Analysis of Section 125(4) CrPC

A Juridical Analysis of Section 125(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: Grounds for Disentitlement to Spousal Maintenance in India

Introduction

Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) stands as a cornerstone of social justice in Indian law, providing a swift and summary remedy for neglected wives, children, and parents to claim maintenance.[1, 2] This provision is designed to prevent vagrancy and destitution, ensuring that those unable to maintain themselves receive necessary financial support.[3, 4] While Section 125(1) lays down the conditions for claiming maintenance, Section 125(4) carves out specific exceptions, enumerating circumstances under which a wife forfeits her right to maintenance. This article undertakes a comprehensive analysis of the grounds stipulated in Section 125(4) CrPC, drawing upon judicial pronouncements and legal principles prevalent in India to elucidate their scope and application.

The interpretation of Section 125(4) is pivotal as it balances the husband's obligation to maintain with the wife's conduct. The judiciary has consistently emphasized that Section 125 CrPC is a measure of social justice, and its provisions must be construed to advance the cause of the vulnerable.[5, 6] However, the disentitlement clauses in sub-section (4) serve as a check against potential misuse and uphold certain normative expectations within the marital framework, or in the context of separation.

The Legislative Mandate of Section 125(4) CrPC

Section 125(4) of the CrPC stipulates:

"No wife shall be entitled to receive an [allowance for the maintenance or the interim maintenance and expenses of proceeding, as the case may be,]* from her husband under this section if she is living in adultery, or if, without any sufficient reason, she refuses to live with her husband, or if they are living separately by mutual consent."
*Words "allowance for the maintenance or the interim maintenance and expenses of proceeding, as the case may be," substituted by Act 50 of 2001, s. 2, for "allowance" (w.e.f. 24-9-2001).

This sub-section thus lays down three distinct grounds that can disentitle a wife from claiming maintenance: (i) if she is "living in adultery"; (ii) if, "without any sufficient reason, she refuses to live with her husband"; or (iii) if they are "living separately by mutual consent". The Supreme Court in Laxmi Bai Patel v. Shyam Kumar Patel affirmed that a wife's right to claim maintenance under Section 125 CrPC can only be denied in the circumstances provided under sub-section (4).[7]

Judicial Interpretation of "Living in Adultery"

The term "living in adultery" under Section 125(4) has been subject to considerable judicial scrutiny. Courts have generally held that isolated or sporadic acts of adultery do not suffice to attract this disqualification. Instead, the term implies a continuous course of adulterous conduct or, at the very least, that the wife is currently living in a state of quasi-permanent union with another man.[8, 9]

In Giraben Sandipbhai Jotangiya v. State Of Gujarat, the Gujarat High Court observed that a single act of infidelity cannot be termed "living in adultery" and that strict proof as expected in criminal proceedings cannot be insisted upon, yet the proof desirable is stricter than required under civil proceedings.[8] Similarly, the Tripura High Court in Anita Das v. Subhash Ch. Das opined that the purpose of Section 125(4) is that a wife who is living in adultery or has lived in adultery for a sufficiently long period is not entitled to maintenance, though one or two sporadic acts may not constitute living in adultery.[9] The burden of proving that the wife is "living in adultery" rests squarely on the husband.[8]

A significant question arises regarding the applicability of this clause to a *divorced* woman, who is included in the definition of "wife" under Explanation (b) to Section 125(1). The Madras High Court in M. Chinna Karuppasamy v. Kanimozhi, after a conjoint reading of Section 125(1) Explanation (b) and Section 125(4), posited that the term "adultery" in Section 125(4) is applicable only to a wife whose marriage is still subsisting.[10] The court reasoned that after divorce, the woman is at liberty to choose her own way of life, and such intimacy would not fall within the term "adultery" as referred to in Section 125(4).[10] This view is supported by the Kerala High Court Full Bench decision (as noted in Giraben Sandipbhai Jotangiya) which held that Section 125(4) will apply only to the female spouse in a subsisting marriage.[8] Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Vanamala (Smt) v. H.M Ranganatha Bhatta categorically held that sub-section (4) of Section 125 does not apply to the case of a woman who has been divorced or who has obtained a decree for divorce.[11]

"Without Any Sufficient Reason, She Refuses to Live with Her Husband"

The second ground for disentitlement arises if the wife, "without any sufficient reason, she refuses to live with her husband." What constitutes "sufficient reason" is a question of fact to be determined based on the circumstances of each case.[12] Conduct such as cruelty, harassment, or dowry demands by the husband or his family can constitute sufficient reason for the wife to live separately and still claim maintenance.[12]

In Deb Narayan Halder v. Anushree Halder (Smt), the Supreme Court denied maintenance to the wife (for herself, though granted for the son) as she failed to provide sufficient evidence to substantiate her claims of cruelty and had no justifiable reason for deserting the matrimonial home.[13] Conversely, in Sunita Kachwaha And Others v. Anil Kachwaha, where the High Court had set aside maintenance on the ground that the wife's separate stay due to alleged dowry torture was not justified, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and directed payment of maintenance, implicitly recognizing the validity of her reason.[12]

The procurement of a decree for restitution of conjugal rights (RCR) by the husband does not automatically disentitle the wife to maintenance if she refuses to comply. The Orissa High Court in ASHOK KUMAR PATRA v. RAJANI PATTANAIK@PATRA, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Rina Kumari @ Rina Devi @ Reena vrs. Dinesh Kumar Mahto @ Dinesh Kumar Mahato and another, held that the disqualification under Section 125(4) CrPC is not attracted merely by non-compliance with an RCR decree.[14] The court must still examine whether the wife had valid and sufficient reason to refuse to live with her husband despite such a decree.[14, 15] The Jharkhand High Court in VISHAL ALIAS VISHAL MISHRA v. PALLAWI KUMARI noted that an inference can be drawn by the Court in cases where maintenance has been granted to the wife that she has reasonable cause not to live in the company of the husband.[16]

"Living Separately by Mutual Consent"

The third ground for disentitlement is if the husband and wife "are living separately by mutual consent." This implies a clear and voluntary agreement between the parties to live apart, without any element of coercion or desertion by one party. If such mutual consent is established, the wife cannot claim maintenance under Section 125 CrPC.[17]

The implications of this clause in the context of a divorce by mutual consent under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, were considered in Vanamala (Smt) v. H.M Ranganatha Bhatta. In that case, the divorce decree by mutual consent did not include any provision for maintenance. The Supreme Court held that sub-section (4) of Section 125 does not apply to a divorced woman.[11] While the wife was denied maintenance in that specific case because the divorce decree itself was silent and she was divorced, the ruling underscores that S.125(4) primarily addresses situations of separation *during marriage* by mutual consent, rather than post-divorce scenarios governed by S.125(1) Explanation (b).

Scope of Section 125(4) CrPC: Divorced Women and Interplay with Section 125(1) Explanation (b)

A crucial aspect of Section 125(4) is its applicability to divorced women. Explanation (b) to Section 125(1) CrPC clarifies that "wife" includes a woman who has been divorced by, or has obtained a divorce from, her husband and has not remarried. The Supreme Court in Rohtash Singh v. Ramendri (Smt) And Others dealt with a case where a wife was divorced on the ground of desertion. The Court upheld her right to maintenance, emphasizing that under Explanation (b), a divorced woman who has not remarried remains entitled to maintenance, irrespective of the grounds on which the divorce was granted.[18] The Court reasoned that the provision is a measure of social justice and even after divorce, the woman's status as a 'wife' persists for maintenance purposes.[18]

This principle was strongly reinforced in Vanamala (Smt) v. H.M Ranganatha Bhatta, where the Supreme Court explicitly stated that "sub-section (4) of Section 125 does not apply to the case of a woman who has been divorced or who has obtained a decree for divorce."[11] This suggests that the disqualifications in Section 125(4) are primarily intended for a woman whose marital status as a "wife" (in the conventional sense, i.e., not yet divorced) is subsisting, even if she is living separately. Once a woman is divorced, her claim is adjudicated under Section 125(1) read with Explanation (b), and the grounds that might have been relevant under Section 125(4) during separation (like desertion leading to divorce) do not automatically bar her claim as a "divorced wife."[18]

The judicial consensus, therefore, leans towards interpreting Section 125(4) as being largely inapplicable to women who have already been divorced, whose claims are primarily governed by their inability to maintain themselves and the fact of their non-remarriage as per Section 125(1) Explanation (b).[10, 11, 18]

Procedural Aspects and Evidentiary Standards

The burden of proving the existence of any of the disabling circumstances under Section 125(4) CrPC lies on the husband who seeks to avoid his liability to pay maintenance.[7] As established in Laxmi Bai Patel, these are the only grounds for denying maintenance to a wife otherwise entitled.[7]

Even at the stage of deciding an application for interim maintenance, objections raised by the husband under Section 125(4) CrPC should be considered by the court.[19] However, the proceedings under Section 125 CrPC are summary in nature, aimed at providing speedy relief.[5] The overarching principle is that Section 125 CrPC is a social justice legislation, and its interpretation should be aimed at protecting women, children, and parents from destitution.[5, 6, 20]

Conclusion

Section 125(4) of the CrPC delineates specific circumstances that disentitle a wife to maintenance, acting as a crucial balancing provision within the broader social welfare objective of Section 125. Judicial interpretations have clarified that "living in adultery" implies a continuous course of conduct, "refusal to live with the husband" must be without sufficient reason, and "living separately by mutual consent" must be a voluntary agreement. A significant development in jurisprudence, spearheaded by cases like Rohtash Singh and Vanamala, indicates that the disqualifications under Section 125(4) primarily apply to a wife during the subsistence of the marriage or during separation without divorce, and generally do not extend to a woman who has already been divorced and claims maintenance as a "divorced wife" under Explanation (b) to Section 125(1).

The courts continue to interpret these provisions keeping in mind the social justice moorings of Section 125 CrPC, ensuring that while legitimate defences are available to the husband, the protective umbrella of maintenance law is not unduly withdrawn from deserving claimants. The nuanced application of Section 125(4) reflects the judiciary's commitment to upholding both fairness and the fundamental objective of preventing destitution.

References

  1. Shamima Farooqui v. Shahid Khan (2015) 5 SCC 705.
  2. Capt. Ramesh Chander Kaushal v. Veena Kaushal (1978) 4 SCC 70 (as cited in Rohtash Singh and Shamima Farooqui).
  3. Chaturbhuj v. Sita Bai (2008) 2 SCC 316 (as cited in Shamima Farooqui).
  4. Deb Narayan Halder v. Anushree Halder (Smt) (2003) 11 SCC 303; (2004) SCC (Cri) 164. (Reference to S.125 preventing vagrancy).
  5. Dwarika Prasad Satpathy v. Bidyut Prava Dixit And Another (1999) 7 SCC 675.
  6. Deenanath Yadav v. State Of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Home Lko. And Another (Allahabad High Court, 2024), citing Badshah v. Urmila Badshah Godse (2014) 1 SCC 188.
  7. Laxmi Bai Patel v. Shyam Kumar Patel (2002) ACR SC 2 1257; (2002) SCC (Cri) 1287.
  8. Giraben Sandipbhai Jotangiya v. State Of Gujarat (Gujarat High Court, 2015).
  9. Anita Das v. Subhash Ch. Das (Tripura High Court, 2015).
  10. M. Chinna Karuppasamy v. Kanimozhi (Madras High Court, 2015).
  11. Vanamala (Smt) v. H.M Ranganatha Bhatta (1995) 5 SCC 299.
  12. Sunita Kachwaha And Others v. Anil Kachwaha (2014) 16 SCC 715.
  13. Deb Narayan Halder v. Anushree Halder (Smt) (2003) 11 SCC 303; (2004) SCC (Cri) 164.
  14. ASHOK KUMAR PATRA v. RAJANI PATTANAIK@PATRA (Orissa High Court, 2025), citing Rina Kumari @ Rina Devi @ Reena vrs. Dinesh Kumar Mahto @ Dinesh Kumar Mahato and another (2024 SCC OnLine SC 72 - as cited in the reference, year adjusted based on typical citation patterns).
  15. BIJAYA SANKAR SINGHDEO @ VIJAY KUMAR SINGHDEO v. POURNAMASI JEMA (Orissa High Court, 2024).
  16. VISHAL ALIAS VISHAL MISHRA v. PALLAWI KUMARI (Jharkhand High Court, 2022).
  17. Manohar Lal v. Jayawanti (Himachal Pradesh High Court, 2017).
  18. Rohtash Singh v. Ramendri (Smt) And Others (2000) 3 SCC 180.
  19. PRASHANT JHA v. ISHA JHA (Chhattisgarh High Court, 2023).
  20. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Section 125.