Analysis of Section 15(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963

An Analytical Study of Section 15(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963: Exclusion of Time for Statutory Notices and Sanctions

Introduction

The Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter "the Act"), serves as a cornerstone of procedural law in India, prescribing time limits for instituting legal proceedings. Its objective is to ensure diligence in pursuing remedies and to provide finality to legal disputes. However, the Act also recognizes that certain circumstances may legitimately impede a litigant's ability to approach the courts within the standard prescribed periods. Part III of the Act, titled "Computation of Period of Limitation," incorporates provisions for the exclusion of time in specific scenarios. Among these, Section 15(2) holds particular significance. It addresses situations where a prospective plaintiff is statutorily obligated to issue a notice or obtain prior consent or sanction from the Government or another authority before initiating a suit. This provision allows for the exclusion of the period consumed by such mandatory pre-suit requirements from the computation of the limitation period, thereby preventing prejudice to the litigant. This article undertakes a comprehensive analysis of Section 15(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, examining its statutory contours, judicial interpretation, and practical application within the Indian legal framework, drawing upon relevant case law and legal principles.

The Statutory Provision: Section 15(2) and its Evolution

Text and Components of Section 15(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963

Section 15 of the Limitation Act, 1963, is titled "Exclusion of time in certain other cases." Sub-section (2) thereof, along with its Explanation, reads as follows:

"(2) In computing the period of limitation for any suit of which notice has been given, or for which the previous consent or sanction of the Government or any other authority is required, in accordance with the requirements of any law for the time being in force, the period of such notice or, as the case may be, the time required for obtaining such consent or sanction shall be excluded.

Explanation.—In excluding the time required for obtaining the consent or sanction of the Government or any other authority, the date on which the application was made for obtaining the consent or sanction and the date of receipt of the order of the Government or other authority shall both be counted."

The key components of this sub-section are:

  • It applies to the computation of the limitation period for "any suit."
  • The precondition for exclusion is either:
    1. The giving of a notice, or
    2. The requirement of previous consent or sanction of the Government or any other authority.
  • Such notice, consent, or sanction must be "in accordance with the requirements of any law for the time being in force."
  • The period to be excluded is:
    1. The "period of such notice," or
    2. The "time required for obtaining such consent or sanction."
  • The Explanation clarifies that for consent/sanction, the time from the date of application to the date of receipt of the order (both inclusive) is excluded.

Comparison with Section 15(2) of the Limitation Act, 1908

The predecessor to the current provision was Section 15(2) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, which stated:

"In computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit of which notice has been given in accordance with the requirements of any enactment for the time being in force, the period of such notice shall be excluded."

The Supreme Court, in Disha Constructions And Others v. State Of Goa And Another (2012 SCC 1 690), observed that the present Section 15(2) of the 1963 Act is "a little more comprehensive" than its 1908 counterpart. The 1963 provision explicitly includes the scenario where previous consent or sanction is required, and also provides an Explanation for computing the time for obtaining such consent/sanction, aspects not detailed in the 1908 Act's sub-section.

Core Principles of Interpretation and Application

Legislative Intent: Preventing Prejudice to Litigants

The primary legislative intent behind Section 15(2) is to ensure that a litigant who is statutorily mandated to fulfill certain pre-conditions before filing a suit (such as issuing a notice or obtaining sanction) is not disadvantaged by the time consumed in complying with these legal requirements. If this period were not excluded, the effective time available to the litigant to prepare and file the suit would be unfairly curtailed, potentially leading to the suit becoming time-barred due to no fault of their own. The Calcutta High Court in Dr. Dipankar Chakraborty v. Allahabad Bank & Ors. (Calcutta High Court, 2017) generally noted that "Section 15 of the Limitation Act, 1963, allows exclusion of time in certain cases specified therein. Section 15 adds the period excluded therein to the period of limitation prescribed in the Schedule in the Act of 1963."

Mandatory Exclusion and Liberal Construction

The language of Section 15(2) ("shall be excluded") indicates that the exclusion is mandatory once the conditions specified therein are met; it is not a matter of judicial discretion. Furthermore, courts have generally adopted a liberal approach in interpreting provisions related to the exclusion of time to advance substantial justice. In Disha Constructions (2012 SCC 1 690), the Supreme Court, while dealing with Section 15(2), endorsed the principle of liberal interpretation, citing its earlier decision in Union Of India And Others v. West Coast Paper Mills Ltd. And Another ((2004) 2 SCC 747), which, though in the context of Section 14, stated: "Any circumstance, legal or factual, which inhibits entertainment or consideration by the court of the dispute on the merits comes within the scope of the section and a liberal touch must inform the interpretation of the Limitation Act which deprives the remedy of one who has a right." This approach ensures that technicalities do not defeat legitimate claims where statutory pre-conditions cause delay.

Applicability to "Any Suit"

Section 15(2) explicitly refers to the computation of the limitation period for "any suit." This raises questions about its applicability to proceedings that are not strictly "suits," such as applications or petitions under special statutes. For instance, in J.J Towers And Estates P. Ltd. v. East India Flour Mills P. Ltd. (Calcutta High Court, 2010), concerning a creditor's winding-up petition, the Calcutta High Court observed, "To begin with, section 15(2) of the Act may not apply to a creditor's winding up petition which is certainly not a suit." However, the court also noted the petitioner's reliance on precedents where Section 15(2) was argued to apply to arbitration proceedings. The precise scope thus depends on the nature of the proceeding and whether it can be equated to a "suit" for the purposes of the Limitation Act, or if the principle underlying Section 15(2) can be extended.

"In Accordance with the Requirements of Any Law"

A crucial prerequisite for invoking Section 15(2) is that the notice must have been given, or the consent/sanction must be required, "in accordance with the requirements of any law for the time being in force." This encompasses a wide array of statutory provisions, most notably Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (which mandates notice before suing the Government or public officers), as well as provisions in various special enactments requiring notices or sanctions (e.g., Railways Act, Port Trusts Acts, etc.). If a notice is given gratuitously, without any legal mandate, the benefit of Section 15(2) cannot be claimed.

Judicial Elucidation through Key Precedents

Exclusion of Notice Period under Section 80 CPC

One of the most common applications of Section 15(2) is in relation to the notice period prescribed under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. In Union Of India And Others v. West Coast Paper Mills Ltd. And Another (Iii) ((2004) 3 SCC 458), the Supreme Court unequivocally held that the period of two months required for a notice under Section 80 CPC must be excluded under Section 15(2) of the Limitation Act when computing the period of limitation for filing a suit. The Court affirmed that "The notice so served squarely attracts the applicability of sub-section (2) of Section 15 of the Limitation Act, 1963." The Court in Disha Constructions (2012 SCC 1 690) also dealt with a Section 80 CPC notice and reiterated that the two-month notice period is excludable, criticizing the High Court for erroneously denying this benefit.

Exclusion of Time for Notices under Special Statutes

The applicability of Section 15(2) extends to notices required under various special statutes. For example, in Union Of India v. M/S. Carda Mylian Sp. Spinning Company Ltd. And Others (1984 SCC Online Guj 109), the Gujarat High Court, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in The Trustees Of Port Of Bombay v. Premier Automobiles Ltd. ((1974) 4 SCC 710), held that the one-month notice period required under Section 87 of the Bombay Port Trust Act, 1879 (analogous to Section 120 of the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963) could legitimately be tacked on to the prescribed limitation period by virtue of Section 15(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963. Similarly, in the historical context of the 1908 Act, the Patna High Court in B. & N.W Railway Co. v. Ramsarup Lal Chaudhury (1922 SCC Online Pat 117) held that the plaintiff was entitled to exclude the period of notice given to the Secretary of State, as it was necessary for a suit against the Eastern Bengal State Railway. The court also considered that a notice under Section 77 of the Railways Act, if required and given, would also lead to exclusion of that notice period under Section 15(2) of the (then) Limitation Act.

The Explanation: Computing Time for Consent/Sanction

The Explanation to Section 15(2) provides clarity on computing the "time required for obtaining such consent or sanction." It mandates that both the date on which the application for consent/sanction was made and the date on which the order was received by the applicant are to be counted within the excluded period. This ensures that the entire duration, from the formal initiation of the process to its culmination in the receipt of the authority's decision, is excluded, provided the litigant has acted with due diligence.

The Principle Underlying Section 15(2) in Other Contexts

The Supreme Court has also recognized that the principle underlying Section 15(2) can be applied in analogous situations. In Harihar Nath And Others v. State Bank Of India And Others ((2006) 4 SCC 457), while discussing applications under Section 446(1) of the Companies Act, 1956 (seeking leave of the Company Court to file a suit or proceeding against a company in winding up), the Court observed: "While computing the period of limitation for the suit/proceeding, the time spent in obtaining leave to file the suit/proceeding will have to be excluded by applying the principle underlying Section 15(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963." This demonstrates a judicial willingness to extend the protective ambit of the provision's rationale even where its text may not directly apply, to ensure fairness.

Interaction with Section 29(2): Special Laws

Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, provides that where a special or local law prescribes a period of limitation different from the Schedule to the Act, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were prescribed by the Schedule, and Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only insofar as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. As Section 15 falls within Sections 4 to 24, its provisions, including sub-section (2), would generally apply to suits governed by special or local laws unless expressly excluded by such laws. The Madhya Pradesh High Court in Vijay Singh Vijendra Singh v. Shyamlal And Others (1999 MPLJ 387), while discussing a different special law, reiterated this general principle of applicability of Sections 4 to 24 to special laws under Section 29(2).

Distinguishing Section 15(2) from Analogous Provisions

It is pertinent to distinguish Section 15(2) from other exclusionary provisions within the Limitation Act to appreciate its specific scope.

  • Section 15(1): Stay by Injunction or Order: Section 15(1) allows for the exclusion of time during which the institution or execution of a suit or decree has been stayed by an injunction or order. This differs from Section 15(2) which deals with pre-suit statutory notices or sanctions. The Supreme Court in Siraj-Ul-Haq Khan And Others v. The Sunni Central Board Of Waqf, U. P., And Others (1959 AIR SC 198), noted the strict construction of Section 15 (likely referring to Section 15(1) of the 1908 Act in that context), holding that prior litigation orders did not constitute a stay. This contrasts with the more liberal interpretation generally accorded to Section 15(2) in modern jurisprudence for its specific purpose.

  • Section 14: Bona Fide Prosecution in Court Without Jurisdiction: Section 14 allows for the exclusion of time spent by a plaintiff in prosecuting another civil proceeding with due diligence and in good faith, where such proceeding failed due to a defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature. This provision, discussed in cases like P. Sarathy v. State Bank Of India ((2000) 5 SCC 355) and Jain And Brothers v. State Of Chhattisgarh (2018 CGHC), operates on a different premise than Section 15(2), focusing on misdirected litigation rather than mandatory pre-suit formalities.

Challenges and Considerations

Burden of Proof

A litigant seeking the benefit of Section 15(2) bears the onus of establishing that the conditions for its applicability are met. This includes proving that a notice was statutorily required and duly given, or that prior sanction was mandatory and applied for, and demonstrating the exact period that qualifies for exclusion.

Strict Adherence to Conditions

While a liberal interpretation is favored, the specific conditions laid down in Section 15(2) must be satisfied. It is not a general provision for condoning delay. The necessity of the notice or sanction being "in accordance with the requirements of any law" is paramount. The general principle, as underscored in cases like Kandimalla Raghavaiah And Company v. National Insurance Company And Another ((2009) 7 SCC 768) concerning limitation under consumer law, is that limitation periods are to be strictly enforced, and exclusions are available only when specific statutory criteria are fulfilled.

Conclusion

Section 15(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, plays a crucial role in the Indian legal system by harmonizing the objectives of the Limitation Act with the practical realities faced by litigants who are bound by statutory pre-suit requirements. The judiciary, through consistent interpretation, particularly in cases like Disha Constructions and Union Of India v. West Coast Paper Mills (Iii), has affirmed the mandatory nature of this exclusion and advocated for a liberal construction to ensure that procedural obligations do not unjustly extinguish substantive rights. By allowing for the exclusion of time spent in issuing mandatory notices or obtaining requisite sanctions, Section 15(2) upholds the principles of fairness and equity, ensuring that the doors of justice remain accessible to those who diligently comply with the procedural mandates of the law. Its proper understanding and application are vital for legal practitioners and courts alike in the administration of justice.