The Legal Validity of Sale Deeds Executed Without Right: An Analysis of Indian Jurisprudence

Introduction

The foundation of property law in India, as in most common law jurisdictions, rests upon the cardinal principle of nemo dat quod non habet—no one can give what they do not have. This doctrine mandates that a transferor of property can only convey a title that is as good as their own. A sale deed, being the primary instrument for transferring ownership of immovable property, is therefore fundamentally contingent on the executant possessing a valid, subsisting, and transferable title. This article undertakes a comprehensive analysis of the legal status and consequences of sale deeds executed by persons who lack the legal right, title, or authority to do so. Drawing upon landmark judgments of the Supreme Court of India and various High Courts, as well as key statutory provisions, this analysis explores the distinction between void and voidable instruments, the specific challenges posed by transfers via power of attorney, the rights of co-owners, and the equitable exceptions that temper the rigidity of the nemo dat rule. The legal framework, primarily governed by the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 ("TPA"), the Registration Act, 1908, and the Specific Relief Act, 1963, reveals a nuanced jurisprudence that seeks to balance the security of title with the protection of bona fide transferees.

The Foundational Principle: Requirement of Title and Authority

The transfer of ownership in immovable property is statutorily defined and regulated. Section 54 of the TPA defines a 'sale' as "a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part-paid and part-promised." The operative word, 'ownership', presupposes that the vendor possesses it. The Supreme Court, in its seminal decision in Suraj Lamp And Industries Private Limited (2) v. State Of Haryana And Another (2012 SCC 1 656), unequivocally affirmed this principle. The Court held that instruments like a General Power of Attorney (GPA), Agreement to Sell (SA), or a Will do not, in themselves, convey title. It clarified that a sale of immovable property can only be effectuated by a registered deed of conveyance (sale deed). A power of attorney creates a mere agency; it "is not an instrument of transfer in regard to any right, title or interest in an immovable property" (Suraj Lamp, 2012). Therefore, a person holding only a GPA has no independent right to sell the property as an owner.

This principle is further reinforced by the observation that even a court, acting on behalf of a judgment-debtor, cannot transfer a title that the judgment-debtor is statutorily barred from conveying. In Inayat Ullah v. Khalil Ullah Khan (Allahabad High Court, 1938), the court held that if a judgment-debtor is precluded by a statutory provision from transferring his property, the court cannot execute a sale deed in violation of that provision, as "it is the title of the judgment-debtor to the property that is transferred by the sale deed executed by the court." Similarly, in Narandas Karsondas v. S.A Kamtam And Another (1977 SCC 3 247), the Supreme Court established that even where a mortgagee has a power of sale, the mortgagor's right of redemption is not extinguished until a registered sale deed is executed, signifying that the transfer of title is incomplete without this final, formal act.

Scenarios of Defective or Non-Existent Right to Sell

The lack of a right to execute a sale deed can manifest in several distinct legal scenarios, each with its own set of consequences.

Void and Voidable Transactions

A critical distinction in law is between void and voidable documents. A void document is a nullity ab initio and has no legal effect, whereas a voidable document is valid until it is set aside by a competent court. A sale deed executed by a person with absolutely no title is a void instrument. For instance, in Dharam Pal v. Second Addl. District Judge (2004 SCC ONLINE ALL 2200), the Allahabad High Court considered a sale deed executed by a widow whose bhumidhari rights had extinguished upon her remarriage. The court noted that the pleading was that the sale deed was "ab initio void inasmuch as Smt. Sohbatta who had admittedly remarried has no right subsisting in the land." Such a deed, being void, does not require cancellation and its invalidity can be declared by a court. A similar situation was noted in Prashant Kumar Dabral v. Digvijay Singh (Uttarakhand High Court, 2012).

The Supreme Court in Dularia Devi v. Janardan Singh And Others (1990 SUPP SCC 1 216) drew a clear line between void and voidable documents in the context of jurisdictional challenges. It observed that a claim that a transaction is void, such as when an illiterate person is tricked into signing a sale deed believing it to be something else (a plea of non est factum), could be adjudicated by consolidation authorities under the relevant statute. Conversely, a voidable document, which remains valid until set aside, must be challenged in a civil court. The appropriate forum for relief often depends on this classification, with disputes over title based on void deeds typically falling within the purview of civil courts, unless barred by a special statute.

Defective Authority: The Case of Power of Attorney

Transactions involving a Power of Attorney (POA) are a frequent source of litigation concerning the authority to sell. As an agent, a POA holder's authority is strictly construed and confined to the powers expressly granted in the instrument. In Church Of Christ Charitable Trust & Educational Charitable Society v. Ponniamman Educational Trust (2012 SCC 8 706), the Supreme Court upheld the rejection of a plaint for specific performance because the power of attorney presented "was not expressly authorized to execute a sale agreement." This underscores the necessity for specific and unambiguous authorization.

Furthermore, the authority of a POA holder is revocable. In Rajiv Mahajan And Others v. Ajit Kaur And Others (2013 SCC ONLINE P&H 18707), the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that a sale deed executed by a POA holder after the POA was cancelled by a registered deed was prima facie invalid. The court reasoned that "once a registered document is cancelled by registered cancellation deed, then cancellation operates as constructive public notice," thereby extinguishing the agent's right to execute the sale deed.

Alienation by Co-owners and Kartas of a Joint Hindu Family

The right of a co-owner to alienate property is also circumscribed. A co-owner cannot, without the consent of other co-owners or a formal partition, execute a sale deed for a specific portion of the joint property. In Mujeebullah v. Smt. Maidunnisha & 5 Others (2017 AHC 87352), the suit was based on the premise that a co-sharer "had no right to execute sale deed dated 05.06.2006 of a specific portion of the suit property."

In the context of a Joint Hindu Family, the Karta possesses the authority to alienate joint family property, but this power is conditional upon the existence of legal necessity or for the benefit of the estate. In Sunil Kumar And Another v. Ram Parkash And Others (1988 SCC 2 77), the Supreme Court held that a coparcener cannot maintain a suit for a permanent injunction to restrain the Karta from alienating property. The proper remedy for the coparcener is to challenge the sale *after* its execution on the grounds that the Karta exceeded his authority. This illustrates a scenario where the right to sell exists but its exercise is challengeable.

Conditional Transfers and the Intention of Parties

In certain transactions, the passing of title is made contingent upon the fulfillment of a condition, most commonly the payment of the full sale consideration. The mere execution and registration of a sale deed may not, in such cases, transfer ownership. The Jharkhand High Court in KHOSHO RANA v. MOSOMAT DAKHIYA (2022) noted a prevalent practice where title does not pass until the full consideration is paid and the vendor hands over the registration receipt (Chirkut). The court held that where consideration was unpaid and possession and the Chirkut remained with the vendor, "the title of the suit land has not passed to the plaintiff by mere execution of the sale deed." This demonstrates that the executant's "right" to effect a complete transfer of title was suspended pending fulfillment of the vendee's obligation.

The Doctrine of Estoppel: Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act

A significant equitable exception to the nemo dat quod non habet rule is encapsulated in Section 43 of the TPA, often referred to as the doctrine of "feeding the grant by estoppel." This section provides that where a person erroneously or fraudulently represents that he is authorised to transfer certain immovable property and purports to transfer such property for consideration, the transfer shall, at the option of the transferee, operate on any interest which the transferor may acquire in such property at a later time.

The High Courts of Madras in Ayisha Banu v. The Sub Registrar (2025) and Palani v. The Sub Registrar (2025) elaborated on this principle, stating it "makes it very clear that even a person who has no title over the property purports to transfer to another by deed and when he subsequently acquires any interest in the property... the title would pass to the transferee without any further act on the part of the transferor."

The case of Noor Mohd. v. Mohd. (1975 SCC ONLINE BOR UP 46) provides a classic illustration. A person with an imperfect title (Sirdar) executed a sale deed and subsequently acquired a perfect title (Bhumidhar). The Board of Revenue considered the argument that the initial defective sale was validated by the subsequent acquisition of full rights, as per Section 43 of the TPA. This doctrine serves to protect a bona fide transferee for value who has acted upon the representation of the transferor.

Jurisdictional and Procedural Aspects

Disputes arising from sale deeds executed without right are overwhelmingly civil in nature. The Allahabad High Court in Mohd. Ahmad v. State Of U.P (1997 SCC ONLINE ALL 213) quashed a criminal complaint alleging fraud in such a case, stating, "This is essentially a Civil matter and in case the complainant wants to challenge validity of the sale deeds, she can take resort to Civil proceedings for cancellation of the same." The primary remedy is to file a suit for declaration that the sale deed is void or for its cancellation if it is voidable.

The maintainability of such a suit can sometimes be challenged at the preliminary stage. As seen in Church Of Christ (2012), a plaint can be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, if it fails to disclose a valid cause of action, for instance, by relying on a sale conducted by a POA holder whose authority is not established by the documents annexed to the plaint.

Conclusion

The principle that a person cannot transfer a better title than they themselves possess remains a cornerstone of Indian property law, providing certainty and security to property rights. A sale deed executed by a person without any legal right, title, or authority is fundamentally a void instrument, incapable of conferring ownership upon the transferee. This is evident in cases involving vendors whose titles have been extinguished (Dharam Pal), agents whose authority has been revoked (Rajiv Mahajan), or where statutory bars are in place (Inayat Ullah). However, the law is not unyieldingly rigid. The jurisprudence recognizes the complexities of property transactions and protects bona fide transferees through equitable doctrines, most notably the principle of estoppel enshrined in Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act. This allows a defective title to be perfected if the transferor subsequently acquires a valid interest. Ultimately, the Indian legal system provides robust mechanisms for adjudicating such disputes through civil courts, ensuring that claims of title are determined on the merits while balancing the foundational need for secure ownership with principles of equity and justice.