Adjudication of Third-Party Claims in Execution: An Analysis of Order XXI Rule 99 CPC

Adjudication of Third-Party Claims in Execution: An Analysis of Order XXI Rule 99 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

Introduction

The execution of a decree is the culmination of the judicial process, signifying the stage where the fruits of litigation are realized by the decree-holder. However, this process is often fraught with challenges, particularly when third parties, not privy to the original suit, assert rights over the property in question. The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), under Order XXI, provides an elaborate mechanism for the execution of decrees. Within this framework, Rule 99 of Order XXI assumes critical importance as it provides a remedy for persons, other than the judgment-debtor, who are dispossessed of immovable property in execution of a decree. This article seeks to provide a comprehensive analysis of Order XXI Rule 99 CPC, examining its scope, the nature of adjudication thereunder, its interplay with other provisions of Order XXI, and the evolution of its interpretation through judicial pronouncements in India. The unfortunate reality of prolonged execution proceedings, as lamented in cases like Rafique Bibi (Dead) By Lrs. v. Sayed Waliuddin (Dead) By Lrs. And Others[1], underscores the need for efficient and just mechanisms like Rule 99 to resolve claims expeditiously.

The Legislative Scheme of Order XXI Rules 97 to 103 CPC

Order XXI Rule 99 cannot be understood in isolation. It forms part of a cohesive scheme designed to address various scenarios of resistance, obstruction, and dispossession during the execution of decrees for immovable property. This scheme primarily encompasses Rules 97 to 103 of Order XXI CPC.

Rule 97 allows a decree-holder or a purchaser of property sold in execution to complain to the executing court if they are met with resistance or obstruction by "any person" in obtaining possession.[20] Rule 98, particularly as amended in some states like Bombay, details the orders the court can pass after adjudication, including putting the applicant in possession and, in certain circumstances, detaining the obstructor.[10]

Conversely, Rule 99 provides a remedy for "any person other than the judgment-debtor" who is dispossessed of immovable property by the holder of a decree for possession, or by a purchaser. Such a person can make an application to the court complaining of such dispossession.[11]

Rule 100 (prior to its omission by the 1976 Amendment Act and subsequent re-interpretations or state amendments) dealt with orders to be passed upon applications under Rule 99. The Kerala High Court in Babu Raj v. Vasanthi Devi noted that the provisions of Rules 98 and 100 could be effectively clubbed and incorporated under Rule 101.[9]

The cornerstone of this scheme is Rule 101, which mandates that all questions (including those relating to right, title, or interest in the property) arising between the parties to a proceeding on an application under Rule 97 or Rule 99, or their representatives, and relevant to the adjudication of the application, shall be determined by the court dealing with the application and not by a separate suit.[12] This provision, as emphasized by the Supreme Court in Bangalore Development Authority v. N. Nanjappa And Another, deems the executing court to have jurisdiction to decide such questions, notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any other law.[12]

Rule 102 acts as a crucial limitation, stipulating that Rules 98 and 100 (and by extension, the adjudicatory process involving Rule 99 claims) do not apply to resistance or obstruction by a person to whom the judgment-debtor has transferred the property after the institution of the suit in which the decree was passed, or to the dispossession of any such person.[18]

Finally, Rule 103 accords the status of a decree to any order made under Rule 98 or Rule 100 (now effectively an order pursuant to adjudication under Rule 101 following an application under Rule 99). This means such an order is appealable as if it were a decree.[4]

Core Principles of Order XXI Rule 99 CPC

1. Locus Standi: Who Can Apply?

An application under Order XXI Rule 99 CPC can be made by "any person other than the judgment-debtor" who has been dispossessed of immovable property. This includes individuals who claim an independent right, title, or interest in the property and are not bound by the decree. For instance, a tenant claiming rights independent of the judgment-debtor, as discussed in the context of Rule 97 in Shreenath And Another v. Rajesh And Others[5], could potentially invoke Rule 99 if dispossessed. The claim must be bona fide and assert a right independent of the judgment-debtor. The Punjab & Haryana High Court in M/S Sunil Auto Service v. Parikshat Suri And Others dealt with an objector invoking Rule 99, where the executing court initially doubted the bona fides of the possession claim.[23]

2. Pre-requisite: Actual Dispossession

A fundamental pre-requisite for invoking Rule 99 is that the applicant must have been "dispossessed" of the immovable property. As observed in Mahesh Electronics v. Ramkumar dead By Lrs AND OTHERS, "Rule 99 of Order 21 is not available to any person until he is dispossessed of immovable property by the decree-holder."[18] This distinguishes it from Rule 97, which deals with resistance or obstruction before possession is taken by the decree-holder. However, the interpretation of "dispossession," especially concerning vacant land, has been subject to judicial scrutiny. The Supreme Court in Salik Ram Singh v. District Judge, citing Brahmdeo Chaudhary, noted that mere physical absence at the time of execution for vacant land might not be a relevant fact to reject a Rule 99 application, as possession could be through ownership and control.[14]

3. Nature of Adjudication under Rule 101 CPC

Upon an application under Rule 99, Rule 101 mandates a comprehensive adjudication by the executing court. The court is required to determine all questions, including those relating to the right, title, or interest in the property, as if it were adjudicating a suit. This was reiterated in Baljit Singh v. Balkar Singh, which stated that it is the duty of the court to determine objections filed under Rule 99 as per Rule 101.[11] The legislative intent, particularly post the 1976 amendment to the CPC, was to ensure that all such disputes are resolved by the executing court itself, thereby preventing multiplicity of proceedings and prolonged litigation.[7], [16] The Supreme Court in Noorduddin v. Dr. K.L Anand emphasized the necessity of adjudicating disputes related to possession and title directly within the execution proceedings.[7] If the claim is found not to fall under Rule 97 or 99, then Rule 101 is not invoked, as noted in Smt. Pooja Garg v. Satya Prakash Goyal And 3 Ors.[24]

4. Order as a Deemed Decree (Rule 103 CPC)

An order passed after adjudication of an application under Rule 99 (read with Rule 101) is treated as a decree under Rule 103 CPC. This implies that the order is final and conclusive between the parties, subject to appeal. The Supreme Court in Sameer Singh And Another v. Abdul Rab And Others clarified that for an order to be treated as a decree under Rule 103, there must be substantive adjudication; a mere declaration of being functus officio without engaging in adjudication does not qualify.[4] The Kerala High Court in Jumailath Beevi And Others Petitioners/Claim v. Rajeena S/Decree Holder And Judgment Debtors affirmed that an order under Rule 99 is a final order and appealable.[25], [27]

Analysis of Key Judicial Pronouncements and the Evolution of Law

The interpretation of Order XXI Rule 99 and its interplay with Rule 97 has evolved significantly, primarily through landmark Supreme Court decisions.

Historically, a stricter view prevailed, suggesting that a third party claiming independent rights had to wait until actual dispossession to file an application under Rule 99. Their right to obstruct delivery proactively was often questioned. As noted by the Kerala High Court in Ajith Kumar M.R v. Vasanthi Devi & Ors., the preponderance of judicial opinion before authoritative pronouncements by the Apex Court was that a stranger to the decree could not object before delivery and their remedy was either a separate suit or an application under Rule 99 post-dispossession.[15]

A paradigm shift occurred with the Supreme Court's decision in Brahmdeo Chaudhary v. Rishikesh Prasad Jaiswal And Another.[3], [19] The Court held that a stranger to the decree, offering resistance or obstruction, could request the executing court to adjudicate upon their claims under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC itself, and need not be dispossessed first to then invoke Rule 99. The Court reasoned:

"Whether the appellant who claims to be a stranger, occupying decretal premises in his own right and who has offered resistance to the execution of the decree obtained by the decree-holder against the judgment-debtor qua such property can request the executing court to adjudicate upon his resistance and obstruction without being insisted upon that first he must hand over possession and then only move an application under Order 21, Rule 99 Code of Civil Procedure (‘CPC’ for short)?”[19]
The Court answered this in favour of the obstructor, emphasizing that the executing court must adjudicate the stranger's claim. This ruling effectively provided a proactive remedy for third parties. This principle was echoed in Salik Ram Singh v. District Judge, which highlighted the fallacy in insisting on prior dispossession for a third party to seek adjudication.[14] The Andhra Pradesh High Court in S AMEER v. SMT.S.PARVATHI AND ANOTHER traced the genesis of this thinking, noting the unfairness of Rule 99 if it strictly required prior dispossession.[26]

The Supreme Court in Shreenath And Another v. Rajesh And Others further clarified the scope of Rule 97, holding that "any person" in Rule 97(1) is broad enough to include third parties like tenants claiming independent rights, allowing them to seek adjudication of their objections.[5], [16] This was reaffirmed in Silverline Forum Pvt. Ltd. v. Rajiv Trust And Another, where resistance by a sub-tenant was held to be adjudicable under Rule 97.[8] In Smt. Parvathi Priyadarshi v. C. Om Prakash, the Telangana High Court also referred to the wide ambit of "any person" under Rule 97 and the subsequent adjudication under Rule 101.[17]

In Tanzeem-E-Sufia v. Bibi Haliman And Others, the appellant, a third party, requested the executing court to treat the decree-holder's application for delivery of possession as a petition under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC, so that its objections could be heard. The Supreme Court, analyzing the scheme, indicated the propriety of such adjudication.[20]

The maintainability of separate suits in light of the comprehensive adjudication provided under Rules 99 and 101 has also been a subject of discussion. In Pavan Kumar And Another v. K. Gopalakrishna And Another, the Andhra Pradesh High Court considered arguments regarding the bar of a separate suit due to prior proceedings under Order XXI.[22] The clear mandate of Rule 101 is to prevent separate suits by ensuring all relevant questions are decided by the executing court.

However, the remedy under Rule 99 is not absolute. Rule 102 CPC explicitly excludes transferees pendente lite from the judgment-debtor from the benefits of Rules 98 and 100 (and by implication, the full scope of adjudication if their claim is solely based on such transfer). The Supreme Court in Silverline Forum Pvt. Ltd. (citing Bhanwar Lal v. Satyanarain) and the Uttarakhand High Court in Mahesh Electronics discussed this limitation, stating that for a transferee pendente lite, the scope of adjudication under Rule 101 would be shrunk to the limited question of whether they are such a transferee.[8], [18]

The case of N.S.S Narayana Sarma And Others v. Goldstone Exports (P) Ltd. And Others involved objections by alleged transferees under Order XXI Rule 99 read with Rule 101, which were dismissed by the High Court as non-maintainable, leading to an appeal before the Supreme Court, highlighting complex factual scenarios where title disputes are brought before the executing court.[21]

Cases like Sk. Sattar Sk. Mohd. Choudhari v. Gundappa Amabadas Bukate[2], dealing with tenancy rights and property partition, though not directly interpreting Rule 99, illustrate the types of complex right, title, and interest claims that can arise during execution and may necessitate adjudication if a party is dispossessed and invokes Rule 99.

The Interplay Between Rule 99 and Rule 97 CPC Post-Brahmdeo Chaudhary

The judgment in Brahmdeo Chaudhary[3] has significantly harmonized the application of Rules 97 and 99. While Rule 99 remains the specific provision for a dispossessed third party to apply for restoration, the ruling in Brahmdeo Chaudhary effectively allows a third party who anticipates dispossession and offers resistance to have their claim adjudicated under Rule 97 itself, upon the decree-holder's application complaining of such resistance. This prevents the often harsh outcome of forcing a bona fide third party to first suffer dispossession and then seek remedy. The Kerala High Court in Ajith Kumar M.R v. Vasanthi Devi & Ors. explicitly acknowledged this shift: "now after the decision of the Supreme Court in Brahmadeo Chaudharay v. Rishikesh Prasad Jaiswal ... such a person need not wait until he is dispossessed in execution of the decree so as to stake his claim."[15]

Thus, a third party has two potential avenues:

  1. If they resist/obstruct possession, and the decree-holder applies under Rule 97, their claim is adjudicated.
  2. If they are dispossessed without having had a prior opportunity for adjudication of their resistance (or if they did not resist initially), they can apply under Rule 99.
In both scenarios, Rule 101 governs the scope of adjudication, and Rule 103 gives the resultant order the force of a decree.

Limitations and Exclusions

The primary limitation, as discussed, is Rule 102 CPC, which curtails the rights of a transferee pendente lite from the judgment-debtor. Such a person cannot resist or obstruct, and if dispossessed, their application under Rule 99 would likely fail if their claim is solely based on the pendente lite transfer, as this is generally hit by the doctrine of lis pendens (Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882).[18]

Furthermore, the claim under Rule 99 must be bona fide and relate to an independent right, title, or interest. Frivolous claims or claims clearly subservient to the judgment-debtor are unlikely to succeed. The provision is designed to protect genuine third-party rights, not to enable judgment-debtors to collusively obstruct execution.

It is also pertinent to note that provisions like Order XXI Rule 89, which allow a judgment-debtor to avoid a sale, operate in a different context and are specific remedies for the judgment-debtor, as mentioned in M/S. AL-CAN EXPORT PVT. LTD. v. PRESTIGE H.M. POLYCONTAINERS LTD. AND ORS.[13], which also noted the limited applicability of CPC to writ petitions.

The case of Vithalbhai (P) Ltd. v. Union Bank Of India[6], dealing with premature suits, has limited direct bearing on the application of Rule 99, which operates at the execution stage based on an existing decree.

Conclusion

Order XXI Rule 99 CPC, read in conjunction with Rules 97, 101, 102, and 103, provides a critical adjudicatory mechanism within execution proceedings to protect the rights of bona fide third parties who are dispossessed of immovable property. The evolution of judicial interpretation, particularly through landmark decisions like Brahmdeo Chaudhary v. Rishikesh Prasad Jaiswal, has ensured that the procedural framework is geared towards comprehensive and expeditious resolution of such claims by the executing court itself, minimizing separate litigation.

By treating the determination under Rule 101 as a deemed decree, the law ensures finality and provides an appellate remedy, balancing the decree-holder's right to enjoy the fruits of their decree with the third party's right to protect their independent claims to property. While challenges in execution remain, Rule 99 and its associated provisions represent a significant effort by the legislature and the judiciary to ensure that the process of execution is not only effective but also just and fair to all parties involved, including those not originally part of the decree.

References

  1. [1] Rafique Bibi (Dead) By Lrs. v. Sayed Waliuddin (Dead) By Lrs. And Others (2004 SCC 1 287, Supreme Court Of India, 2003)
  2. [2] Sk. Sattar Sk. Mohd. Choudhari v. Gundappa Amabadas Bukate . (1996 SCC 6 373, Supreme Court Of India, 1996)
  3. [3] Brahmdeo Chaudhary v. Rishikesh Prasad Jaiswal And Another (1997 SCC 3 694, Supreme Court Of India, 1997)
  4. [4] Sameer Singh And Another v. Abdul Rab And Others (2015 SCC 1 379, Supreme Court Of India, 2014)
  5. [5] Shreenath And Another v. Rajesh And Others (1998 SCC 4 543, Supreme Court Of India, 1998)
  6. [6] Vithalbhai (P) Ltd. v. Union Bank Of India . (2005 SCC 4 315, Supreme Court Of India, 2005)
  7. [7] Noorduddin v. Dr. K.L Anand . (1995 SCC 1 242, Supreme Court Of India, 1994)
  8. [8] Silverline Forum Pvt. Ltd. v. Rajiv Trust And Another (1998 SCC 3 723, Supreme Court Of India, 1998)
  9. [9] Babu Raj v. Vasanthi Devi (Kerala High Court, 2008)
  10. [10] Prakash Gobindram Ahuja v. Ganesh Pandharinath Dhonde (Bombay High Court, 2016)
  11. [11] Baljit Singh v. Balkar Singh (Punjab & Haryana High Court, 2000)
  12. [12] Bangalore Development Authority v. N. Nanjappa And Another (Supreme Court Of India, 2021)
  13. [13] M/S. AL-CAN EXPORT PVT. LTD. v. PRESTIGE H.M. POLYCONTAINERS LTD. AND ORS. (Supreme Court Of India, 2024)
  14. [14] Salik Ram Singh v. District Judge (Allahabad High Court, 2022)
  15. [15] Ajith Kumar M.R v. Vasanthi Devi & Ors. (Kerala High Court, 2008)
  16. [16] Shreenath And Another v. Rajesh And Others (Supreme Court Of India, 1998) - *Duplicate of Ref 5, cited for consistency if different aspects are drawn*
  17. [17] Smt. Parvathi Priyadarshi v. C. Om Prakash (Telangana High Court, 2023)
  18. [18] Mahesh Electronics v. Ramkumar dead By Lrs AND OTHERS (Uttarakhand High Court, 2019)
  19. [19] Brahmdeo Chaudhary v. Rishikesh Prasad Jaiswal And Another (1997 SCC 3 694, Supreme Court Of India, 1997) - *Duplicate of Ref 3, cited for consistency if different aspects are drawn*
  20. [20] Tanzeem-E-Sufia v. Bibi Haliman And Others (2002 SCC 7 50, Supreme Court Of India, 2002)
  21. [21] N.S.S Narayana Sarma And Others v. Goldstone Exports (P) Ltd. And Others (2002 SCC 1 662, Supreme Court Of India, 2001)
  22. [22] Pavan Kumar And Another v. K. Gopalakrishna And Another (1998 SCC ONLINE AP 76, Andhra Pradesh High Court, 1998)
  23. [23] M/S Sunil Auto Service v. Parikshat Suri And Others S (2011 SCC ONLINE P&H 6026, Punjab & Haryana High Court, 2011)
  24. [24] Smt. Pooja Garg v. Satya Prakash Goyal And 3 Ors (Allahabad High Court, 2015)
  25. [25] Jumailath Beevi And Others Petitioners/Claim v. Rajeena S/Decree Holder And Judgment Debtors. (Kerala High Court, 2020)
  26. [26] S AMEER v. SMT.S.PARVATHI AND ANOTHER (Andhra Pradesh High Court, 2024)
  27. [27] Jumailath Beevi And Others Petitioners/Claim v. Rajeena S/Decree Holder And Judgment Debtors. (Kerala High Court, 2020) - *Duplicate of Ref 25, cited for consistency if different aspects are drawn*