An Analysis of Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894: Judicial Interpretation and Application in India

An Analysis of Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894: Judicial Interpretation and Application in India

Introduction

Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter "L.A. Act, 1894" or "the Act"), introduced by the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, stands as a significant provision aimed at ensuring equity and fairness in the determination of compensation for compulsorily acquired land. It provides a mechanism for landowners, who may not have sought a reference to the civil court under Section 18 of the Act, to claim redetermination of compensation if a court subsequently enhances the compensation for other lands covered by the same acquisition notification. This article undertakes a comprehensive analysis of Section 28-A, tracing its legislative intent and examining its interpretation and application by the Indian judiciary, drawing heavily upon key pronouncements of the Supreme Court and various High Courts. The objective is to delineate the contours of this provision, including its scope, eligibility criteria, procedural requirements, and the overarching principles guiding its enforcement.

Historical Context and Legislative Intent

Section 28-A was not part of the original L.A. Act, 1894. Its incorporation through the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, was a deliberate legislative intervention to address a perceived lacuna in the compensation mechanism. The Statement of Objects and Reasons accompanying the Amendment Act explicitly clarified the purpose behind introducing Section 28-A. As noted by the Supreme Court in NEW OKHLA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. HARNAND SINGH (DECEASED) THR. LRS. (Supreme Court Of India, 2024) (Ref 7), Section 28-A aimed to "rectify disparities between landowners." It sought to address situations where more affluent or informed landowners could avail themselves of a reference to the civil court under Section 18, potentially securing higher compensation, while "inarticulate and poor people often could not resort to a similar recourse, resulting in inequality in compensation for similar quality of land."

The Supreme Court in Babua Ram And Others v. State Of U.P And Another (1995 SCC 2 689) (Ref 2) also emphasized this legislative intent, observing that the provision was particularly beneficial for those who, due to socio-economic constraints such as poverty or inarticulateness, did not proactively seek legal redress. Similarly, the Allahabad High Court in Sayeed Alam And Others v. State Of U.P And Others (Allahabad High Court, 2009) (Ref 12), citing Mewa Ram v. State of Haryana ((1986) 4 SCC 151), reiterated that Section 28-A was intended for "inarticulate and poor people who by reason of their poverty and ignorance have failed to take advantage of the right of reference to the civil court under Section 18." The provision, therefore, embodies a principle of social justice, striving to ensure that all persons whose lands are acquired under the same notification receive compensation on a par, irrespective of their ability to litigate.

Key Interpretive Themes by the Judiciary

The judiciary has played a crucial role in shaping the application of Section 28-A. Several key themes have emerged from judicial pronouncements, clarifying its scope, eligibility, procedural nuances, and underlying constitutional principles.

1. Scope and Applicability of Section 28-A

The Supreme Court in Babua Ram (1995 SCC 2 689) (Ref 2) established that Section 28-A operates prospectively, meaning it applies only to awards made by the Collector after the commencement of the Amendment Act on September 24, 1984. Awards made prior to this date cannot be reopened under this section.

Furthermore, the applicability of Section 28-A is confined to acquisitions made under the L.A. Act, 1894. In Union Of India And Another v. Babu Singh And Others (1996 SCC 1 477) (Ref 19), the Supreme Court held that Section 28-A has no application to acquisitions made under the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952, emphasizing that a wrong concession by counsel cannot confer jurisdiction where none exists.

A fundamental prerequisite for invoking Section 28-A is that the applicant's land must be "covered by the same notification under Section 4, sub-section (1)" to which the court award (forming the basis of the redetermination claim) relates. This was highlighted by the Bombay High Court in Maimune Banu Hamidali Khan & Others v. State & Others (Bombay High Court, 2000) (Ref 9) and the Allahabad High Court in Chhangur v. State Of U.P And Anr. (Allahabad High Court, 2007) (Ref 14), which stated, "it is immaterial whether such land is situated in the same village or different villages and forms part of the same award made by Collector or different awards, instead thereof the essential condition is that the land must be covered by same notification under Section 4(1) of the Act."

2. Eligibility: The "Person Aggrieved" and Entitlement to Apply

The phrase "person aggrieved" and the conditions for eligibility under Section 28-A have been extensively litigated.

  • Non-invocation of Section 18: The primary beneficiaries of Section 28-A are those landowners who "had not made an application to the Collector under Section 18" (Tanaji Abaso Pawar v. State Of Maharashtra, Bombay High Court, 2004 (Ref 11); Maimune Banu, 2000 (Ref 9)).
  • Exclusion of those who availed Section 18: Conversely, individuals who have already sought a reference under Section 18 and pursued their claims, irrespective of the outcome, are generally not entitled to apply under Section 28-A. The Supreme Court in Scheduled Caste Co-Operative Land Owning Society Ltd., Bhatinda v. Union Of India And Others (1991 SCC 1 174) (Ref 6) clarified that Section 28-A was expressly designed for claimants who had not sought a reference under Section 18, thereby excluding those who had actively engaged in the reference and appeal process. This principle was also affirmed in Mewa Ram v. State of Haryana (cited in Sayeed Alam, 2009 (Ref 12)) and Chhangur (2007) (Ref 14), the latter noting that the principle of res judicata might apply.
  • Impact of technical dismissal of Section 18 application: A significant clarification came from the Supreme Court in Union Of India And Another v. Hansoli Devi And Others (2002 SCC 7 273) (Ref 5, 16, 17). The Court held that if an application under Section 18 was dismissed on technical grounds, such as delay, it amounts to "not filing an application" within the meaning of Section 28-A. Such a person is, therefore, entitled to maintain an application under Section 28-A, provided other conditions are met. This interpretation ensures that procedural missteps in invoking Section 18 do not perpetually bar a landowner from the benefits of Section 28-A. The Andhra Pradesh High Court in Guthula Seshagiri Rao v. Collector (2008 SCC ONLINE AP 276) (Ref 20) applied this principle where the petitioner's Section 18 application was dismissed for limitation.
  • Receipt of compensation without protest: The Hansoli Devi judgment (2002 SCC 7 273) (Ref 5, 17) also clarified that a person who has received compensation without protest, pursuant to the Collector's award, and has not filed an application under Section 18, can still be considered a "person aggrieved" within the meaning of Section 28-A. This prevents the mere acceptance of the initial award from acting as an estoppel against seeking redetermination under Section 28-A.

3. Limitation Period for Application

Section 28-A(1) prescribes a specific limitation period for making an application for redetermination.

  • The Three-Month Rule: An application must be made to the Collector "within three months from the date of the award of the Court" on the basis of which redetermination is sought (Tanaji Abaso Pawar, 2004 (Ref 11); Maimune Banu, 2000 (Ref 9)). The proviso to Section 28-A(1) clarifies that in computing this period, "the day on which the award was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded" (Tanaji Abaso Pawar, 2004 (Ref 11)).
  • The "Award" Triggering Limitation – Judicial Evolution: A crucial point of interpretation was whether the limitation period under Section 28-A would be triggered only by the *first* award of the court enhancing compensation after the 1984 amendment, or by *any subsequent* award related to the same Section 4 notification. Initially, in cases like Babua Ram (1995 SCC 2 689) (Ref 2) and Union of India v. Karnail Singh (1995 SCC 2 728) (Ref 3, cited in Union Of India And Another v. Hansoli Devi And Others, 2001 SCC 4 404 (Ref 18)), a view was taken that the limitation would run from the earliest award. However, the Supreme Court in Union Of India And Another v. Pradeep Kumari And Others (1995 SCC 2 736) (Ref 3) took a more liberal stance. It held that an application under Section 28-A could be made within three months from the date of *any* award of the Reference Court or Appellate Court (passed after the 1984 amendment) enhancing compensation, not necessarily the first such award. The Court reasoned that restricting Section 28-A to the first award would undermine its purpose, as subsequent awards could result in higher compensation based on better evidence. This interpretation was aimed at ensuring that the benefit of the provision was widely available. The Pradeep Kumari ruling explicitly expressed disagreement with the view in Babua Ram on this point (as noted in Hansoli Devi, 2001 SCC 4 404 (Ref 18)). The Allahabad High Court in Chhangur (2007) (Ref 14) also acknowledged this shift in law, citing Pradeep Kumari.
  • Need for Procedural Compliance: Despite the beneficent nature of the provision, procedural compliance, including adherence to the limitation period, remains important. In NOIDA v. Harnand Singh (2024) (Ref 7), the Supreme Court noted that landowners had not demonstrated compliance with procedural technicalities, such as writing to the Collector within the prescribed limitation period, as one of the reasons for not delving deep into their prayer for parity under Section 28-A in that specific instance.

4. The Redetermination Process

Section 28-A outlines a two-stage process for redetermination, potentially involving a further reference to the court.

  • Application to Collector and Collector's Inquiry (Section 28-A(1) & (2)): Upon receiving a written application under Section 28-A(1), the Collector is mandated by Section 28-A(2) to "conduct an inquiry after giving notice to all the persons interested and giving them a reasonable opportunity of being heard, and make an award determining the amount of compensation payable to the applicants" (Tanaji Abaso Pawar, 2004 (Ref 11)). The Allahabad High Court in Feroz Gandhi Polytechnic, Rae Bareli v. 3Rd Addl.District Judge, Rae Bareli And Others (1995 LCD 13 351) (Ref 21) dealt with a scenario where the Collector referred the Section 28-A application to the Court for redetermination, which the petitioner (beneficiary of acquisition) challenged. The High Court in Tanaji Abaso Pawar (2004) (Ref 11) noted that the procedure under Sections 11 and 12(2) of the Act would also apply to such inquiries.
  • Further Reference to Court (Section 28-A(3)): If a person has not accepted the award made by the Collector under Section 28-A(2), they can, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred for determination by the Court. Section 28-A(3) stipulates that "the provisions of sections 18 to 28 shall, so far as may be, apply to such reference as they apply to a reference under section 18" (Tanaji Abaso Pawar, 2004 (Ref 11)). This ensures a judicial review of the Collector's redetermined award. The Punjab & Haryana High Court in Smt. Kanta v. State Of Haryana And Another (Punjab & Haryana High Court, 2012) (Ref 13) dealt with an appeal arising from a landowner's application under Section 28-A(3). The Kerala High Court in District Collector v. Athickal Muhammed Kunhi (Kerala High Court, 2012) (Ref 15), relying on Ramakrishna Rao v. Singareni Collieries Company Ltd. (2010 (4) KLT 255 (SC)), affirmed that a person who benefits from higher compensation under Section 28-A(1) can also make an application under Section 28-A(3) if dissatisfied with the Collector's redetermined amount.

5. Judicial Approach: Beneficent Construction and Constitutional Dimensions

Courts have generally adopted a beneficent construction towards Section 28-A, keeping in mind its objective of providing relief to landowners, particularly the vulnerable.

The Kerala High Court in K.V. Sarada v. Special Tahasildar (Kerala High Court, 2016) (Ref 8) observed that "The Act contemplates the land owner getting the market value as compensation and no technicalities should come in the way of the land owner getting such market value as compensation." It further stated, "The Act being a beneficent legislation, the law is well settled that while construing the provisions of such a legislation, the court should adopt a construction which advances the policy of the legislation to extend the benefit, rather than a construction which has the effect of curtailing the benefit, conferred by it."

This approach is often linked to constitutional rights. The K.V. Sarada case (Ref 8) also highlighted that compulsory acquisition of property has repercussions on the constitutional right under Article 300-A, and therefore, "every effort must be taken to ensure that the person who has been deprived of his land is granted compensation that is not less than what other owners of similar land have received." The Bombay High Court in Maimune Banu (2000) (Ref 9) also referred to Article 300-A in the context of possession taken without authority of law, reinforcing the sanctity of property rights.

The Kerala High Court in District Collector v. Athickal Muhammed Kunhi (2012) (Ref 15) noted that Section 28-A "represents the Legislature's determination to ensure that the goal of equality enshrined in the Preamble of the Constitution and Arts. 38, 39 and 46 thereof is translated into reality" and "also represents statutory embodiment of the doctrine of equality in matters relating to the acquisition of land." It aims to provide "some solace" to landowners who could not seek reference under Section 18 due to various disabilities, by ensuring they "get an opportunity to claim compensation at par with others."

Discussion of Specific Reference Materials

The understanding of Section 28-A has been significantly shaped by landmark judgments. Babua Ram (1995 SCC 2 689) (Ref 2) laid foundational principles regarding prospective application and the initial interpretation of the limitation trigger. However, Pradeep Kumari (1995 SCC 2 736) (Ref 3) marked a pivotal shift by liberalizing the interpretation of the limitation period, allowing applications based on any subsequent court award enhancing compensation. This was a crucial development in expanding the beneficial reach of the provision. Subsequently, Hansoli Devi (2002 SCC 7 273) (Ref 5, 17) provided vital clarifications on who constitutes a "person aggrieved," particularly by including those whose Section 18 applications were dismissed on technical grounds like delay, thereby furthering the equitable intent of Section 28-A.

It is pertinent to note that some provided reference materials, while related to land acquisition, do not directly bear on the interpretation of Section 28-A of the L.A. Act, 1894. For instance, Karnail Kaur And Others v. State Of Punjab And Others (2015 SCC 3 206) (Ref 1) primarily deals with the lapse of land acquisition proceedings under Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013. While it underscores the judiciary's commitment to protecting landowners' rights and ensuring adherence to statutory processes, its direct applicability to the nuances of Section 28-A of the 1894 Act is limited, though it reflects a continuing judicial concern for fairness in land acquisition matters.

Similarly, the summary provided for Special Land Acquisition Officer, Kiadb, Mysore And Another v. Anasuya Bai (Dead) By Legal Representatives And Others (Supreme Court Of India, 2017) (Ref 10) details Sections 28 and 29 of an unspecified Act, likely a state-level legislation concerning acquisition by a Development Board (possibly the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, given "KIADB" and "Board"). These provisions outline a scheme for acquisition and compensation distinct from Section 28-A of the L.A. Act, 1894, and thus, this material serves more as an example of other statutory frameworks for land acquisition rather than a direct commentary on the specific provision under analysis here.

The case of Union Of India v. Munshi Ram (Dead) By Lrs. And Others (2006 SCC 4 538) (Ref 4) illustrates the practical application where the Supreme Court directed redetermination under Section 28-A and noted the Union of India's concession not to challenge applications on the ground of delay in that particular instance, reinforcing the equitable considerations that can influence the application of this section.

Challenges and Contemporary Relevance

Despite numerous judicial clarifications, the application of Section 28-A is not without challenges. Ensuring timely processing of applications by the Collector and subsequent references, if any, remains a practical concern. The balance between the beneficent intent of the provision and the necessity of adhering to procedural requirements, such as the limitation period, continues to be a focal point, as seen in NOIDA v. Harnand Singh (2024) (Ref 7). While the L.A. Act, 1894 has been repealed by the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, the principles underlying Section 28-A concerning parity in compensation and protection of vulnerable landowners continue to hold relevance in the broader discourse on land acquisition and fair compensation in India. The interpretation of Section 28-A through decades of case law provides valuable lessons on how statutory provisions aimed at social and economic justice are given life by the judiciary.

Conclusion

Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, represents a commendable legislative effort to infuse fairness and equality into the process of determining compensation for compulsorily acquired land. The Indian judiciary, through a series of interpretative rulings, has largely sought to uphold and advance the beneficent spirit of this provision. By clarifying its scope, defining the eligibility of "persons aggrieved," liberalizing the understanding of the limitation period's trigger, and affirming the procedural pathway for redetermination, the courts have endeavored to ensure that the protection offered by Section 28-A is not unduly curtailed by technicalities. While challenges in its implementation persist, the jurisprudence surrounding Section 28-A underscores a commitment to the constitutional principles of equality and the right to fair compensation, serving as a crucial safeguard for landowners, especially those who might otherwise be disadvantaged in the complex process of land acquisition.