Analysis of Section 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954

Analyzing Section 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954: Sanction, Authority, and Procedural Imperatives

Introduction

The Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (PFA Act), now largely repealed and replaced by the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 (FSS Act), was a pivotal legislation in India aimed at curbing the menace of food adulteration and ensuring the purity of food articles supplied to the public. Within the PFA Act, Section 20 occupied a critical position as it laid down the procedural framework for the institution of prosecutions for offences under the Act. This provision acted as a gatekeeper, stipulating who could initiate legal proceedings and under what conditions, thereby seeking to prevent frivolous or unauthorized prosecutions while ensuring that genuine cases of adulteration could be effectively pursued. This article undertakes a comprehensive analysis of Section 20 of the PFA Act, 1954, examining its textual mandate, judicial interpretations regarding the authority to prosecute, the nature of consent required, procedural aspects, and its relationship with other provisions of the Act, drawing extensively from the jurisprudence developed by Indian courts.

The Textual Mandate of Section 20, PFA Act, 1954

Section 20 of the PFA Act, 1954, underwent amendments over time, but its core structure regarding the institution of prosecutions remained central. As quoted in Municipal Corporation Of Delhi v. R. Sahai And Others (Supreme Court Of India, 1979) and Ranajoy Bose v. A.B Roy And Another (Supreme Court Of India, 2002), Section 20(1) stipulated:

“20. (1) No prosecution for an offence under this Act, not being an offence under Section 14 or Section 14-A, shall be instituted except by, or with the written consent of, the Central Government or the State Government or a person authorised in this behalf, by general or special order, by the Central Government or the State Government: Provided that a prosecution for an offence under this Act may be instituted by a purchaser or recognized consumer association referred to in Section 12, if he or it produces in court a copy of the report of the public analyst along with the complaint.”

Section 20(2) further provided for the jurisdiction of courts: “No court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class shall try any offence under this Act.” (Municipal Corporation Of Delhi v. R. Sahai And Others).

Additionally, Section 20(3) stated: “Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, an offence punishable under sub-section (1-AA) of Section 16 shall be cognisable and non-bailable.” (Municipal Corporation Of Delhi v. R. Sahai And Others).

The key components of Section 20(1) were thus:

  • A general bar on instituting prosecutions for most offences under the Act.
  • Exceptions to this bar: prosecutions could be instituted "by" the Central/State Government or an authorised person, or "with the written consent" of these entities.
  • Authorisation could be through a general or special order.
  • A proviso allowing a purchaser or recognized consumer association to institute prosecution under specific conditions (production of public analyst's report).

Judicial Interpretation of "Instituted By or With Written Consent"

The phrases "instituted except by, or with the written consent of" and "a person authorised in this behalf" in Section 20(1) have been subject to extensive judicial scrutiny, particularly concerning the scope of delegation, the nature of the authorisation, and the application of mind required.

Authority to Prosecute and Delegation of Powers

A seminal judgment on the limits of delegation under Section 20(1) is A.K Roy And Another v. State Of Punjab And Others (1986 SCC 4 326, Supreme Court Of India, 1986). The Supreme Court held that the power to institute prosecution, being a significant executive function, must be exercised strictly in accordance with the statute. The Court invoked the maxim delegatus non potest delegare (a delegate cannot further delegate). While Section 24(2)(e) of the PFA Act empowered the State Government to make rules for delegating its powers and functions, this did not permit an endless chain of delegation. In A.K. Roy, the State Government had delegated its power to the Food (Health) Authority. The Court ruled that this Food (Health) Authority could not further sub-delegate the power to launch prosecutions to a Food Inspector by making rules (Rule 3 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration (Punjab) Rules, 1958, was held ultra vires to this extent). The prosecution initiated by the Food Inspector based on such sub-delegation was quashed. The Court emphasized the negative language of Section 20(1) ("No prosecution... except by"), indicating its mandatory and absolute nature.

The question of whether a specific officer, like a Health Officer, is duly authorised often depends on the terms of the authorisation and relevant municipal or state laws. In Ranajoy Bose v. A.B Roy And Another (Supreme Court Of India, 2002), the context involved a Health Officer under the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951, and the court noted that expressions like "Health Officer" or "District Health Officer" were not defined in that specific municipal act, highlighting the need for clear authorisation.

However, if a Food Inspector is directly authorised by the State Government (not via sub-delegation from another delegatee), they can validly institute a complaint. The Punjab & Haryana High Court in The State v. Moti Ram (Punjab & Haryana High Court, 1962) observed that where the Food Inspector was authorised by the State Government to file the complaint, the requirement of considering the reasonableness and propriety of the prosecution was deemed fulfilled when he chose to file the complaint. The emphasis was on the consent to the filing of the prosecution, not necessarily on the specific individual filing it, provided the filer was duly authorised.

The competence of the officer according sanction and the validity of such sanction are crucial. In State Of Gujarat v. Ratilal Ashabhai Patel (2007 CRIMES 4 719, Gujarat High Court, 2007), the defence challenged the sanction on the ground that the officer was merely holding an in-charge position. Similarly, in P.C.Trivedi v. Rasikbhai Masubhai (2007 FAC 2 376, Gujarat High Court, 2006), the court emphasized the need for a specific notification authorising the concerned officer (by name or designation) to accord sanction under Section 20 of the PFA Act. The absence or non-production of such notification could render the sanction infirm.

Nature of "Consent" and "Sanction"

The term "written consent" in Section 20(1) implies an application of mind by the consenting authority to the facts of the case before permitting prosecution. The Bombay High Court in State Of Maharashtra v. M/S. Saibaba Toddy Co. & Ors. (Bombay High Court, 2009) noted that "grant of consent under section 20 of the pfa act, no doubt, requires application of mind. Still, however, the rigorous of requirement of a valid sanction under the other enactments cannot be invoked in such a case." This suggests that while application of mind is necessary, the standard might not be as stringent as a formal "sanction" required under certain other penal statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act.

The Delhi High Court in Oriental Bank Of Commerce v. Delhi Development Authority & Anr. (Delhi High Court, 1982), while comparing Section 20 of the PFA Act with Section 49(1) of the Delhi Development Act, 1957, highlighted a vital difference. Section 20 PFA Act uses "instituted except by, or with the written consent of...". The court noted the omission of the word "by" in Section 49 of the DDA Act made a difference in determining who virtually made the complaint. Under Section 20 PFA Act, if a prosecution is instituted "by" an authorised person, that person exercises their own judgment. If it is instituted by someone else "with the written consent" of the specified authority, then the consenting authority is the one that applies its mind to the facts and grants permission.

Who is the Complainant?

When a prosecution is instituted "by" a person authorised by the Central or State Government, or a local authority, the question arises as to who is considered the de jure complainant. The Delhi High Court in Oriental Bank Of Commerce v. Delhi Development Authority & Anr. (Delhi High Court, 1982), referring to Supreme Court decisions like Dhian Singh v. Municipal Board, Saharanpur and Jagdish Lal v. State of U.P. (though not provided as primary references here, their essence is captured), stated that in filing the complaint, the officer was acting as an agent authorised by the (e.g.) Delhi Municipal Corporation to file the complaint, and therefore, it must be deemed in the contemplation of law that the Corporation was the complainant.

The Supreme Court in Subhash Chand v. State (Delhi Administration) (2013 SCC 2 17, Supreme Court Of India, 2013) affirmed that cases under the PFA Act are instituted on the filing of a complaint before the Court of the Metropolitan Magistrate or Judicial Magistrate of the First Class, as specified in Section 20 of the PFA Act.

Procedural Aspects and Consequences of Non-Compliance

Mandatory Nature of Section 20(1)

The requirements of Section 20(1) are generally considered mandatory. The Supreme Court in A.K Roy And Another v. State Of Punjab And Others (1986 SCC 4 326) emphasized that the use of negative words ("No prosecution... shall be instituted except by...") in a statute are usually indicative of its imperative and absolute nature. Non-compliance with such mandatory provisions typically vitiates the prosecution. This principle aligns with broader canons of statutory interpretation where procedural safeguards, especially in penal statutes, are to be strictly construed. The Supreme Court's observations in State Of U.P And Others v. Babu Ram Upadhya (1961 AIR SC 751), although in a different context (service law), also underscored that rules framed under a statute could be mandatory if they confer a benefit or protection on a person, and non-compliance would render the action invalid.

Timing and Effect of Sanction/Consent

The "written consent" or the act of institution "by" an authorised person under Section 20(1) is a pre-requisite for the court to take cognizance of the offence. If a prosecution is launched without adhering to these requirements, it is liable to be quashed. For instance, in State (Delhi) Administration Petitioner v. Vijay Kumar & Ors. (2007 SCC ONLINE DEL 1405, Delhi High Court, 2007), one of the grounds for acquittal considered by the trial court (though the High Court was reviewing an appeal against acquittal on multiple grounds) can often be defects in the sanction or authorisation under Section 20 of the PFA Act.

Proviso for Purchasers and Consumer Associations

The proviso to Section 20(1) carved out an important exception, empowering individual purchasers and recognized consumer associations (as defined in Section 12 of the PFA Act) to directly institute prosecutions. This was a significant measure for consumer protection, allowing citizens to take action against adulteration. The only pre-condition was the production in court of a copy of the public analyst's report along with the complaint. This democratized the prosecution process to some extent, reducing sole reliance on governmental agencies. (Municipal Corporation Of Delhi v. R. Sahai And Others; Ranajoy Bose v. A.B Roy And Another).

Section 20 in Relation to Other Provisions

Section 20-A: Power to Implead Manufacturer, Distributor, or Dealer

Section 20-A of the PFA Act provided a special power to the court. It stated: “Where at any time during the trial of any offence under this Act alleged to have been committed by any person, not being the manufacturer, distributor or dealer of any article of food, the court is satisfied, on the evidence adduced before it, that such manufacturer, distributor or dealer is also concerned with that offence, then, the court may, notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (3) of Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), or in Section 20 proceed against him as though a prosecution had been instituted against him under Section 20.”

The Supreme Court in Omparkash Shivprakash v. K.I Kuriakose And Others (1999 SCC 8 633, Supreme Court Of India, 1999) clarified that Section 20-A overrides the ban contained in Section 20 of the Act regarding the institution of prosecution. This means that a manufacturer, distributor, or dealer could be impleaded during the trial even if the initial prosecution against them did not comply with Section 20 requirements (i.e., they were not initially prosecuted by or with the consent of the specified authorities). The essential conditions for invoking Section 20-A were: (1) the trial should have already begun against another person; (2) the court must be satisfied from evidence that the manufacturer, distributor, or dealer is also concerned with the offence. The satisfaction of the court based on evidence adduced was key, as also noted in cases like M/S GUPTA TRADERS v. STATE OF HARYANA AND ANR (Punjab & Haryana High Court, 2018).

Section 20-AA: Application of Probation Laws

Section 20-AA, introduced by an amendment in 1976, restricted the application of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, and Section 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, to persons convicted under the PFA Act. It stated: “Nothing contained in the Probation of offenders Act, 1958 (20 of 1958) or section 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) shall apply to a person convicted of an offence under this Act unless that person is under eighteen years of age.” (NAGARAJAN v. THE STATE OF TAMIL NADU, Supreme Court Of India, 2025).

Prior to this specific provision, the Supreme Court in Ishar Das v. State Of Punjab (1973 SCC 2 65, Supreme Court Of India, 1972) had held that the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, could apply to offences under the PFA Act, emphasizing its rehabilitative intent, especially for young offenders. Section 20-AA significantly curtailed this judicial interpretation by limiting probation benefits primarily to offenders under eighteen years of age.

The Transition to the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006

The PFA Act, 1954, including Section 20, was repealed by Section 97 of the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 (FSS Act). However, Section 97 of the FSS Act also contained saving clauses. As noted in NAGARAJAN v. THE STATE OF TAMIL NADU (Supreme Court Of India, 2025), the proviso to Section 97 FSS Act saved previous operations, rights, obligations, or liabilities accrued under the repealed PFA Act.

Furthermore, Section 97(4) of the FSS Act provided a transitional window: “Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, no court shall take cognizance of an offence under the repealed Act or Orders after the expiry of a period of three years from the date of the commencement of this Act.” (MANIK HIRU JHANGIANI v. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH, Supreme Court Of India, 2023). This meant that for offences committed when the PFA Act was in force, cognizance could still be taken under the PFA (subject to its S.20 requirements) for up to three years after the FSS Act's commencement. The FSS Act introduced its own mechanisms for dealing with offences and penalties, and Section 89 of the FSS Act gives it an overriding effect over other food-related laws.

Conclusion

Section 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, served as a crucial procedural safeguard, ensuring that prosecutions for food adulteration were initiated by responsible authorities or with their considered consent, thereby balancing the objectives of public health protection with the prevention of unwarranted litigation. Judicial interpretations consistently emphasized the mandatory nature of its core requirements, particularly the proper authorisation for launching prosecutions and the limits on the delegation of this power, as underscored by the principle of delegatus non potest delegare. The courts required a demonstrable application of mind for granting consent, though perhaps not to the same rigorous standard as "sanction" under other specialized statutes. The proviso allowing consumer-initiated prosecutions was a progressive feature. While the PFA Act has been succeeded by the FSS Act, 2006, the jurisprudence developed around Section 20 remains instructive on the principles governing the institution of proceedings under regulatory statutes concerned with public welfare and safety, highlighting the enduring importance of procedural rectitude in the administration of justice.