change in the circumstances of either party at any time after it has made an order under sub-section (1), it may, at the instance of either party, vary, modify or rescind any such order in such manner as the court may deem just.

(3) If the court is satisfied that the party in whose favour an order has been made under this section has remarried or, if such party is the wife, that she has not remained chaste, or, if such party is the husband, that he has had sexual intercourse with any woman outside wedlock, it shall rescind the order.”[2]

Key elements discernible from the provision include:

  • Jurisdiction: Exercisable by a court having jurisdiction under the HMA.
  • Timing: Order can be made at the time of passing "any decree" or subsequent thereto.
  • Application: An application by either spouse is a prerequisite.[3]
  • Beneficiary: Either wife or husband.
  • Condition: Payable while the applicant remains unmarried.
  • Purpose: For maintenance and support.
  • Nature of Payment: Gross sum or monthly/periodical sum.
  • Duration: Not exceeding the life of the applicant.
  • Guiding Factors: Respondent's income/property, applicant's income/property, conduct of parties, and other circumstances.
  • Security: Payment can be secured by a charge on immovable property.
  • Modification (Sub-section 2): Orders can be varied, modified, or rescinded upon a change in circumstances.
  • Mandatory Rescission (Sub-section 3): On remarriage of the applicant, or if the wife is unchaste, or if the husband has sexual intercourse outside wedlock.[4]

Judicial Interpretation of "Any Decree"

The phrase "at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto" in Section 25(1) has been a subject of significant judicial scrutiny. The seminal pronouncement on this issue is Chand Dhawan (Smt) v. Jawaharlal Dhawan.[5] The Supreme Court clarified that "any decree" refers to decrees that affect or disrupt the marital status, such as those for restitution of conjugal rights (Section 9), judicial separation (Section 10), nullity of marriage (Sections 11 and 12), or divorce (Section 13). Consequently, if the main petition seeking such substantive relief is dismissed, the court cannot grant permanent alimony under Section 25 as no decree altering the marital status has been passed. The power to grant alimony under Section 25 is ancillary or incidental to the passing of such a substantive decree.[6] This interpretation was supported by earlier High Court rulings like Kadia Harilal Purshottam v. Kadia Lilavati Gokaldas[7] and Sushma v. Satish Chander,[8] which emphasized that decrees under Section 25 pertain to those affecting marital status. The Calcutta High Court in Minarani Majumdar v. Dasarath Majumdar[9] and the Bombay High Court in Bhausaheb v. Leelabai[10] also held that dismissal of a petition does not constitute "passing of any decree" for Section 25 purposes.

The Supreme Court in Rameshchandra Rampratapji Daga v. Rameshwari Rameshchandra Daga[11] further elaborated on this, affirming Chand Dhawan and holding that Section 25 encompasses decrees of nullity under Section 11. Thus, even if a marriage is declared null and void (e.g., for contravention of Section 5(i) HMA – bigamy), the court retains the power to grant maintenance to the financially dependent spouse. The Court emphasized that the legislative intent is to prevent destitution and provide financial support to a vulnerable spouse who underwent a marriage ceremony, irrespective of the marriage's ultimate legal validity. This principle was reiterated in Ajay Choubey v. Rekha Devi.[12]

Application for Maintenance: A Prerequisite

Section 25(1) explicitly states that an order for permanent alimony can be made "on application made to it for the purpose by either the wife or the husband." The Madhya Pradesh High Court in Mahesh Prasad v. Smt. Chhoti Bai[13] held that in the absence of such an application, the court has no jurisdiction to pass an order under Section 25. This aligns with the principles of natural justice, ensuring that the party against whom the claim is made is aware of the plea and has an opportunity to defend against it. The application can be filed during the pendency of the suit, and the court can dispose of it at the time of delivering the judgment on the main matrimonial cause, provided the conditions for invoking Section 25 are met.

Factors Guiding the Quantum of Maintenance

The determination of the quantum of maintenance under Section 25(1) is a discretionary exercise guided by several factors: "respondent's own income and other property, if any, the income and other property of the applicant and the conduct of the parties and other circumstances of the case."

In Dr Kulbhushan Kumar v. Smt Raj Kumari And Another,[14] the Supreme Court, while dealing with maintenance under the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 (HAMA), emphasized a holistic evaluation considering the financial status of the payer, the reasonable needs of the claimant, and other circumstances, rather than applying rigid percentage-based calculations. These principles are broadly applicable to Section 25 HMA.

The Supreme Court in Kalyan Dey Chowdhury v. Rita Dey Chowdhury Nee Nandy[15] (a case concerning enhancement under Section 25(2)) referenced Dr. Kulbhushan Kumar for the general guideline that maintenance should ideally not exceed 25% of the husband's net salary. However, the Court also considered the husband's increased income, the needs of the ex-wife and son (even if major but still a student), and the husband's subsequent remarriage and additional responsibilities, ultimately adopting a balanced approach. The Delhi High Court in Kusum Sharma v. Mahinder Kumar Sharma,[16] citing the Supreme Court in Vinny Parmvir Parmar, reiterated that no fixed formula can be laid down. The court must consider the status of the parties, their respective needs, the capacity of the husband to pay (having regard to his own maintenance and that of other dependents), and ensure the wife can live in reasonable comfort considering her status.

A significant development in standardizing the assessment of maintenance is the Supreme Court's judgment in Rajnesh v. Neha And Another.[17] The Court issued comprehensive guidelines, including the mandatory filing of an Affidavit of Disclosure of Assets and Liabilities by both parties in all maintenance proceedings. This aims to ensure transparency and enable a more informed and realistic determination of the quantum. The Court emphasized that the objective is to provide a fair assessment based on the true financial capacity of the parties.

The "conduct of the parties" is another crucial factor. While Section 25(3) provides for rescission based on specific conduct like unchastity or remarriage, the initial grant under Section 25(1) also allows the court to consider broader aspects of conduct. An older perspective from the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Dayal Singh v. Bhajan Kaur[18] suggested that even an unchaste wife might be entitled to a "starving allowance" unless she has her own income, referencing English case law and the Hindu law concept of maintaining a concubine. However, this must be read in conjunction with the explicit provisions of Section 25(3) regarding rescission for unchastity.

The Condition "While the Applicant Remains Unmarried"

Section 25(1) stipulates that the maintenance shall be paid "while the applicant remains unmarried." The Calcutta High Court in Minarani Majumdar v. Dasarath Majumdar[19] interpreted this to mean "while the applicant is not remarried." This condition is further reinforced by Section 25(3), which mandates the rescission of the maintenance order if the party in whose favour it was made has remarried.

Modification, Variation, or Rescission of Orders (Section 25(2) & (3))

Section 25(2) empowers the court to vary, modify, or rescind a maintenance order if there is a "change in the circumstances of either party" after the order was made. In Kalyan Dey Chowdhury v. Rita Dey Chowdhury Nee Nandy,[20] the Supreme Court dealt with an application for enhancement of maintenance under Section 25(2) due to the husband's increased salary, demonstrating the application of this sub-section. Similarly, in Harilal Sarkar v. Subhra Sarkar,[21] the Tripura High Court upheld the enhancement of maintenance that was initially fixed by a consent decree, recognizing that changed circumstances can warrant modification under Section 25(2) even for consent terms.

Section 25(3) provides for mandatory rescission of the maintenance order under specific circumstances: (i) if the party in whose favour the order was made has remarried; (ii) if such party is the wife, and she has not remained chaste; or (iii) if such party is the husband, and he has had sexual intercourse with any woman outside wedlock. The Bombay High Court in Arun Vamanrao Shastri v. Lina Arun Shastri[22] discussed the implications of this sub-section. The provision for rescission on grounds of unchastity of the wife is a stringent one and reflects a traditional view on marital fidelity as a continuing condition for maintenance, distinct from the initial assessment of conduct under Section 25(1).

Interplay with Other Maintenance Provisions

Parties in matrimonial disputes in India may have recourse to maintenance under various statutes, including Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC), the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (DV Act), and the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 (HAMA), in addition to Section 25 HMA. The Supreme Court in Rajnesh v. Neha And Another[23] addressed the issue of overlapping jurisdictions and the potential for multiple proceedings and orders. The Court mandated disclosure of any previous maintenance orders and directed that in subsequent proceedings, the court should consider any amounts already awarded under other statutes to avoid duplication and ensure an equitable overall award. The objective is to ensure that the aggrieved party receives adequate maintenance, but the paying spouse is not unduly burdened by multiple, uncoordinated orders.

The Bombay High Court in Panditrao Chimaji Kalure v. Gayabai Panditrao Kalure[24] observed that a petition for maintenance under Section 18 HAMA could be considered even under Section 25 HMA for a divorced wife, indicating a degree of flexibility in ensuring that a deserving claimant is not denied relief due to procedural technicalities. While Ram Awadh v. State Of U.P.[25] primarily discussed maintenance pendente lite under Section 24 HMA vis-à-vis Section 125 CrPC, it highlighted that these remedies operate in different spheres but can complement each other.

Scope of "Wife" for Section 25 Claims in Void Marriages

A significant jurisprudential development under Section 25 concerns the entitlement of a "wife" of a void marriage. As established in Rameshchandra Rampratapji Daga v. Rameshwari Rameshchandra Daga,[26] a woman whose marriage is declared null and void under Section 11 HMA (e.g., due to the husband having a spouse living at the time of the marriage, contravening Section 5(i) HMA[27]) can still claim maintenance under Section 25. The Supreme Court reasoned that the term "wife" in Section 25 should be interpreted broadly to include a woman who has undergone a marriage ceremony and entered into a marital relationship, even if that marriage is subsequently found to be void ab initio. This interpretation is rooted in social justice and aims to protect women from destitution after the annulment of such marriages, recognizing the societal realities and vulnerabilities involved. The conditions for a valid Hindu marriage are laid out in Section 5 HMA, and grounds for voidable marriages (which can be annulled by a decree of nullity) are in Section 12 HMA.[28]

Procedural Aspects and Enforcement

The procedural framework for seeking relief under Section 25 involves making an application to the court exercising jurisdiction under the HMA. The Supreme Court in Rajnesh v. Neha And Another[29] laid down guidelines not only for the assessment of maintenance but also for ensuring the timely disposal of maintenance applications and the effective enforcement of maintenance orders. This includes the use of standardized affidavits for disclosure of assets and liabilities. The Court emphasized the need for robust enforcement mechanisms to prevent defaulting spouses from evading their obligations.

Regarding consent decrees, the Gauhati High Court in Raju Sarkar v. Sabita Sarkar[30] observed that a divorce decree passed by mutual consent under Section 13B HMA does not automatically translate into an order under Section 25(1) unless maintenance or alimony was specifically claimed and granted as part of that decree or by a separate application. However, as seen in Harilal Sarkar, even consent terms regarding maintenance can be modified under Section 25(2) upon a change in circumstances.

Conclusion

Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, is a critical provision designed to provide financial security to a spouse whose marital status has been altered by a decree of the court. Judicial interpretations over the decades have significantly shaped its application. The Supreme Court's ruling in Chand Dhawan firmly established that an order under Section 25 is contingent upon a decree affecting marital status, while Rameshchandra Daga extended its protective umbrella to women in void marriages, reflecting a progressive and socially conscious approach. The courts are tasked with a delicate balancing act, weighing the needs of the applicant against the capacity of the respondent, considering their conduct and other relevant circumstances, without adhering to rigid formulae. The guidelines laid down in Rajnesh v. Neha represent a major step towards ensuring uniformity, transparency, and expediency in maintenance proceedings across India. Section 25 HMA continues to evolve through judicial interpretation, striving to achieve its underlying objective of preventing destitution and ensuring justice in the aftermath of matrimonial breakdowns, thereby upholding the socio-economic rights of the affected parties within the framework of family law.

References

  1. See Sachindra Nath Biswas v. Banamala Biswas & Anr. (Calcutta High Court, 1960) and Sushma v. Satish Chander . (Delhi High Court, 1983), which provide the text of Section 25.
  2. Arun Vamanrao Shastri v. Lina Arun Shastri (Gujarat High Court, 1972), detailing sub-sections (1), (2), and (3).
  3. Mahesh Prasad v. Smt. Chhoti Bai (Madhya Pradesh High Court, 2002).
  4. Arun Vamanrao Shastri v. Lina Arun Shastri (Gujarat High Court, 1972).
  5. Chand Dhawan (Smt) v. Jawaharlal Dhawan . (1993 SCC 3 406, Supreme Court Of India, 1993).
  6. Ajay Choubey v. Rekha Devi (2016 SCC ONLINE JHAR 3207, Jharkhand High Court, 2016), citing Chand Dhawan.
  7. Kadia Harilal Purshottam v. Kadia Lilavati Gokaldas . (Gujarat High Court, 1961).
  8. Sushma v. Satish Chander . (Delhi High Court, 1983).
  9. Minarani Majumdar v. Dasarath Majumdar Opposite Party. (Calcutta High Court, 1963).
  10. Bhausaheb v. Leelabai (Bombay High Court, 2006).
  11. Rameshchandra Rampratapji Daga v. Rameshwari Rameshchandra Daga . (2005 SCC 2 33, Supreme Court Of India, 2004).
  12. Ajay Choubey v. Rekha Devi (2016 SCC ONLINE JHAR 3207, Jharkhand High Court, 2016).
  13. Mahesh Prasad v. Smt. Chhoti Bai (Madhya Pradesh High Court, 2002).
  14. Dr Kulbhushan Kumar v. Smt Raj Kumari And Another (1970 SCC 3 129, Supreme Court Of India, 1970).
  15. Kalyan Dey Chowdhury v. Rita Dey Chowdhury Nee Nandy (2017 SCC ONLINE SC 440, Supreme Court Of India, 2017).
  16. Kusum Sharma v. Mahinder Kumar Sharma (Delhi High Court, 2014).
  17. Rajnesh v. Neha And Another (2021 SCC 2 324, Supreme Court Of India, 2020).
  18. Dayal Singh, . v. Bhajan Kaur, . (Punjab & Haryana High Court, 1971).
  19. Minarani Majumdar v. Dasarath Majumdar Opposite Party. (Calcutta High Court, 1963).
  20. Kalyan Dey Chowdhury v. Rita Dey Chowdhury Nee Nandy (2017 SCC ONLINE SC 440, Supreme Court Of India, 2017). Also see the version cited as Kalyan Dey Chowdhury v. Rita Dey Chowdhury Nee Nandy (2017 SCC ONLINE SC 440, Supreme Court Of India, 2017) (Reference Material 23, identical).
  21. Harilal Sarkar v. Subhra Sarkar (2016 SCC ONLINE TRI 356, Tripura High Court, 2016).
  22. Arun Vamanrao Shastri v. Lina Arun Shastri (Gujarat High Court, 1972).
  23. Rajnesh v. Neha And Another (2021 SCC 2 324, Supreme Court Of India, 2020).
  24. Panditrao Chimaji Kalure v. Gayabai Panditrao Kalure . (2001 SCC ONLINE BOM 165, Bombay High Court, 2001). Also cited as Panditrao Chimaji Kalure… v. Gayabai Panditrao Kalure…. (Bombay High Court, 2001) (Reference Material 25, identical).
  25. Ram Awadh v. State Of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. And Others (Allahabad High Court, 2019).
  26. Rameshchandra Rampratapji Daga v. Rameshwari Rameshchandra Daga . (2005 SCC 2 33, Supreme Court Of India, 2004).
  27. Parayankandiyal Eravath Kanapravan Kalliani Amma (Smt) And Others v. K. Devi And Others (Supreme Court Of India, 1996), which quotes Section 5 HMA.
  28. Sharda v. Dharmpal . (Supreme Court Of India, 2003), outlining Sections 5, 12(1)(b), and 13(1)(iii) HMA.
  29. Rajnesh v. Neha And Another (2021 SCC 2 324, Supreme Court Of India, 2020).
  30. Raju Sarkar v. Sabita Sarkar . (Gauhati High Court, 2017).

Additional Referenced Cases (Contextual/General Principles):