Analysis of Atrocity Offences Involving Intentional Humiliation under the SC/ST Act

An Analysis of Offences Involving Intentional Humiliation under Section 3(1) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989

Introduction

The Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter "SC/ST Act" or "the Act") was enacted with the profound objective of preventing the commission of atrocities against members of Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs), to provide for Special Courts for the trial of such offences, and for the relief and rehabilitation of the victims.[1] The Act acknowledges the historical injustices and continuing vulnerabilities faced by these communities, aiming to safeguard their dignity and ensure their socio-economic upliftment.[2] Amongst its various provisions, those penalizing acts of intentional insult and humiliation hold particular significance in addressing everyday manifestations of caste-based discrimination. This article specifically analyzes Section 3(1)(x) of the Act as it originally stood, and its subsequent iterations, primarily Section 3(1)(r) and Section 3(1)(s) following the 2016 amendment, focusing on the essential ingredients of these offences and their interpretation by the Indian judiciary.

Legislative Framework and Evolution

Section 3 of the SC/ST Act enumerates various acts that constitute "atrocities" when committed by a person not belonging to an SC or ST community against a member of an SC or ST community.[1], [3] The original Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act, prior to its amendment vide S.O. 152(E) dated 18 January 2016, read as follows:

"(1) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, —
... (x) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view; ... shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months but which may extend to five years and with fine."[4], [1]

The Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Amendment Act, 2015 (Act No. 1 of 2016), which came into effect on January 26, 2016, substituted and expanded these provisions. The erstwhile Section 3(1)(x) found its place primarily in the newly inserted Section 3(1)(r), and a related offence was articulated in Section 3(1)(s). These sections read:

"3. Punishments for offences of atrocities- (1) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,-
... (r) intentionally insults or intimidates with the intent to humiliate a member of the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view.
... (s) abuses any member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe by caste name in any place within public view;"[5]

The legislative intent behind these provisions is to address and penalize acts that, through verbal abuse and humiliation, attack the dignity of individuals belonging to SC/ST communities, reinforcing caste hierarchies and perpetuating discrimination.[2]

Key Ingredients of the Offence

For an act to constitute an offence under Section 3(1)(x) (now Section 3(1)(r) and/or Section 3(1)(s)), certain ingredients must be established by the prosecution. The judiciary has, through numerous pronouncements, clarified these essential elements.

1. Status of the Accused and the Victim

A foundational requirement is that the alleged perpetrator must not be a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, and the victim must be a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe.[3], [1] If both the accused and the complainant belong to the SC/ST category, the provisions of Section 3(1) of the Act are not attracted.[6] Furthermore, the prosecution must establish that the victim indeed belongs to an SC or ST community; mere assertion without proof, such as a caste certificate, may be insufficient.[7]

2. "Intentionally Insults or Intimidates with Intent to Humiliate" (Section 3(1)(r)) / "Abuses... by Caste Name" (Section 3(1)(s))

The mens rea is a critical component. The act of insult or intimidation must be "intentional" and carried out "with intent to humiliate" the SC/ST member.[5], [8] Simply calling a person by their caste name, for instance "Chamar," may not per se be an offence unless the context shows it was done with the intent to insult or humiliate.[9], [10] However, the Supreme Court in Swaran Singh And Others v. State Through Standing Counsel And Another recognized that the term "chamar" is often used in a derogatory sense to insult and humiliate, and its use with such intent falls within the ambit of the offence.[11]

Crucially, the insult or intimidation must be on account of the victim belonging to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe.[8], [12] If the dispute is purely personal or civil in nature, and the caste identity of the victim is incidental rather than the reason for the abuse, the offence under the SC/ST Act may not be made out. In Hitesh Verma v. State Of Uttarakhand And Another, the Supreme Court quashed charges under the Act where the dispute was primarily over property, and the alleged abuses, though offensive, were not found to be motivated by the victim's caste status.[12] Similarly, in Gorige Pentaiah v. State Of Andhra Pradesh And Others, proceedings were quashed as essential elements, including intentional insult due to caste in public view, were absent.[13] The Court in Dinesh Alias Buddha v. State Of Rajasthan also found Section 3(2)(v) of the Atrocities Act inapplicable due to the absence of evidence that the offence was committed on the basis of the victim's SC/ST membership.[14]

Section 3(1)(s) specifically targets abuse "by caste name." While overlapping with Section 3(1)(r), it emphasizes the mode of abuse, making the utterance of caste-based slurs in public view a distinct offence.[5]

3. "In Any Place Within Public View"

This element is pivotal and has been subject to considerable judicial interpretation. The expression "in any place within public view" is distinct from "public place."[11], [12] An offence can occur in a privately-owned place if it is visible or audible to the public. For instance, a lawn outside a house, visible from a public road, would be a "place within public view."[11], [8]

However, if the alleged incident occurs inside a private building, such as a house, and no member of the public (apart from the complainant, accused, and their immediate family members involved in the altercation) is present to witness it, the ingredient of "public view" may not be satisfied. In Ramesh Chandra Vaishya v. The State Of Uttar Pradesh, the Supreme Court noted that the FIR was silent about the place of occurrence and the presence of any member of the public, and the charge-sheet indicated witnesses were the complainant, his wife, and son. The incident appeared to have occurred at the appellant's house, leading to the quashing of the charge under Section 3(1)(x).[4] Similarly, in Hitesh Verma, abuses confined within the four walls of the informant’s building, with no evidence of being in public view, were held not to meet the statutory requirement.[12] Conversely, the Bombay High Court in Sambhaji v. State Of Maharashtra Another observed that a place of ordinary residence, like a courtyard, could be "within public view" if the illegalities could be activated to be known to the public at large.[15]

Judicial Scrutiny and Quashing of Proceedings

The High Courts, exercising their inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), and the Supreme Court, can quash criminal proceedings, including those under the SC/ST Act, if the allegations in the FIR or charge-sheet, even if taken at face value, do not prima facie constitute an offence or if the proceedings amount to an abuse of the process of law.[13], [12]

The Supreme Court in Gorige Pentaiah emphasized that allowing proceedings based on unfounded allegations unjustly impacts the accused and clogs the judicial machinery.[13] In Hitesh Verma, the Court reiterated that for an offence under Section 3(1)(r) (formerly 3(1)(x)), the insult must be specifically intended to humiliate the victim because of their caste, and must occur in public view.[12] The necessity for the FIR or at least the charge-sheet to outline the specific utterances and circumstances to enable the court to ascertain if an offence is made out was highlighted in cases like Ramesh Chandra Vaishya and FULLERTON INDIA CREDIT CO LTD.[4], [16]

While Section 18 of the SC/ST Act bars the application of Section 438 CrPC (anticipatory bail) for offences under the Act,[17] courts have held that a prima facie scrutiny of the complaint is necessary. If the complaint does not make out an offence under the SC/ST Act, the bar under Section 18 may not apply.[18] This ensures that the stringent provisions of the Act are not misused to settle personal scores or in cases where the ingredients of the atrocity are clearly absent.

Challenges in Application and Interpretation

Despite judicial clarifications, challenges persist in the application of these sections.

  • Proving Intent: Establishing that an insult or intimidation was "intentional" and "with intent to humiliate" specifically due to the victim's caste can be complex, often relying on circumstantial evidence and the context of the incident.[19]
  • Defining "Public View": The factual determination of whether a place is "within public view" can be contentious, especially in incidents occurring in semi-private spaces.
  • Misuse of Provisions: Courts have acknowledged instances where the Act's provisions might be invoked in property disputes or personal vendettas, necessitating careful scrutiny to prevent abuse of process.[13], [12], [20]
  • Evidentiary Issues: The reliability and corroboration of witness testimonies, especially when parties are involved in pre-existing disputes, are crucial. The non-examination of Investigating Officers or lack of independent corroboration can weaken the prosecution case.[21]

The judiciary often has to strike a delicate balance between upholding the protective mandate of the SC/ST Act and ensuring that individuals are not subjected to frivolous or malicious prosecution. Cases like Surendra Kaurav And Others v. State Of M.P illustrate situations where the immediate trigger for the incident was unrelated to the complainant's caste, even if caste-based slurs were allegedly used during the altercation.[19] Similarly, acquittals have occurred where the prosecution failed to prove the specific caste-based intent or other essential ingredients beyond reasonable doubt.[22], [23]

Conclusion

Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act, 1989, and its amended forms, Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s), are vital legal instruments for combating caste-based verbal abuse and humiliation, which are deeply offensive to human dignity. The Indian judiciary has played a crucial role in interpreting these provisions, emphasizing the necessity of establishing specific intent to humiliate on account of caste and the occurrence of the act "within public view." While the Act serves as a strong deterrent and a means of redress for victims of caste atrocities, the courts remain vigilant to ensure that its provisions are applied fairly, all essential ingredients of the offence are strictly proven, and the legal process is not abused. The continued nuanced interpretation and careful application of these sections are imperative for achieving the Act's objective of creating a society free from caste-based discrimination and violence, upholding the constitutional promise of equality and dignity for all citizens.

References

  1. Manju Devi v. Onkarjit Singh Ahluwalia Alias Omkarjeet Singh And Others (Supreme Court Of India, 2017)
  2. G. Krishnan v. Union Of India (Madras High Court, 2005)
  3. Smt. Saroj Kumari v. State Of Haryana . (Punjab & Haryana High Court, 2001)
  4. RAMESH CHANDRA VAISHYA v. THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH (Supreme Court Of India, 2023)
  5. PRITI AGARWALLA v. THE STATE OF GNCT OF DELHI (Supreme Court Of India, 2024)
  6. Satto Sada v. State Of Bihar (2010 SCC ONLINE PAT 1752, Patna High Court, 2010)
  7. Bharatsingh v. State Of M.P. (2006 SCC ONLINE MP 279, Madhya Pradesh High Court, 2006)
  8. RAGHUNATH v. STATE AND ORS (Rajasthan High Court, 2023)
  9. Malludas v. State Of M.P (Madhya Pradesh High Court, 2011)
  10. Afzaal v. State of Uttarakhand (Uttarakhand High Court, 2011) (citing Gorige Pentaiah)
  11. Swaran Singh And Others v. State Through Standing Counsel And Another (2008 SCC 8 435, Supreme Court Of India, 2008)
  12. Hitesh Verma v. State Of Uttarakhand And Another (2021 SCC CRI 1 1, Supreme Court Of India, 2020)
  13. Gorige Pentaiah v. State Of Andhra Pradesh And Others (2009 SCC CR 1 446, Supreme Court Of India, 2008)
  14. Dinesh Alias Buddha v. State Of Rajasthan . (2006 SCC 3 771, Supreme Court Of India, 2006)
  15. Sambhaji v. State Of Maharashtra Another (Bombay High Court, 2013)
  16. FULLERTON INDIA CREDIT CO LTD THROUGH ITS AUTHORIZED REPRESENTED MR RANJEET KUMAR v. THE STATE OF JHARKHAND (Jharkhand High Court, 2023)
  17. Vilas Pandurang Pawar And Another v. State Of Maharashtra And Others (2012 SCC 8 795, Supreme Court Of India, 2012)
  18. State Of Karnataka v. Appa Balu Ingale And Others (1995 SUPP SCC 4 469, Supreme Court Of India, 1992) (While this case is on Protection of Civil Rights Act, the principle of judicial scrutiny in social justice legislations is relevant, though specific bar of S.18 SC/ST Act is distinct). *Vilas Pandurang Pawar* is more direct on S.18.
  19. Surendra Kaurav And Others v. State Of M.P (2007 SCC ONLINE MP 636, Madhya Pradesh High Court, 2007)
  20. SHRI. PRAFULCHANDRA GOVIND OAK v. THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ANR. (Bombay High Court, 2017)
  21. RAM SUDISTHA SINGH and ORS v. STATE OF BIHAR (Patna High Court, 2024)
  22. Kewal Chand v. State Of Rajasthan & Anr. (2011 SCC ONLINE RAJ 54, Rajasthan High Court, 2011)
  23. DHARAMVEER SINGH v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN (Rajasthan High Court, 2024)