Section 154 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872: Judicial Discretion in Permitting Cross-Examination of Own Witness

Introduction

Section 154 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, occupies a pivotal position in the law of evidence, addressing the circumstances under which a party may be permitted by the court to put questions to its own witness which might be put in cross-examination by the adverse party. This provision is instrumental in the pursuit of truth, particularly when a witness unexpectedly displays antagonism or resiles from a previous statement. Often colloquially associated with the term "hostile witness," Section 154 does not, in fact, employ this nomenclature. Instead, it vests considerable discretion in the court to allow a departure from the normal course of examination-in-chief. This article undertakes a comprehensive analysis of Section 154, drawing upon statutory provisions and significant judicial pronouncements from Indian courts, including those provided in the reference materials, to elucidate its scope, application, and the evidentiary value of testimony elicited thereunder.

The Statutory Mandate: Section 154 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872

Section 154 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter "the Act") states:

"154. Question by party to his own witness.—The Court may, in its discretion, permit the person who calls a witness to put any questions to him which might be put in cross-examination by the adverse party."

The provision is concise but profound. It empowers the court with discretion to allow a party to cross-examine its own witness. This is an exception to the general rule that leading questions, characteristic of cross-examination, cannot be asked during examination-in-chief (Section 142 of the Act). The primary objective is to elicit truth and prevent a party from being disadvantaged by a witness who appears to be suppressing facts or favoring the adversary.

Judicial Interpretation of "Hostility" and the Court's Discretion

The Misnomer of "Hostile Witness"

The term "hostile witness," though frequently used in legal parlance, is not defined in the Indian Evidence Act. The Privy Council in Baikuntha Nath Chattoraj v. Prasannamoyi Debya (1922) observed that Section 154 "says nothing as to declaring a witness hostile, but provides that the Court may in its discretion, permit the person who calls a witness to put any questions to him which might be put in cross-examination by the adverse party." Similarly, the Calcutta High Court in Emperor v. Ajit Kumar Ghosh And Others Accused (1944) noted that the adoption of the procedure under Section 154 "does not necessarily mean that the witness in question should be declared hostile."

The Supreme Court in Sat Paul v. Delhi Administration (1975) extensively discussed the concept, clarifying that the Indian law, unlike its English counterpart at the time, does not rigidly categorize witnesses as "hostile" or "unfavorable" to determine the permissibility of cross-examination by the party calling them. The discretion under Section 154 is for the court to exercise when it appears that the witness is prevaricating or has an adverse animus.

Ambit of Judicial Discretion

The cornerstone of Section 154 is the court's discretion. The Supreme Court in Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakkar v. State Of Gujarat (1964) emphasized that Section 154 "is wide in scope and the discretion is entirely left to the court to exercise the power when the circumstances demand." This discretion is to be exercised judiciously, based on the witness's demeanor, the nature of their testimony, and the overall context of the case. The Delhi High Court in Jugal Kishor Ratnu v. Mrs. Meena Tevary & Ors. (2014) reiterated that this discretion is "unqualified and untrammelled," though it should be "exercised sparingly when the facts and circumstances of the case warrant," particularly noting that there must be some material to show the witness is not speaking the truth or has exhibited hostility.

Timing and Procedure for Invoking Section 154

The power under Section 154 can be invoked at various stages of a witness's examination. The Supreme Court in Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakkar v. State Of Gujarat (1964) clarified that "Section 154 does not in terms, or by necessary implication confine the exercise of the power by the court before the examination-in-chief is concluded or to any particular stage of the examination of the witness." The Andhra Pradesh High Court in Mattam Ravi v. Mattam Raja Yellaiah (2017) opined that permission under Section 154 can be sought "during the examination-in-chief or at the stage of cross-examination or perhaps there may be cases even where he is under re-examination," but importantly, "before his evidence is concluded, his hostility must be brought to the notice of the Court and the permission sought."

Evidentiary Value of Testimony under Section 154

Admissibility and Reliability

A crucial aspect of Section 154 is the evidentiary value of testimony given by a witness who has been cross-examined by the party calling them. The mere fact that a witness is permitted to be cross-examined under Section 154 does not automatically render their entire testimony inadmissible or unreliable. The Supreme Court in Bhagwan Singh v. State Of Haryana (1975) held that "the fact that the court gave permission to the prosecutor to cross-examine his own witness, thus characterising him as, what is described as a hostile witness, does not completely efface his evidence. The evidence remains admissible in the trial and there is no legal bar to base a conviction upon his testimony if corroborated by other reliable evidence."

This principle was echoed in Gura Singh v. State Of Rajasthan (2000), where the Supreme Court emphasized that "hostility does not automatically render a witness's testimony unreliable." The Bombay High Court in Babu Nathu Gond v. State Of Maharashtra (1975), citing the Full Bench decision in Profulla Kumar Sarkar v. Emperor, asserted that the fact that a witness is dealt with under Section 154 "in no way warrants a direction...that they are bound in law to place no reliance on his evidence or that the party who called and cross-examined him can take no advantage from any part of his evidence." The court can accept parts of such a witness's testimony and reject others, just as with any other witness (Sat Paul v. Delhi Administration, 1975).

Corroboration and Scrutiny

While the testimony of a witness cross-examined under Section 154 remains admissible, courts generally approach such evidence with caution and look for corroboration. In Bhagwan Singh v. State Of Haryana (1975), the conviction was upheld as the testimony of the witness cross-examined under Section 154 was "amply corroborated by other evidence." The Supreme Court in cases like State Of U.P v. Ramesh Prasad Misra And Another (1996) and Balu Sonba Shinde v. State Of Maharashtra (2002) has indicated that the testimony of hostile witnesses requires close scrutiny. In Balu Sonba Shinde, the conflicting testimony of a hostile witness (PW5) contributed to the acquittal, highlighting the need for careful evaluation.

Applicability Across Civil and Criminal Jurisdictions

Section 154 of the Act is not confined to criminal proceedings; it applies with equal force to civil cases. The Andhra Pradesh High Court in Mattam Ravi v. Mattam Raja Yellaiah (2017) explicitly stated, "The provision Under Section 154 of the Evidence Act does not distinguish between civil and criminal proceedings." This was also affirmed by the Kerala High Court in Thankamani v. Prabhakaran (2001), which held that "whether the case involves application of criminal law or civil law, the provisions of Sec. 154 of the Indian Evidence Act would be applicable." The court's discretion to permit such cross-examination in civil matters is guided by the same principles of ensuring that a party is not prejudiced by a witness who turns unexpectedly adverse.

Interrelation with Section 145 of the Evidence Act

When a party is permitted to cross-examine its own witness under Section 154, it often involves confronting the witness with their previous inconsistent statements. This brings Section 145 of the Act into play, which deals with contradicting a witness by their previous statements in writing. The Calcutta High Court in Emperor v. Ajit Kumar Ghosh And Others Accused (1944) highlighted this connection, stating that if the prosecution sought to contradict a witness by a portion of his statement made before the committing Magistrate (after being permitted to ask questions under S.154), "This could only be done by having recourse to Section 145, Evidence Act... the previous statement should have been read to the witness or he should have been allowed to read it for the purpose of enabling him to explain or reconcile any discrepancy." This ensures fairness to the witness and proper procedure in impeaching credit.

Conclusion

Section 154 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, is a vital tool in the judicial arsenal for the ascertainment of truth. It grants courts a flexible, discretionary power to permit a party to cross-examine its own witness, moving beyond the rigid confines of traditional examination stages when a witness exhibits adversity or attempts to suppress truth. Judicial interpretations have clarified that the term "hostile witness" is a convenient label rather than a statutory category, and the grant of permission under Section 154 does not automatically discredit the entirety of the witness's testimony. Such evidence remains admissible and can be relied upon, subject to careful scrutiny and corroboration, in both civil and criminal proceedings. The judicious application of Section 154, guided by established legal principles, continues to play a significant role in ensuring that justice is not defeated by witnesses who deviate from their expected testimony, thereby upholding the integrity of the trial process in India.