Introduction

Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (hereinafter "the Act") stands as a cornerstone in the law governing specific performance of contracts in India. It establishes a personal bar to relief, mandating that a plaintiff seeking specific performance must plead and prove their readiness and willingness to perform their essential contractual obligations. This provision ensures that only a party who has demonstrated a consistent commitment to the contract can invoke the equitable remedy of specific performance. The principles enshrined in Section 16(c) are not novel to the 1963 Act; their antecedents can be traced to English equitable doctrines and were recognized in Indian jurisprudence even prior to the Act's enactment.^[1] The Supreme Court of India, in GADDIPATI DIVIJA v. PATHURI SAMRAJYAM (2023), has clarified that the Specific Relief (Amendment) Act, 2018, which made certain changes to Section 16, is prospective in nature.^[2] Consequently, for transactions predating this amendment, the unamended Section 16(c) remains applicable. This article undertakes a comprehensive analysis of Section 16(c) as it stood prior to the 2018 amendment, drawing upon judicial pronouncements to elucidate its scope, interpretation, and application.

The Statutory Framework of Section 16(c) (Pre-2018 Amendment)

Prior to the 2018 amendment, Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, stipulated:

"16. Personal bars to relief.— Specific performance of a contract cannot be enforced in favour of a person—
...
(c) who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him, other than terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant.
Explanation.— For the purposes of clause (c),—
(i) where a contract involves the payment of money, it is not essential for the plaintiff to actually tender to the defendant or to deposit in court any money except when so directed by the court;
(ii) the plaintiff must aver performance of, or readiness and willingness to perform, the contract according to its true construction.”

The legislative intent behind this provision is to ensure that a plaintiff seeking the discretionary relief of specific performance comes to the court with clean hands and demonstrates a consistent commitment to their contractual obligations. The twin requirements of "averment" and "proof" underscore the mandatory nature of this condition precedent.

The Explanation to Section 16(c)

The Explanation appended to Section 16(c) provides crucial clarifications. Clause (i) relaxes the need for actual tender of money or deposit in court, unless specifically directed by the court. This acknowledges that a plaintiff's readiness to pay does not always necessitate the physical presentation of funds at every stage.^[3] However, as held in Sukhbir Singh And Others v. Brij Pal Singh And Others (1996), the plaintiff must establish the capacity to pay the sale consideration.^[4] Clause (ii) reiterates the necessity of averring performance or readiness and willingness, emphasizing that such averment must align with the "true construction" of the contract. This was highlighted in Anandavally v. Kanda Kunju Natesan (1992), where the Kerala High Court noted that while actual tender is not always essential, compliance with court directions for deposit is mandatory under the Explanation.^[5]

Judicial Interpretation of "Readiness and Willingness"

The phrase "ready and willing" has been subject to extensive judicial scrutiny. "Readiness" generally refers to the financial capacity and preparedness of the plaintiff to perform their obligations, while "willingness" pertains to their volition and intention to do so.^[6]

The Nature of Averment: Substance Over Form

While Section 16(c) mandates averment, courts have generally adopted a pragmatic approach, prioritizing substance over rigid adherence to form. In Syed Dastagir v. T.R Gopalakrishna Setty (1999), the Supreme Court held that the plea of readiness and willingness need not be in any specific phrasal manner; if the pleadings, read as a whole, convey the plaintiff's continuous readiness and willingness, the requirement is met.^[7] This principle was reiterated in Aniglase Yohannan v. Ramlatha And Others (2005), where the Court emphasized that pleadings must convey readiness and willingness in spirit and substance.^[8] Similarly, in Manjunath Anandappa Urf Shivappa Hanasi v. Tammanasa And Others (2003), it was held that averments in spirit and substance, not necessarily in letter and form, would suffice.^[9] The Kerala High Court in K. Chekkunni v. Ahammed @ Ahammed Kutty (1991) also opined that it is not mandatory to reproduce the exact words of Section 16(c) or follow the CPC forms verbatim if the plaint as a whole demonstrates readiness and willingness.^[10]

However, some earlier High Court decisions, such as those discussed in Shakoor And Others v. Palakdhari And Others (1982), had indicated a stricter view regarding compliance with the forms (Forms 47 and 48 of Appendix A, CPC).^[11] The prevailing view, however, leans towards a liberal construction of pleadings as long as the statutory intent is fulfilled.

Continuous Readiness and Willingness

The requirement of readiness and willingness is not a one-time affair but must be continuous, subsisting from the date of the contract until the date of the decree, and sometimes even thereafter. The Supreme Court in Aniglase Yohannan affirmed this necessity.^[8] In J.P Builders And Another v. A. Ramadas Rao And Another (2010), the Court scrutinized the plaintiff's financial capacity and conduct to ascertain continuous readiness.^[12] The Bombay High Court in Bhikaram Nathuji Vanjari And Another v. Saraswatibai Motilal Zarkariya (1996) categorically stated that continuous readiness and willingness is a condition precedent, and failure to aver or prove it is fatal to the plaintiff's claim.^[13] This was echoed by the Kerala High Court in Susheela v. T.M. Muhammedkunhi (2012).^[14]

Proving Readiness: Financial Capacity

"Readiness" implies the plaintiff's capacity, particularly financial, to perform their part of the contract. As established in Sukhbir Singh, it is sufficient for the plaintiff to establish the capacity to pay; it is not necessary to carry money at all times.^[4] In J.P Builders, the Court affirmed the plaintiff's readiness by examining substantial payments made and bank statements.^[12] Conversely, in His Holiness Acharya Swami Ganesh Dassji v. Sita Ram Thapar (1996), where the purchaser lacked sufficient funds, specific performance was refused.^[15] The Madras High Court in Indravathi Petitioner v. Kamala (2000) also emphasized the need for proof of availability of funds.^[16] In Nathulal v. Phoolchand (1969), the purchaser's arrangement of funds for the balance payment was considered indicative of readiness.^[17]

Proving Willingness: Conduct of the Plaintiff

"Willingness" relates to the plaintiff's intention and disposition to perform the contract. It is inferred from their conduct and the totality of circumstances. In P. D'Souza v. Shondrilo Naidu (2004), the plaintiff's consistent attempts to execute the agreement and partial payments were considered indicative of willingness.^[18] The plaintiff must demonstrate that they have acted in good faith and have not been responsible for delays or non-performance.

Factors Influencing the Court's Assessment under Section 16(c)

Impact of Delay and Laches

Unexplained or inordinate delay on the part of the plaintiff can negate the plea of readiness and willingness. In K.S Vidyanadam And Others v. Vairavan (1997), the Supreme Court denied specific performance due to the plaintiff's significant inaction over two and a half years, emphasizing that such delay could render it inequitable to grant relief.^[19] Dilatory tactics by the plaintiff, as seen in His Holiness Acharya Swami Ganesh Dassji, can also be fatal.^[15] The Court in K.S Vidyanadam noted that even if time is not expressly of the essence, courts can infer reasonable timeframes, and substantial delays can be a ground for refusal.

Time as Essence of the Contract

If time is of the essence of the contract, failure to perform within the stipulated time can be a strong indicator of a lack of willingness, potentially barring relief under Section 16(c). In His Holiness Acharya Swami Ganesh Dassji, where time was an essential element and the petitioner failed to perform, specific performance was denied.^[15] However, in contracts for the sale of immovable property, time is not usually presumed to be of the essence unless specifically made so or implied by the nature of the contract or surrounding circumstances.^[19]

Conduct of the Defendant: Prevention or Waiver

Section 16(c) itself provides an exception: the plaintiff need not prove performance of terms if such performance has been "prevented or waived by the defendant." If the defendant's conduct obstructs the plaintiff's ability to perform, the plaintiff may still be considered ready and willing. This aspect requires a careful examination of the facts and the respective obligations of the parties.

Section 16(c) and its Interplay with Other Provisions

Section 20: Discretionary Nature of Specific Performance

Compliance with Section 16(c) is a necessary but not sufficient condition for obtaining specific performance. Section 20 of the Act (as it stood pre-2018 amendment) vested courts with discretion to grant specific performance. Even if a plaintiff successfully avers and proves readiness and willingness, the court is not bound to grant the relief if it would be inequitable or cause undue hardship.^[19] In Amar Chand v. Jagan Nath (2019), the Himachal Pradesh High Court, reiterating Supreme Court principles, noted that the court is not bound to grant specific performance merely because it is lawful to do so, and the motive behind the litigation should also be considered.^[20]

Section 22: Ancillary Reliefs

Section 22 of the Act allows a plaintiff suing for specific performance to ask for ancillary reliefs such as possession, partition, or refund of earnest money if the claim for specific performance is refused.^[21] If a plaintiff's suit for specific performance fails due to non-compliance with Section 16(c), they may still be entitled to a refund of any earnest money paid, subject to the terms of the contract and other equitable considerations.

The Prospective Application of the 2018 Amendment

The Specific Relief (Amendment) Act, 2018, brought significant changes, including to Section 16(c). Notably, the requirement for the plaintiff to "aver and prove" was modified to "prove." As held in GADDIPATI DIVIJA, this amendment is prospective and does not apply to transactions or suits initiated before its enforcement.^[2] Thus, the jurisprudence developed under the pre-amendment Section 16(c), emphasizing both pleading and proof, continues to govern older cases. The removal of "aver" from the main clause of Section 16(c) by the 2018 amendment might suggest a subtle shift, though Explanation (ii) still retains the term "aver." The precise impact of these changes on future litigation will unfold as courts interpret the amended provisions.

Conclusion

Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, serves as a critical gatekeeper for the equitable remedy of specific performance. The consistent judicial interpretation, prior to the 2018 amendment, has established that a plaintiff must meticulously plead and rigorously prove continuous readiness and willingness to perform their essential contractual obligations. While courts have shown flexibility regarding the form of pleadings, the substantive requirement remains non-negotiable. The plaintiff's financial capacity ("readiness") and their consistent conduct demonstrating an intention to perform ("willingness") are paramount. Factors such as delay, the essentiality of time, and the conduct of both parties significantly influence the court's determination. The principles underlying Section 16(c) underscore the equitable nature of specific performance, ensuring that this powerful remedy is granted only to those who have themselves been diligent and forthright in honoring their contractual commitments. The rich body of case law surrounding this provision continues to guide the adjudication of specific performance suits in India, ensuring a balance between contractual sanctity and equitable considerations.