Admissibility and Evaluation of Evidence in Indian Family Courts: Doctrinal Developments and Judicial Trends

Admissibility and Evaluation of Evidence in Indian Family Courts: Doctrinal Developments and Judicial Trends

Introduction

Family Courts were conceived as therapeutic forums that dispense speedy justice while remaining sensitive to the litigants’ intimate disputes. A core pillar of this design is a distinctive evidentiary regime that tempers the rigidity of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 with the flexibility required in matrimonial, custodial, and maintenance litigation. This article critically analyses the contemporary Indian jurisprudence on “evidence in Family Court”, focusing on: (i) the statutory architecture of Sections 10, 14-16 of the Family Courts Act, 1984; (ii) the interface with the Evidence Act, particularly Section 112 (presumption of legitimacy) and Section 65B (electronic records); and (iii) thematic case law on paternity testing, cruelty, privacy, and procedural safeguards.

Legislative Framework

1. Family Courts Act, 1984

  • Section 10 makes the Code of Civil Procedure and Code of Criminal Procedure applicable mutatis mutandis, yet permits the Family Court to evolve its own procedure.[1]
  • Section 14 authorises the Court to “receive as evidence any report, statement, document, information or matter” irrespective of formal admissibility under the Evidence Act, provided it assists in effective adjudication.[2]
  • Sections 15–16 relax the recording of evidence (memorandum rather than verbatim) and allow formal evidence by affidavit, thereby expediting trials.[3]

2. Indian Evidence Act, 1872

  • Section 112 embeds a conclusive presumption of legitimacy for a child born during marriage, rebuttable only by proof of non-access.
  • Section 45 recognises expert opinion (including forensic science) as relevant.
  • Section 65B stipulates procedural conditions for admitting electronic records.

Relaxed Admissibility under Section 14: Scope and Limits

Judicial exposition confirms that Section 14 is an admission clause, not a rule of proof. In Deepti Kapur v. Kunal Julka the Delhi High Court held that the Family Court may take documents, statements, or digital media on record “without the rigours and shackles of the conventional rules of evidence,” yet must later weigh authenticity and relevancy with circumspection.[4] A similar position emerges from PV v. PK[5], Deepali Lokhande[6] and Sandip Kedia[7].

Safeguards accompany this latitude. Courts may anonymise sensitive material, restrict courtroom access, or even initiate action against parties who procure evidence illegally.[8] Thus, Section 14 operates as a two-stage filter: reception is liberal, but reliance is contingent upon conventional tests of credibility, voluntariness, and probative value.

Paternity Disputes and Scientific Evidence

1. Early Judicial Hesitancy

In Goutam Kundu v. State of West Bengal the Supreme Court refused compulsory blood grouping, stressing the sanctity of Section 112 and the potential social stigma of illegitimacy.[9]

2. DNA Era: Calibrated Acceptance

The technological leap to DNA profiling triggered doctrinal recalibration. The Court in Nandlal Wasudeo Badwaik v. Lata Badwaik accepted DNA results as “irrefutable” proof overriding the Section 112 presumption when scientific conclusions directly negated biological paternity.[10] One month later, in Dipanwita Roy v. Ronobroto Roy, the Court balanced the presumption with a conditional direction for DNA testing, reiterating that such orders must follow a strong prima facie case.[11]

3. Recent Consolidation

Anju Garg v. Deepak Garg (2022) illustrates continued reliance on DNA evidence, though Family Courts retain discretion to decline tests where they appear vexatious or unnecessary.[12]

Cruelty, Desertion and Other Matrimonial Wrongs: Evidentiary Standards

Unlike criminal trials, matrimonial causes are decided on the preponderance of probabilities. In Vijaykumar Bhate v. Neela Bhate defamatory allegations in pleadings were treated as documentary evidence constituting mental cruelty, notwithstanding their subsequent withdrawal.[13] Similarly, Mayadevi v. Jagdish Prasad and Durga Prasanna Tripathy v. Arundhati Tripathy underscore that courts may infer cruelty or desertion from cumulative circumstances proven through oral testimony, correspondence, and conduct.[14]

Procedural Architecture: Recording, Affidavits and Clubbing of Proceedings

  • Recording of Evidence: The Supreme Court in Aman Lohia v. Kiran Lohia reiterated that Family Courts must invite formal pleadings, frame issues, and then draw a memorandum of each witness’s deposition per Section 15.[15]
  • Affidavit Evidence: Section 16 facilitates proof of formal facts via affidavit, reducing courtroom time.
  • Clubbing Proceedings: High Courts routinely transfer allied Domestic Violence or maintenance cases to the Family Court to avoid inconsistent findings and facilitate common evidence (Samarth Jagnani v. Arzoo Jagnani).[16]

Electronic and Illegally Obtained Evidence: Post-Puttaswamy Concerns

The privacy jurisprudence ushered in by KS Puttaswamy v. Union of India casts a long shadow on the admissibility of clandestinely recorded conversations or surveillance data. While the general rule remains that relevance governs admissibility,[17] Family Courts, exercising equitable jurisdiction, have shown readiness to exclude evidence procured in flagrant violation of privacy, or at least to dilute its weight.

Emerging Issues and Recommendations

  1. Codify Guidelines for DNA Testing: Parliament or the Supreme Court (under Article 142) should promulgate uniform criteria balancing truth-finding, privacy, and the child’s welfare.
  2. Harmonise Section 14 with Section 65B: Clarify that while electronic records may be received without certificate, reliance should ordinarily follow substantial compliance with Section 65B unless impracticable.
  3. Strengthen In-Camera and Anonymisation Protocols: Institutionalise protective measures outlined in Deepti Kapur to prevent voyeuristic misuse of intimate evidence.
  4. Capacity Building: Continuous judicial education on forensic science, digital evidence and trauma-informed adjudication will enhance probative assessment.

Conclusion

Indian Family Courts operate within a sui generis evidentiary ecosystem—liberal at the admission stage yet anchored in conventional canons of proof and fairness at the evaluation stage. The judiciary has progressively embraced scientific evidence, especially DNA profiling, to reconcile statutory presumptions with empirical truth. However, discretion is tempered by concern for privacy, dignity, and the best interests of children. Future reforms must codify safeguards while preserving the therapeutic and flexible character that distinguishes Family Courts from ordinary civil or criminal fora.

Footnotes

  1. Family Courts Act, 1984, s. 10.
  2. Id., s. 14.
  3. Id., ss. 15–16.
  4. Deepti Kapur v. Kunal Julka, AIR 2020 Del 156.
  5. PV v. PK, Delhi HC, 2021.
  6. Deepali Santosh Lokhande v. Santosh Vasantrao Lokhande, 2017 SCC OnLine Bom 9877.
  7. Sandip Shankarlal Kedia v. Pooja Kedia, Bom HC, 2013.
  8. Deepti Kapur, supra note 4.
  9. Goutam Kundu v. State of West Bengal, (1993) 3 SCC 418.
  10. Nandlal Wasudeo Badwaik v. Lata Nandlal Badwaik, (2014) 2 SCC 576.
  11. Dipanwita Roy v. Ronobroto Roy, (2015) 1 SCC (Cri) 683.
  12. Anju Garg v. Deepak Kumar Garg, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1314.
  13. Vijaykumar Ramchandra Bhate v. Neela Vijaykumar Bhate, (2003) 6 SCC 334.
  14. Mayadevi v. Jagdish Prasad, (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 48; Durga Prasanna Tripathy v. Arundhati Tripathy, (2005) 7 SCC 353.
  15. Aman Lohia v. Kiran Lohia, SC, 2021.
  16. Mr. Samarth Vimal Jagnani v. Mrs. Arzoo Samarth Jagnani, Kar HC, 2023.
  17. PV v. PK, supra note 5, para 34.