Analysis of Section 153B IPC

An Analysis of Section 153B of the Indian Penal Code: Imputations and Assertions Prejudicial to National Integration

Introduction

Section 153B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC)[1], is a significant provision aimed at safeguarding the national integration of India. It penalizes imputations and assertions that are prejudicial to the unity and integrity of the nation, particularly those that question the allegiance of any class of persons to the Constitution or propagate deprivation of their rights as citizens, or cause inter-group disharmony. This article seeks to provide a comprehensive analysis of Section 153B IPC, examining its statutory components, judicial interpretations of its essential elements, the crucial procedural safeguard of sanction for prosecution, and its interplay with fundamental rights, drawing heavily upon relevant case law and legal principles prevalent in India.

The Statutory Framework of Section 153B IPC

Section 153B IPC is titled "Imputations, assertions prejudicial to national integration." It was inserted to address acts and statements that undermine the fabric of national unity. The provision reads as follows:

153B. Imputations, assertions prejudicial to national integration.—

(1) Whoever, by words either spoken or written or by signs or by visible representations or otherwise,—

(a) makes or publishes any imputation that any class of persons cannot, by reason of their being members of any religious, racial, language or regional group or caste or community, bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of India as by law established or uphold the sovereignty and integrity of India, or

(b) asserts, counsels, advises or propagates that any class of persons shall, by reason of their being members of any religious, racial, language or regional group or caste or community, be denied or deprived of their rights as citizens of India, or

(c) makes or publishes any assertion, counsel, plea or appeal concerning the obligation of any class of persons, by reason of their being members of any religious, racial, language or regional group or caste or community, and such assertion, counsel, plea or appeal causes or is likely to cause disharmony or feelings of enmity or hatred or ill-will between such members and other persons,

shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.

(2) Whoever commits an offence specified in sub-section (1), in any place of worship or in any assembly engaged in the performance of religious worship or religious ceremonies, shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to five years and shall also be liable to fine.

Defining the Offence: Sub-sections (1)(a), (b), and (c)

Sub-section (1) delineates three distinct types of conduct that constitute an offence under Section 153B:

  • Clause (a) targets imputations questioning the patriotism or constitutional allegiance of a specific group based on their religious, racial, linguistic, regional, caste, or community identity.
  • Clause (b) addresses assertions or propaganda suggesting that a particular group should be denied their rights as Indian citizens due to their group identity.
  • Clause (c) criminalizes assertions or appeals related to a group's obligations that cause or are likely to cause inter-group disharmony, enmity, hatred, or ill-will. This clause shares some conceptual overlap with Section 153A IPC, which deals with promoting enmity between different groups.[15]

Aggravated Offence: Sub-section (2)

Sub-section (2) provides for an enhanced punishment if the offence under sub-section (1) is committed in a place of worship or during a religious assembly. This signifies the legislature's intent to treat such offences with greater severity when they occur in sensitive locations that ought to be spaces of peace and reverence.

Punishment Prescribed

The general punishment for an offence under Section 153B(1) is imprisonment up to three years, or a fine, or both. For offences committed under the aggravated circumstances of Section 153B(2), the imprisonment can extend up to five years, along with a fine.

Essential Elements and Judicial Interpretation

The application of Section 153B IPC hinges on the interpretation of its core elements, many of which have been elucidated by the judiciary, often by drawing parallels with analogous provisions like Section 153A IPC.

The Actus Reus: "Words, Signs, or Visible Representations"

The prohibited act involves making or publishing the specified imputations or assertions through various means, including spoken or written words, signs, or visible representations. This broad definition encompasses a wide range of communicative acts.

Mens Rea: The Question of Intent

While Section 153B IPC does not explicitly use terms like "intentionally" or "malignantly" in all its clauses, the jurisprudence surrounding similar speech-related offences, particularly Section 153A IPC, strongly indicates that mens rea (guilty mind) is a crucial ingredient. The Supreme Court in Manzar Sayeed Khan v. State Of Maharashtra And Another[4], interpreting Section 153A IPC, held that "The gist of the offence is the intention to promote feelings of enmity or hatred between different classes of people. The intention to cause disorder or incite the people to violence is the sine qua non of the offence under Section 153-A IPC and the prosecution has to prove prima facie the existence of mens rea on the part of the accused." This principle was reiterated in JAVED AHMAD HAJAM v. THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA[7].

Similarly, in Balwant Singh And Another v. State Of Punjab[5], the Supreme Court, while dealing with Sections 124-A and 153-A IPC, quashed convictions based on the casual raising of slogans, emphasizing the absence of intent to incite hatred or disorder. The Court noted, "The casual raising of the slogans, once or twice by two individuals alone cannot be said to be aimed at exciting or attempting to excite hatred or disaffection towards the Government as established by law in India." The necessity of mens rea was also highlighted in Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v. State Of A.P.[6] for offences under Sections 153-A and 505(2) IPC. Given the serious implications of Section 153B for freedom of speech, it is arguable that a similar requirement of intent or, at the very least, a high degree of recklessness as to the consequences, would be read into its provisions by the courts.

Interpreting "Likely to Cause": The Standard of Assessment

Clauses (a), (b) (implicitly, by effect), and (c) of Section 153B(1) involve an assessment of the likelihood of certain consequences, such as undermining allegiance, deprivation of rights, or causing disharmony. Judicial pronouncements on analogous provisions emphasize that the impact of words must be judged objectively. In Manzar Sayeed Khan[4], the Supreme Court, approving the observations of Vivian Bose, J. in Bhagwati Charan Shukla v. Provincial Govt. (as cited in Ramesh v. Union Of India[8]), stated that "the effect of the words must be judged from the standards of reasonable, strong-minded, firm and courageous men, and not those of weak and vacillating minds, nor of those who scent danger in every hostile point of view. … It is the standard of ordinary reasonable man or as they say in English law ‘the man on the top of a Clapham omnibus’." This standard was also referred to in K. Neelamegam v. State[9]. Furthermore, the matter complained of must be read as a whole, and one cannot rely on isolated passages.[4]

National Integration: The Core Protected Interest

The overarching aim of Section 153B is the protection of national integration. This involves fostering a sense of unity, allegiance to the Constitution, and harmonious co-existence among diverse groups within India. The section targets expressions that directly attack these foundational values.

Section 153B IPC and the Freedom of Speech and Expression

Section 153B IPC operates as a restriction on the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India[10]. Such restrictions must be reasonable and fall within the permissible grounds enumerated in Article 19(2), which include "the sovereignty and integrity of India," "public order," and "incitement to an offence." The judiciary plays a vital role in balancing these competing interests.

In SRI B Y VIJAYENDRA v. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA[11], the Karnataka High Court, while dealing with allegations under Sections 153-A and 505(1)(c) IPC, observed that "Disapprobation of governmental inaction cannot be branded as an attempt to promote hatred between different communities. Free speech of the citizens of this country cannot be stifled by implicating them in criminal cases, unless such speech has the tendency to affect public order." This sentiment underscores the need for caution in applying penal provisions that curtail speech. The Allahabad High Court in Vijay Singh v. State Of U.P.[12], while granting bail in a Section 153B IPC case involving slogans like "Pak Rashtrapati Mohd. Ali Jinnah Amar Rahen," noted arguments that such expressions might be the "rantings and ravings of a wholly frustrated man" and referred to Section 95 IPC concerning trivial acts.

Procedural Imperative: Sanction for Prosecution under Section 196 CrPC

A critical procedural safeguard for offences falling under Section 153B IPC is the requirement of prior sanction for prosecution. Section 196(1)(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC)[3] mandates that no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under Chapter VI of the IPC (which includes Section 153B, as it pertains to offences against the State in a broader sense of national integration) except with the previous sanction of the Central Government or of the State Government.

The Supreme Court in State Of Karnataka And Another v. Pastor P. Raju[2] unequivocally affirmed this requirement. In this case, criminal proceedings initiated against the respondent under Section 153B IPC were quashed by the High Court due to the absence of the requisite sanction under Section 196(1-A) CrPC (the relevant sub-section for 153B). The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, emphasizing that "before initiating any proceedings under Section 153-B IPC, the police ought to have obtained previous sanction of the Central Government or of the State Government or of the District Magistrate as required by Section 196(1-A) CrPC and in the absence of such a sanction having been obtained, the proceedings initiated against the respondent were illegal and without jurisdiction." This judgment underscores the mandatory nature of the sanction, which acts as a check against frivolous or unwarranted prosecutions under this serious provision.

Section 153B in Judicial Practice: Case Law Insights

Apart from the landmark ruling in Pastor P. Raju[2] on sanction, other cases provide glimpses into the application of Section 153B IPC:

  • In Vijay Singh v. State Of U.P.[12], the Allahabad High Court granted bail to an individual accused under Section 153B for raising certain slogans and distributing pamphlets. The court considered arguments that the acts were those of a frustrated individual and might not necessarily be construed as prejudicial to national integrity.
  • In Abdul Azeez P.V And Others v. National Investigation Agency[16], Section 153B IPC was one of the provisions under which the accused were charge-sheeted. The case primarily dealt with the issue of statutory bail and the finality of the charge sheet, but its inclusion indicates the section's invocation in cases involving alleged unlawful activities.
  • Kanta Prasad Sharma v. Govt. Of Rajasthan[17] involved a challenge to the forfeiture of pamphlets under Section 95 CrPC, inter alia, for offending Section 153B IPC. The Rajasthan High Court dismissed the application as the petitioner failed to produce the pamphlet to demonstrate it did not contain offending material, highlighting the burden on the applicant in such proceedings.
  • The Allahabad High Court in Pushpendra And 6 Ors. v. State Of U.P. And 2 Ors.[18] declined to quash an FIR under Section 153B IPC, indicating that the allegations, on their face, warranted investigation.

These cases illustrate the varied contexts in which Section 153B is invoked and the judicial scrutiny applied, both at substantive and procedural levels.

Comparative Perspectives: Section 153B vis-à-vis Section 153A and Other Speech Offences

Section 153B IPC shares common ground with Section 153A IPC, which penalizes promoting enmity between different groups on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, etc., and doing acts prejudicial to maintenance of harmony.[14] While Section 153A focuses on inter-group enmity and disharmony, Section 153B specifically addresses imputations and assertions that strike at national integration, such as questioning a group's allegiance to the Constitution or advocating for the denial of their rights as citizens. Clause (c) of Section 153B(1) does overlap with Section 153A in penalizing acts likely to cause disharmony or ill-will between groups.

The principles of interpretation regarding mens rea, contextual analysis, and the "reasonable person" standard, extensively discussed by courts in the context of Section 153A (e.g., Manzar Sayeed Khan[4], Balwant Singh[5], Amish Devgan v. Union Of India[14]), are highly pertinent to the interpretation of Section 153B. The legislative intent behind Section 153A, as noted in Sudhir Kumar Panda v. State Of Orissa[15], was "to check fissiparous communal and separatist tendencies," an objective that resonates with the aim of Section 153B to protect national integration.

Other provisions like Section 124A (sedition) and Section 505 (statements conducing to public mischief) also deal with speech offences but have distinct ingredients and focuses. The Supreme Court in Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan v. Union Of India And Others[13], while addressing hate speech, affirmed the adequacy of existing laws but stressed the need for effective enforcement, a sentiment applicable across the spectrum of speech-regulating statutes.

Conclusion

Section 153B of the Indian Penal Code serves as a crucial legislative tool to combat expressions that threaten the foundational principle of national integration in India. Its provisions target specific types of imputations and assertions deemed detrimental to the unity and allegiance of diverse communities towards the nation and its Constitution. Judicial interpretation has emphasized the need to read the provision in context, apply the standard of a reasonable person, and, importantly, has underscored the necessity of mens rea, often by analogy with similar offences like Section 153A IPC. The mandatory requirement of prior sanction for prosecution under Section 196 CrPC, as affirmed in Pastor P. Raju[2], acts as a vital safeguard against potential misuse.

The application of Section 153B necessitates a careful balancing act between protecting national integration and upholding the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression. As courts continue to interpret and apply this provision, the focus remains on ensuring that it serves its intended purpose of fostering a cohesive and integrated nation without unduly stifling legitimate discourse or dissent.

References

  1. Indian Penal Code, 1860.
  2. State Of Karnataka And Another v. Pastor P. Raju, (2006) 6 SCC 728. (As per Reference Material 17)
  3. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
  4. Manzar Sayeed Khan v. State Of Maharashtra And Another, (2007) 5 SCC 1. (As per Reference Materials 6, 9, 19, 24)
  5. Balwant Singh And Another v. State Of Punjab, 1995 SCC (Cri) 432 (also cited as 1995 3 SCC 214 in other contexts). (As per Reference Material 5)
  6. Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v. State Of A.P., (1997) 7 SCC 431. (As per Reference Material 4)
  7. JAVED AHMAD HAJAM v. THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, 2024 INSC 115. (As per Reference Material 8, which cites Manzar Sayeed Khan)
  8. Ramesh v. Union Of India, (1988) 1 SCC 668. (As cited in Reference Materials 23, 24)
  9. K. Neelamegam v. State, (2011) SCC OnLine Mad 940 (Madras High Court, 2011, citing Ramesh v. Union of India). (As per Reference Material 23)
  10. Constitution of India.
  11. SRI B Y VIJAYENDRA v. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA, 2024 SCC OnLine Kar 25 (Karnataka High Court, 2024). (As per Reference Material 13)
  12. Vijay Singh v. State Of U.P., 2005 SCC OnLine All 179 (Allahabad High Court, 2005). (As per Reference Material 18)
  13. Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan v. Union Of India And Others, (2014) 11 SCC 477. (As per Reference Material 2)
  14. Amish Devgan v. Union Of India, (2021) 1 SCC 1 (also cited as AIR Online 2020 SC 930). (As per Reference Materials 10, 16)
  15. Sudhir Kumar Panda v. State Of Orissa, 2013 SCC OnLine Ori 160 (Orissa High Court, 2013). (As per Reference Material 14)
  16. Abdul Azeez P.V And Others v. National Investigation Agency, (2014) 16 SCC 543. (As per Reference Material 20)
  17. Kanta Prasad Sharma v. Govt. Of Rajasthan, 2005 SCC OnLine Raj 324 (Rajasthan High Court, 2005). (As per Reference Material 21)
  18. Pushpendra And 6 Ors. v. State Of U.P. And 2 Ors., 2015 SCC OnLine All 5006 (Allahabad High Court, 2015). (As per Reference Material 22)
  19. Gopal Vinayak Godse v. The Union Of India And Others, 1969 SCC OnLine Bom 88 (Bombay High Court, 1969). (As per Reference Material 3, relevant for general principles of interpreting such sections)