Adverse Possession Against Deity: Immunity, Exceptions and Contemporary Judicial Trends in Indian Law

Adverse Possession Against Deity: Immunity, Exceptions and Contemporary Judicial Trends in Indian Law

Introduction

The Hindu deity, recognised as a juristic person by Indian courts, owns vast tracts of immovable property across the country. Whether a third party – or even a shebait, archaka, or trustee – may perfect title over such property by adverse possession raises intricate questions at the intersection of personal law, property law, constitutional mandates and the law of limitation. This article critically analyses the doctrine of adverse possession as applied vis-à-vis deities, drawing upon seminal precedent and statutory provisions, and situates the discussion within broader normative debates on the protection of religious endowments in India.

Juristic Personality and Fiduciary Structure of Hindu Temples

A Hindu idol or temple is a legal person capable of owning, acquiring and defending property.[1] The deity’s earthly affairs are administered by shebaits, trustees, or archakas who occupy a fiduciary position akin to that of trustees under English law, albeit with unique incidents prescribed by Hindu jurisprudence.

Statutory Framework: Limitation Act, 1963

Two provisions are immediately relevant:

  • Section 10: Exempts suits against “any person in possession of property belonging to a trust for any specific purpose” from any period of limitation, so long as the property “continues to be so vested.” The section effectively renders temple property imprescriptible where the defendant’s possession traces to, or remains in, a fiduciary relationship with the trust or deity.
  • Articles 64 & 65: Prescribe twelve years for suits based on possessory title and for recovery of immovable property, respectively. These provisions supply the temporal text for strangers seeking to usurp debuttar property; yet their applicability is curtailed by Section 10 when the possessor is a trustee-figure.

Classical Requirements of Adverse Possession

The Supreme Court reiterates the Roman law triad – nec vi, nec clam, nec precario (peaceful, open and hostile) – as the touchstone for adverse possession (Mandal Revenue Officer v. Goundla Venkaiah, 2010; P. Lakshmi Reddy, 1957).[2] These requirements must co-exist with animus possidendi – an intention to hold against the true owner (P. T. Munichikkanna Reddy v. Revamma, 2007).[3]

Can a Trustee or Archaka Prescribe Against the Deity?

Section 10 as a Bar

Section 10’s language – “property belonging to a trust for a specific purpose” – squarely covers debuttar endowments. Consequently, a shebait or archaka, whose possession is inherently fiduciary, cannot plead adverse possession so long as the fiduciary tie subsists.

Judicial Pronouncements

  • Paddinti Venkatanara Simha Charyulu v. Rayasam Gangamma Pantulu (Madras HC, 1952) held that archakas “could not acquire title by adverse possession against the deity,” because they enjoy in a fiduciary capacity.[4]
  • In Atyam Veerraju v. Pechetti Venkanna (SC 1965) the Court refused to permit a tenant-archaka to convert permissive possession into hostile possession, stressing that the deity’s title remained unaffected from 1851-1949.[5]
  • The Orissa High Court echoed this line in Chandrawati v. Sri Shivaji Maharaj (1967) and Arulmigu Kolavizhi Amman Temple v. R. Shamugham (Madras HC 2008), emphasising the perpetual minority of the idol and the concomitant impossibility of prescription by fiduciaries.[6]

Conceptual Justification

Two rationales animate this rule:

  1. Perpetual Minority Doctrine: An idol is deemed an eternal minor, incapable of protecting its own interests and perpetually entitled to the disability protections minors enjoy (Kama Reddy v. Ranga Dasan, 1925).[7]
  2. Fiduciary Estoppel: No fiduciary may derogate from his own title or assert a claim hostile to the beneficiary without first surrendering possession (Privy Council in Srinivasa Moorthy v. Venkatavarada Iyengar, 1910; approved in subsequent Indian cases).

Adverse Possession by Strangers: A Qualified Possibility

Where the possessor is neither a trustee nor derives title through the temple’s management, Section 10 ceases to apply. In such cases Articles 64 and 65 govern, and the deity – represented by its current shebait or a next friend – must sue within twelve years of accrual of the cause of action.

Illustrative Cases

  • Dasami Sahu v. Param Shameshwar (Allahabad HC 1929) accepted, in principle, that “there can be adverse possession, not only as against the idols but over the idols themselves.”[8] The Court nevertheless underscored the evidentiary burden on the stranger to prove unequivocal hostility.
  • In Berhampur Municipality v. Sri Kothari Thakurani (Orissa HC 2018) the deity asserted adverse possession against the State; the Court found title in the deity on classical evidence of long, hostile possession exceeding a century.[9] The decision, though fact-specific, demonstrates that adverse possession can protect temple property as shield when the deity itself is the occupant.

Heightened Scrutiny Standard

Contemporary courts have exhibited an “anti-encroachment” bias, particularly when public or religious land is at stake. The Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar (2011) deemed adverse possession “hostile to a modern notion of property as a human right,” advising strict pleading and proof.[10] Similarly, the Madras High Court in D. Thanikkachalam v. M. Kannaiya Padayachi (2023) required courts to adopt “greater seriousness, care and circumspection” where public land is claimed by prescription.[11]

Constitutional Dimensions

While adverse possession disputes are typically private-law contests, constitutional considerations subtly colour the analysis. In Sri Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore (1958) the Supreme Court recognised the State’s power under Article 25(2)(b) to reform denominational temples, underscoring the public character of many religious endowments.[12] This public character strengthens the normative case for insulating temple property from hostile acquisition, aligning with Article 300-A’s guarantee that deprivation of property shall be only by authority of law.

Reconciling Section 10 with Articles 64/65: A Proposed Analytical Framework

The following matrix, distilled from precedent, clarifies when adverse possession can succeed against a deity:

  • Possessor is a fiduciary (shebait/archaka/trustee or successor) – Section 10 applies; no limitation runs; adverse possession barred.
  • Possessor traces title through fiduciary breach (e.g., alienee from trustee) – Section 10 continues to apply (transferee stands in the shoes of fiduciary); adverse possession barred.
  • Possessor is a complete stranger with no privity – Articles 64/65 apply; limitation runs; adverse possession possible if nec vi, nec clam, nec precario is strictly proved.

Policy Concerns and Reform Proposals

The present regime—invoking Section 10, the perpetual minority doctrine, and stringent evidentiary standards—largely shields temple assets, yet challenges persist:

  1. Managerial Negligence: Many temples lack institutional vigilance, permitting strangers to erect factual complexities that later cloud title.
  2. Record-keeping Deficiencies: Absence of cadastral clarity complicates the deity’s task of establishing paper title, which, though legally unnecessary under Section 10, remains practically valuable.
  3. Need for Statutory Oversight: Parliament or State Legislatures could create dedicated mechanisms for monitoring temple lands, akin to “Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971” for government property.

Conclusion

Indian law accords near-impregnable protection to debuttar property vis-à-vis fiduciaries, grounding the rule in Section 10 of the Limitation Act and the equitable principle that a trustee may not derogate from his trust. Adverse possession against a deity is, however, not wholly unknown: a determined stranger may succeed by demonstrating open, continuous and hostile enjoyment for the statutory period, unprotected by Section 10. Contemporary jurisprudence, reflecting constitutional values and public policy, tends to construe such claims narrowly, placing the evidentiary burden squarely on the possessor and demanding meticulous pleadings. Ultimately, the jurisprudence balances the sanctity of religious endowments against the Limitation Act’s mandate for finality of claims, leaning unmistakably in favour of the former.

Footnotes

  1. For early articulation see Pramatha Nath Mullick v. Pradyumna Kumar Mullick (1925) 52 IA 245 (PC).
  2. Mandal Revenue Officer v. Goundla Venkaiah, (2010) 2 SCC 461; P. Lakshmi Reddy v. L. Lakshmi Reddy, AIR 1957 SC 314.
  3. P. T. Munichikkanna Reddy v. Revamma, (2007) 6 SCC 59.
  4. Paddinti Venkatanara Simha Charyulu v. Rayasam Gangamma Pantulu, 1952 SCC OnLine Mad 321.
  5. Atyam Veerraju v. Pechetti Venkanna, AIR 1966 SC 629.
  6. Arulmigu Kolavizhi Amman Temple v. R. Shamugham, (2008) 2 MLJ 1136; Chandrawati v. Sri Shivaji Maharaj, 1967 SCC OnLine All 175.
  7. Kama Reddy v. Ranga Dasan, AIR 1925 Mad 1005.
  8. Dasami Sahu v. Param Shameshwar, AIR 1929 All 373.
  9. Berhampur Municipality v. Sri Kothari Thakurani, 2018 SCC OnLine Ori 642.
  10. State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar, (2011) 10 SCC 404.
  11. D. Thanikkachalam v. M. Kannaiya Padayachi, 2023 SCC OnLine Mad 1191.
  12. Sri Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore, AIR 1958 SC 255.