The Mandate of Veracity: A Judicial Analysis of Order XIX Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

Introduction

The law of evidence in civil litigation is fundamentally concerned with the ascertainment of truth. Within the procedural framework of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), Order XIX provides for the adducing of evidence by affidavit. While this mechanism facilitates the expeditious disposal of certain matters, it is governed by stringent rules to prevent its misuse. At the heart of this regulatory scheme lies Order XIX, Rule 3, a provision that has been the subject of extensive judicial interpretation for over a century. The Rule stipulates:

3. Matters to which affidavits shall be confined.—

(1) Affidavits shall be confined to such facts as the deponent is able of his own knowledge to prove, except on interlocutory applications, on which statements of his belief may be admitted: provided that the grounds thereof are stated.

(2) The costs of every affidavit which shall unnecessarily set forth matters of hearsay or argumentative matter, or copies of or extracts from documents, shall (unless the Court otherwise directs) be paid by the party filing the same.

This article posits that Order XIX, Rule 3 is not a mere procedural formality but a cornerstone of procedural justice in India. It serves a dual purpose: first, it establishes personal knowledge as the bedrock of affidavit evidence, ensuring accountability; second, while permitting statements of belief in interlocutory matters, it mandates the disclosure of the grounds for such belief, thereby preventing the introduction of vague, irresponsible, or unsubstantiated allegations into the judicial record. Through an analysis of seminal and contemporary case law, this article will demonstrate the unwavering insistence of the Indian judiciary on the strict observance of this rule as a vital safeguard for the integrity of the adjudicatory process.

The Foundational Dichotomy: Personal Knowledge versus Substantiated Belief

The General Rule: The Primacy of Personal Knowledge

The primary injunction of Order XIX, Rule 3(1) is that an affidavit must be confined to facts that the deponent can prove from their "own knowledge." This requirement is fundamental to the nature of an affidavit as a form of evidence. Unlike a deposition, where the veracity of a statement can be tested through cross-examination, an affidavit is often taken ex parte.^[1] The insistence on personal knowledge ensures that the deponent is testifying to matters they have personally witnessed or experienced, for which they can be held responsible, including under the law of perjury. This principle distinguishes a valid affidavit, which holds evidentiary value, from a mere collection of assertions.

The Interlocutory Exception and its Indispensable Proviso

The rule carves out a critical exception for interlocutory applications, such as those for temporary injunctions or the appointment of a receiver. In such proceedings, which often demand swift judicial intervention, the court may admit statements of belief. However, this relaxation is not absolute. It is subject to a mandatory proviso: "provided that the grounds thereof are stated." The judiciary has interpreted this proviso not as a directory guideline but as a condition precedent for the admissibility of statements not based on personal knowledge.

The locus classicus on this subject is the Calcutta High Court's decision in Padmabati Dasi v. Rasik Lal Dhar (1909).^[2] In this case, the court held that an affidavit containing a general averment based on "knowledge, information, and belief" without specifying the source of the information or the grounds for the belief was legally insufficient. The court emphatically stated that the provisions of Order XIX, Rule 3 must be strictly observed, and an affidavit that fails to distinguish between matters of knowledge and matters of belief, and fails to state the grounds for the latter, is defective and cannot be used as evidence.

This century-old principle has been consistently affirmed by the Supreme Court of India. In State Of Bombay v. Purushottam Jog Naik (1952), the Court, while dealing with a preventive detention matter, scrutinized an affidavit filed by the Home Secretary. It found the affidavit deficient because it did not disclose the source of information for the facts stated, thereby violating the mandate of Order XIX, Rule 3.^[3] The Court observed that when a deponent makes statements based on information, the sources of that information must be clearly disclosed. This principle was elevated to the highest authority by a Constitution Bench in A.K.K. Nambiar v. Union of India (1969), which explicitly approved the law laid down in Padmabati Dasi, cementing its status as the definitive interpretation of the rule.^[4] The enduring vitality of this principle is evident in recent judgments, such as Faizul Hoque v. State of West Bengal (2025), where the Calcutta High Court reiterated that every affidavit must expressly state how much is a statement of knowledge and how much is a statement of belief, with the grounds for belief stated with sufficient particularity.^[5]

Judicial Application and Consequences of Non-Compliance

Heightened Scrutiny in Allegations of Mala Fides

The courts apply the requirements of Order XIX, Rule 3 with even greater rigour when affidavits are used to make serious allegations, such as fraud or mala fides, particularly against public officials. The Supreme Court's judgment in Shivajirao Nilangekar Patil v. Dr. Mahesh Madhav Gosavi (1986) is instructive.^[6] In that case, allegations of manipulation of examination results were made against the then Chief Minister of Maharashtra. The Court observed that the affidavit making these allegations was unreliable because it lacked clarity regarding the sources of information. It held that when allegations of mala fides are levelled, the burden of proof is high, and courts must insist on strict compliance with procedural rules, including Order XIX, Rule 3. An affidavit that fails this test cannot form the basis for a finding of fact, and the allegations remain mere "adverse comments" rather than proven facts.

The Consequence of a Defective Affidavit

An affidavit that contravenes Order XIX, Rule 3 is not merely irregular; it is legally infirm and devoid of evidentiary value. The courts have repeatedly held that such an affidavit is liable to be rejected and cannot be relied upon. The information contained therein is considered inadmissible. While Rule 3(2) provides for a specific penalty of costs for affidavits containing unnecessary hearsay or argumentative matter, as noted in Mis. Stellar Information Technology Private Ltd. v. Chandan Kumar Chaudhary (2022),^[7] the consequence for failing to state the grounds of belief under Rule 3(1) is more severe: the statement itself is rendered inadmissible. The affidavit is treated as mere waste paper, and the court is precluded from considering its contents.

Interplay with Other Provisions of the CPC

The principles of Order XIX, Rule 3 are often considered in conjunction with other procedural requirements, most notably the verification of pleadings under Order VI, Rule 15. The CPC (Amendment) Act of 2002 made it mandatory for a pleading to be supported by an affidavit. A question thus arose whether this supporting affidavit must also comply with the stringent requirements of Order XIX, Rule 3.

The High Courts have clarified this distinction. In Syed Wasif Husain Rizvi v. Hasan Raza Khan (2016), the Allahabad High Court differentiated between the verification of a pleading and an affidavit intended as evidence.^[8] This was further elaborated by the Bombay High Court in cases like Mahesh Rupnarayan Soni v. Sheikhah Fedia Saad Al-Abdullah Al-Sabah (2022).^[9] The consensus is that while the verification of a pleading under Order VI, Rule 15 requires the person to specify what is based on knowledge and what is based on information believed to be true, an affidavit filed as evidence, even in support of a pleading, must meet the higher threshold of Order XIX, Rule 3. If statements of belief are made, especially in the context of an interlocutory application supported by such an affidavit, the grounds for that belief must be explicitly stated for the affidavit to have any probative value.

Conclusion

Order XIX, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, embodies a fundamental principle of legal procedure: that judicial decisions must be based on credible and verifiable evidence. The consistent and strict interpretation of this rule by the Indian judiciary, from the seminal ruling in Padmabati Dasi to contemporary pronouncements, underscores its importance. It acts as a crucial filter, preventing the judicial process from being clogged with hearsay, conjecture, and irresponsible allegations. By mandating that deponents either speak from personal knowledge or, in limited circumstances, disclose the basis of their belief, the rule promotes accountability, fairness, and the pursuit of truth. Its rigorous enforcement is not a matter of procedural pedantry but an essential act of preserving the sanctity and integrity of the administration of justice in India.