Challenging Ex Parte Injunctions

The primary utility of Order 39 Rule 4 is to provide an immediate remedy to a party against whom an ex parte injunction has been granted. Such a party can approach the same court to demonstrate that the injunction was granted erroneously, without proper basis, or that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case, balance of convenience, or irreparable injury. The Supreme Court in A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu v. S. Chellappan And Others (2000 SCC 7 695) emphasized that while courts have the power to grant ex parte injunctions, this power is circumscribed by procedural mandates, and any order passed in violation can be challenged. The court noted the importance of the thirty-day limit for disposing of ex parte injunction applications under Order 39 Rule 3-A, a principle also reflected in the first proviso to Rule 4.

Suppression or Misrepresentation of Material Facts

A significant ground for seeking discharge of an injunction, particularly an ex parte one, is the suppression or misrepresentation of material facts by the party who obtained the injunction. The judiciary has consistently held that a litigant approaching the court for equitable relief must do so with "clean hands."

In Dalip Singh v. State Of Uttar Pradesh And Others (2010 SCC CRI 1 324), the Supreme Court deprecated the practice of litigants misleading courts and emphasized that those who make false statements or suppress material facts are not entitled to relief. While this case did not directly involve Order 39 Rule 4, its principles are squarely applicable. The Court observed, "litigants must approach the judiciary with honesty, and any attempt to corrupt the justice delivery system through deceit would not be tolerated."

Similarly, in M/S. Seemax Construction (P) Ltd. v. State Bank Of India And Another (1991 SCC ONLINE DEL 668), the Delhi High Court dismissed an application for an injunction, holding that the plaintiff had suppressed material facts by not disclosing prior related lawsuits. The court, relying on precedents like The King v. The General Commissioners for the purposes of the Income-tax Acts for the District of Kensington (1917 1 KB 486), affirmed that suppression of material facts can lead to the rejection of discretionary relief without examining the merits. This principle directly informs the court's power to discharge an injunction under Order 39 Rule 4 if it was obtained through such means.

The Supreme Court in Ramrameshwari Devi And Others v. Nirmala Devi And Others (2011 SCC 8 249), while primarily addressing frivolous litigation and costs, also touched upon the importance of truthfulness. Dishonest litigants who obtain interim orders by misleading the court can have such orders vacated under Order 39 Rule 4, and may also face exemplary costs.

Non-Compliance with Procedural Mandates (Order 39 Rule 3 & 3A)

Order 39 Rule 3 CPC mandates that the court shall, before granting an injunction, direct notice to the opposite party, except where it appears that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by delay. In such ex parte cases, the proviso to Rule 3 requires the court to record reasons for its opinion and to ensure compliance with Rule 3(a) regarding service of documents. Furthermore, Order 39 Rule 3A (and the first proviso to Rule 4) mandates an endeavor to dispose of the application within thirty days.

Failure to comply with these procedural safeguards can be a ground for an application under Order 39 Rule 4. In Hari Chand v. Panchayat Mohalla Soodan (Punjab & Haryana High Court, 2018), the court noted that the requirement of recording reasons under Order 39 Rule 3 CPC is mandatory. If an ex parte injunction is granted without recording reasons, or if the plaintiff fails to supply documents as required, the aggrieved party can seek its vacation under Rule 4. The court in Hari Chand emphasized that the opposite party must be enabled "to approach the Court for vacation of such ex parte ad interim injunction order... and/or to bring to the notice of the Court facts which may not have been disclosed."

The Supreme Court in A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu (supra) also highlighted that procedural lapses, such as not limiting an injunction's duration or failing to provide notice when required, are critical and can necessitate setting aside the injunction. The Calcutta High Court in Nanda Roy & Ors. v. Gynanidhi Trust & Ors. (2015) observed that if the mandate of Order 39 Rule 3A is flouted, the aggrieved party is entitled to appeal, and by extension, such non-compliance would also be a strong ground for an Order 39 Rule 4 application.

Change in Circumstances or Undue Hardship (Post-Hearing Injunctions)

The second proviso to Order 39 Rule 4 specifically addresses situations where an injunction order was passed after giving the party an opportunity of being heard. In such cases, the rule restricts the grounds for discharge, variation, or setting aside to: (a) a change in circumstances, or (b) the court's satisfaction that the order has caused undue hardship to the party.

This implies that a party cannot repeatedly agitate the same points that were considered when the injunction was granted after a hearing. However, if subsequent events materially alter the situation on which the injunction was based, or if the continued operation of the injunction causes unforeseen and disproportionate hardship, the court can intervene. The observations in Upendra Nath Srivastava v. Additional District And Sessions Judge/Special Judge, Pocso Act, Court No. 1,Lko. And 3 Others (Allahabad High Court, 2024), though general, are pertinent here: "in many cases, it has been discovered that while protecting the plaintiffs from suffering the alleged injury, more serious injury has been caused to the defendants due to continuance of interim orders of injunction without final hearing." Such undue hardship can be a ground under the second proviso. In Bepin Krishna Sur And Ors. v. Gautam Kumar Sur And Ors. (Calcutta High Court, 1980), an application under Order 39 Rule 4 was rejected by the trial court, presumably because the defendants could not demonstrate changed circumstances or undue hardship sufficient to vary an earlier injunction that had been made absolute after hearing parties.

Locus Standi: Application by a Dissatisfied Party

Order 39 Rule 4 explicitly states that an application can be made by "any party dissatisfied with such order." This includes not only the original defendants but also parties who may have been subsequently impleaded and are affected by the injunction. In The Gram Panchayat Barmer v. Firm Marudhar Stone Industries Barmer & Others (2000 SCC ONLINE RAJ 32), the Rajasthan High Court held that a party impleaded as a defendant after the passing of an injunction order under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 has a legal right to be heard and can move an application under Order 39 Rule 4 to set aside the earlier injunction order. The court found that the lower court erred in rejecting the new party's Rule 4 application on the ground that the earlier order had become final.

Interplay with Appeal (Order 43 Rule 1(r) CPC) and Doctrine of Election

An order granting or refusing an injunction, or an order under Order 39 Rule 4, is appealable under Order 43 Rule 1(r) CPC. A question often arises whether a party can pursue both remedies – an application under Order 39 Rule 4 before the same court and an appeal under Order 43 Rule 1(r) before the appellate court – simultaneously or in succession.

The Supreme Court in A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu (supra), and later affirmed in Sajjan Kumar Tharad & Anr. v. Deoris Marbaniang (Gauhati High Court, 2010, citing the SC), clarified that "any order passed in exercise of the aforesaid powers in Rule 1 would be appealable... The choice is for the party affected by the order either to move the appellate Court or to approach the same Court which passed the ex-parte order for any relief." This suggests an election of remedies. In Mahesh Yadav And Others v. Ram Mohan Agarwal And Others (Allahabad High Court, 2023), the court considered objections to the maintainability of an Order 39 Rule 4 application where the defendants had already filed an appeal under Order 43 Rule 1 against the ex parte injunction, highlighting the complexities of the doctrine of election in this context. The trial court in that case decided to hear the O39R4 application. Contrastingly, the Calcutta High Court in Sankar Kumar Ghosh, In Re (1983 SCC ONLINE CAL 24), took a view that an appeal under Order 43 Rule 1(r) might not lie against an ad interim injunction if an application under Order 39 Rule 4 is already pending before the court of first instance, suggesting a preference for exhausting the remedy before the original court first in certain circumstances. However, the Supreme Court's view in A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu generally allows the party to choose.

Scope of Inquiry by the Court

When adjudicating an application under Order 39 Rule 4, the court essentially re-evaluates the grounds on which the injunction was granted, especially if it was an ex parte order. This includes reconsidering the prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury, in light of the new material or arguments presented by the applicant under Rule 4. If the application is based on suppression of facts, the court examines the materiality of the suppressed facts. For orders passed after hearing, the inquiry is limited by the second proviso to changed circumstances or undue hardship.

In Gangadhar Raut v. Bindo Bihari Nayak (Orissa High Court, 1998), where an ex parte ad interim injunction was granted and the defendant filed an application under Order 39 Rule 4, the trial court confirmed the injunction. The appellate court, however, vacated it and also commented on the suit's maintainability. The High Court, in revision, held that in injunction matters, the court is primarily to find a prima facie case, irreparable loss, and balance of convenience, and should not delve deep into the suit's maintainability at that stage. This implies that the scope of an O39R4 hearing should also be confined to these parameters as relevant to the interim relief.

Time Limit for Disposal of Applications

The first proviso to Order 39 Rule 4 mandates that if an injunction was granted ex parte, the court "shall make an endeavour to finally dispose of the application" (presumably the original injunction application, which would encompass hearing the Rule 4 objections) within thirty days from the date the injunction was granted. If unable, reasons must be recorded. This aligns with Order 39 Rule 3A. The Supreme Court in A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu (supra) stressed the importance of this time limit. The Calcutta High Court in Nanda Roy & Ors. v. Gynanidhi Trust & Ors. (2015) went further to state that failure to decide the application or vacate the ex parte temporary injunction within thirty days could, for appeal purposes, be deemed a final order on the application, and suggested accountability for erring judicial officers. This underscores the judiciary's intent to prevent ex parte orders from continuing indefinitely without a hearing on the merits of the objections raised via a Rule 4 application or otherwise.