Analysis of Section 231 CrPC

The Jurisprudence of Witness Examination in Sessions Trials: An Analysis of Section 231 of the Code of Criminal Procedure

Introduction

Section 231 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) serves as the procedural linchpin for the presentation of evidence by the prosecution in a sessions trial. Situated within Chapter XVIII, which delineates the trial procedure before a Court of Session, this provision governs the manner in which prosecutorial evidence is adduced and tested. While sub-section (1) mandates the court to record all evidence produced in support of the prosecution, it is sub-section (2) that has been the subject of considerable judicial interpretation. This sub-section confers a discretionary power upon the trial judge to permit the deferral of a witness's cross-examination. This article undertakes a comprehensive analysis of Section 231 CrPC, examining its procedural mandate, the scope of judicial discretion it confers, and its interplay with the fundamental right to a fair trial. Drawing upon a catena of judicial pronouncements, particularly the authoritative ruling of the Supreme Court in State of Kerala v. Rasheed (2018), this analysis seeks to crystallize the principles governing the examination of prosecution witnesses and the circumscribed nature of the power to defer cross-examination.

The Procedural Framework of Section 231 CrPC

The trial before a Court of Session commences with the framing of charges under Section 228 CrPC. Once the accused pleads not guilty, the court proceeds to the stage of prosecution evidence, which is governed by Section 231. The section reads:

231. Evidence for prosecution.
(1) On the date so fixed, the Judge shall proceed to take all such evidence as may be produced in support of the prosecution.
(2) The Judge may, in his discretion, permit the cross-examination of any witness to be deferred until any other witness or witnesses have been examined or recall any witness for further cross-examination.

The procedural sequence is clear: after charges are framed, the prosecution presents its evidence (Teekam Singh v. Iii Rd Addi. Sessions Judge, 1994). The term "trial" in a sessions case is understood to commence effectively at this stage of witness examination (Devarasu v. The State, 1997). The default rule for witness examination, as enshrined in Section 138 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, is a sequential process of examination-in-chief, followed by cross-examination, and then re-examination. Section 231(1) CrPC is the enabling provision for this process, obligating the judge to record the evidence presented by the prosecution. The examination of witnesses is not necessarily confined to persons whose statements were recorded under Section 161 CrPC; the prosecution may examine any witness who can throw light on the subject matter (Babu Roy v. State Of W B, 2008).

Sub-section (2) carves out a specific judicial discretion that deviates from the standard procedure. It empowers the judge to either defer the cross-examination of a witness or to recall a witness for further cross-examination. This power is not unique to sessions trials; a synonymous provision exists in Section 242(3) CrPC for the trial of warrant cases before a Magistrate (Shamoon Ahmed Sayed & Another v. Intelligence Officer, 2008). However, the exercise of this power is not unfettered and has been meticulously delineated by the judiciary to prevent its misuse.

Judicial Discretion under Section 231(2): The Rule and the Exception

The Norm of Immediate Cross-Examination

The appellate courts have consistently held that the standard procedure of examination-in-chief followed immediately by cross-examination is the norm. Deferring the cross-examination of all witnesses to a subsequent date is considered both "irregular and inconvenient" (Shamoon Ahmed Sayed & Another v. Intelligence Officer, 2008). The rationale is to ensure the freshness of testimony, prevent witnesses from being worn down by repeated court appearances, and deny the defence an undue strategic advantage of viewing the entire prosecution case before commencing cross-examination. The practice of seeking adjournments can undermine the trial, and courts have a duty to prevent such delays (Vinod Kumar v. State Of Punjab, 2015). Therefore, the power under Section 231(2) is an exception to the general rule and must be invoked only in "exceptional circumstances" (Shamoon Ahmed Sayed & Another v. Intelligence Officer, 2008).

The Landmark Ruling in State of Kerala v. Rasheed

The definitive judicial pronouncement on the scope of Section 231(2) came from the Supreme Court in State Of Kerala v. Rasheed (2018). In this case, the accused sought to defer the cross-examination of multiple prosecution witnesses on the general ground of potential prejudice. The trial court rejected the application, but the High Court allowed it through a "short unreasoned cryptic order." The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's decision and laid down clear principles for the exercise of discretion under Section 231(2). The Court held that:

  • The deferral of cross-examination cannot be claimed as a matter of right by the accused.
  • The party seeking deferral must provide "sufficient reasons" to invoke the court's discretion. A vague assertion of prejudice is insufficient.
  • The discretion must be exercised judiciously, in consonance with the statutory framework, and with an awareness of reasonably foreseeable consequences, such as trial delays.
  • A straitjacket formula for exercising this discretion is not possible, and it must depend on the facts of each case.

This judgment, which is consistently followed by High Courts (Ansad Badruddin v. State Of U.P, 2024), firmly establishes that deferral is a tool to be used sparingly for the ends of justice, not as a routine procedural step. The burden is squarely on the applicant to demonstrate a compelling necessity for such a deviation from the normal course of trial. The court must guard against applications made for the purpose of "vexation or delay or for defeating the ends of justice" (State Of M.P v. Badri Yadav And Another, 2006), thereby ensuring the trial is not reduced to a "mockery" (Vijay Kumar v. State, 2017).

Interplay with Other Procedural Rights and Powers

Distinction from Section 311 CrPC

While Section 231(2) allows for the recall of a witness for further cross-examination, it is distinct from the plenary power vested in the court under Section 311 CrPC. Section 311 grants the court the power to summon any person as a witness or recall and re-examine any person at any stage of the trial if their evidence appears essential for a just decision. This power is expansive and has been interpreted liberally to ensure a fair trial and prevent a miscarriage of justice (P. Sanjeeva Rao v. State Of Andhra Pradesh, 2012; Vijay v. State, 2015). The power under Section 231(2) is more specific, contextually limited to the stage of prosecution evidence in a sessions trial, and primarily concerns the scheduling and management of cross-examination. In contrast, Section 311 is a general power available throughout the trial to rectify errors and ascertain the truth.

Contrast with Section 233 CrPC (Evidence for Defence)

The structured nature of a sessions trial is further highlighted when comparing Section 231 with Section 233, which governs the adducing of defence evidence. After the prosecution closes its evidence, the accused is called upon to enter their defence. While Section 233(3) allows the accused to apply for compelling the attendance of any witness, courts have strictly curtailed attempts to use this provision to recall and re-examine prosecution witnesses as defence witnesses. In State Of M.P v. Badri Yadav (2006), the Supreme Court deprecated the practice of "juxtaposing" prosecution witnesses as defence witnesses long after their testimony was complete, holding that this was not the intent of Section 233(3) and was a tactic for vexation and delay. This principle, reiterated in later cases (Vinay Chandra Tiwari v. State Of U.P., 2025), reinforces the sequential and orderly progression of a trial, where the prosecution's case under Section 231 must be concluded before the defence formally begins its case under Section 233.

Balancing with the Right to a Fair Trial

The entire procedural edifice, including Section 231, must be interpreted in light of the constitutional guarantee of a fair trial under Article 21. The right to an effective cross-examination is an indispensable part of this guarantee, as it is the primary tool for the defence to test the veracity of prosecution evidence and rebut incriminating claims (Kalyani Baskar v. M.S Sampoornam, 2007). The discretion under Section 231(2) must be exercised to balance this right with the need for an efficient and orderly trial. Denying a legitimate request for deferral based on compelling grounds could prejudice the accused. Conversely, granting frivolous requests for deferral can prejudice the prosecution, cause harassment to witnesses, and delay justice. The jurisprudence, culminating in Rasheed, seeks to strike this delicate balance by insisting on a high threshold of justification for any deviation from the standard procedural norm.

Conclusion

Section 231 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides a structured framework for the presentation of prosecution evidence in a sessions trial. The established norm, rooted in Section 138 of the Evidence Act, is the immediate cross-examination of a witness following their examination-in-chief. Section 231(2) CrPC carves out a discretionary exception, empowering the trial judge to defer this cross-examination. However, as clarified by the Supreme Court in State of Kerala v. Rasheed, this discretion is not a gateway for the accused to claim deferral as a right or to engage in strategic delays. It is a power to be exercised sparingly, in exceptional circumstances, and upon the demonstration of specific and compelling reasons that serve the ultimate ends of justice. By circumscribing this discretion, the judiciary has reinforced the principles of procedural integrity, trial efficiency, and fairness, ensuring that the rights of the accused are protected without allowing the trial process to be held hostage to vexatious applications.