Ad Hoc Disciplinary Authority in Indian Service Jurisprudence: A Critical Analysis

Ad Hoc Disciplinary Authority in Indian Service Jurisprudence: A Critical Analysis

Introduction

The edifice of public administration in India rests significantly on the conduct and discipline of its employees. Service rules invariably provide for a structured disciplinary mechanism, central to which is the concept of a 'Disciplinary Authority' (DA) – an authority competent to impose penalties upon an employee for misconduct. However, peculiar circumstances may arise where the designated DA is unable or unsuited to discharge this function, necessitating the appointment of an 'ad hoc Disciplinary Authority'. This article undertakes a critical analysis of the concept, legality, operational dynamics, and judicial scrutiny of ad hoc disciplinary authorities within the framework of Indian service jurisprudence. It draws upon statutory principles and judicial precedents to explore the nuances surrounding such ad hoc arrangements, which, while essential for ensuring fairness and continuity in disciplinary proceedings, also carry inherent risks if not meticulously regulated and implemented.

The Concept of Disciplinary Authority in Indian Service Law

In Indian service law, a 'Disciplinary Authority' is typically defined in relation to an employee or a grade of post. For instance, Regulation 3(g) of the Food Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1971, as noted in Bajinder Kumar Chopra v. The Food Corporation Of India (Punjab & Haryana High Court, 1998), defines the disciplinary authority in terms of the appointing authority or a higher authority. Similarly, rules such as Rule 2(k) of the Jharkhand Government Servant (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 2016, define 'Disciplinary Authority' as the Appointing Authority or any other authority authorized by it to impose penalties (THE STATE OF JHARKHAND v. RUKMA KESH MISHRA, Supreme Court of India, 2023 (assuming 2023 as a plausible recent year for the cited principles)). The competence of the DA to initiate proceedings and impose penalties is paramount, as underscored in Chairman-Cum-Managing Director, Coal India Limited And Others v. Ananta Saha And Others (2011 SCC 5 142, Supreme Court Of India, 2011), where proceedings were vitiated because they were initiated by an authority lacking competence. Strict adherence to rules governing the DA's powers is crucial for the validity of disciplinary actions (Union Of India And Others v. B.V Gopinath, 2014 SCC 1 351, Supreme Court Of India, 2013).

Emergence and Rationale for Ad Hoc Disciplinary Authorities

The need for an ad hoc DA typically arises when the impartiality or availability of the regular DA is compromised. The overarching principle is to ensure fairness and uphold the tenets of natural justice.

Situations Necessitating Ad Hoc Appointments

  • Preventing Bias and Upholding Natural Justice: A cornerstone of natural justice is the principle nemo debet esse judex in propria causa (no one should be a judge in their own cause). If the regular DA has a personal interest in the matter or harbors bias against the delinquent employee, their involvement would vitiate the proceedings. The Supreme Court in Rattan Lal Sharma v. Managing Committee, Dr. Hari Ram (Co-Education) Higher Secondary School And Others (1993 SCC 4 10) emphasized that the mere appearance of bias is sufficient to invalidate proceedings. Similarly, in A.K Kraipak And Others v. Union Of India And Others (1969 SCC 2 262), the Supreme Court highlighted the necessity of impartiality in administrative inquiries, quashing selections where a candidate was part of the selection board. These principles directly inform the necessity for an ad hoc DA when the regular DA's impartiality is questionable.
  • When the Prescribed Authority is a Witness or Complainant: A common scenario leading to the appointment of an ad hoc DA is when the regular DA is a material witness to the misconduct or is the complainant. In Asstt. Supdt. Of Post Offices And Others v. G. Mohan Nair (1999 SCC 1 183, Supreme Court Of India, 1998), an ad hoc DA (a superior officer) was appointed because the original DA was a material witness. The Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) in P.P. Surendran v. Union Of India (2010 SCC ONLINE CAT 1908) and related cases (P.P.Surendran v. Union of India represented by, CAT, 2012; P.P. Surendran v. Union Of India, 2011 SCC ONLINE CAT 6062) also dealt with situations where an ad hoc DA was appointed because the original DA was the victim of the alleged misconduct and thus a prime witness.
  • Administrative Exigencies: Other administrative reasons, such as the transfer, leave, or unavailability of the regular DA, might also necessitate the temporary appointment of an ad hoc DA to ensure that disciplinary proceedings are not unduly delayed.

Legal Framework for Appointment

The power to appoint an ad hoc DA must stem from a valid legal source, be it statutory rules or duly authorized executive instructions. The Kerala High Court in Assistant Educational Officer, Kuthuparamba, v. P.R Mammoo And Others (Kerala High Court, 1968) observed that if a system of 'ad hoc' control is intended, "the power to make rules in that behalf must be granted to the rule-making authority by the legislative organ in appropriate language." This implies that usurping the powers of a statutory DA through an ad hoc appointment without proper legal backing would be impermissible. The challenge in Sri Yash Malviya v. Union Of India And 5 Others (2024 AHC 51332, Allahabad High Court, 2024) to an "illegal and self styled 'Ad hoc Disciplinary Authority'" due to alleged non-adherence to procedural requirements like Gazette Notification of a Presidential Order for such appointment, further underscores the importance of a transparent and legally sound appointment process. The authority making the ad hoc appointment must itself be competent to do so, aligning with principles laid down in cases like Ananta Saha and Surjit Ghosh v. Chairman & Managing Director, United Commercial Bank And Others (1995 SCC 2 474, Supreme Court Of India, 1995) concerning the proper designation of disciplinary authority.

Operational Dynamics: Powers, Functions, and Limitations

Once validly appointed, the ad hoc DA steps into the shoes of the regular DA, but their powers and functions may sometimes be circumscribed or be subject to specific scrutiny.

Scope of Authority of Ad Hoc Disciplinary Authorities

A critical question is whether an ad hoc DA, appointed for a specific reason or incident, can exercise jurisdiction over unrelated matters. In P.P. Surendran v. Union Of India (2010 SCC ONLINE CAT 1908), the applicant contended that the ad hoc DA, appointed specifically for an incident occurring on 02.04.2008, could not frame charges related to other prior incidents. The Tribunal noted the pivotal question: "whether the applicant can be ordered for facing a charge framed as per Annexure A7 order in the light of the fact that as per Annexure A2 order, the appointment of the ad-hoc disciplinary authority has been only confined to the incident which took place on 2.4.08." This suggests that the terms of appointment of an ad hoc DA are crucial in determining the scope of their authority. Unless the appointment order confers general powers, the ad hoc DA's jurisdiction might be limited to the specific purpose for which they were appointed.

Procedural Obligations and Natural Justice Compliance

An ad hoc DA is fully bound by the principles of natural justice and must adhere to all procedural requirements applicable to disciplinary proceedings. This includes providing a fair opportunity to the employee (PANKAJ AGARWAL v. M/O DEFENCE, Central Administrative Tribunal, 2018), ensuring an unbiased inquiry, and making decisions based on evidence on record. Allegations of bias against the ad hoc DA, as raised in the P.P. Surendran cases (e.g., P.P.Surendran v. Union of India represented by, CAT, 2012), highlight that the ad hoc appointee must also be, and appear to be, impartial. The Supreme Court's consistent emphasis on natural justice in administrative actions (Maneka Gandhi v. Union Of India (1978), cited in Rattan Lal Sharma) applies with equal force to ad hoc DAs.

While early judgments like Ram Chander Roy v. University Of Allahabad (Allahabad High Court, 1955) suggested that disciplinary authorities in educational institutions do not act as judicial or quasi-judicial tribunals, the landscape of administrative law has evolved. The Supreme Court in A.K. Kraipak blurred the lines between administrative and quasi-judicial functions, asserting that natural justice applies to administrative actions with civil consequences. Modern disciplinary inquiries are generally considered quasi-judicial, requiring adherence to fairness (Moturam v. State Of Madhya Pradesh & Others, Chhattisgarh High Court, 2011).

Appointment of Ancillary Authorities in Ad Hoc Proceedings

An interesting procedural aspect arose in Asstt. Supdt. Of Post Offices v. G. Mohan Nair (1998 SC). Here, the charge-sheet was issued by the original DA, who also appointed the Enquiry Officer (EO) and Presenting Officer (PO), *before* the ad hoc DA was formally appointed (though after it was contemplated). The disciplinary proceedings were ultimately conducted, and punishment imposed, by the ad hoc DA. The Tribunal set aside the proceedings because the EO was appointed by the original DA, not the ad hoc DA. The Supreme Court overturned this, holding:

"In the absence of any prejudice or any allegations of mala fides, the enquiry should not have been set aside and the action of the disciplinary authority should not have been quashed only on a technical ground that instead of the ad hoc disciplinary authority, the actual disciplinary authority had appointed the enquiry officer in respect of the present case."
This pragmatic approach by the Supreme Court indicates that mere technical procedural deviations, not resulting in prejudice to the employee, may not vitiate the proceedings conducted under an ad hoc DA. However, prudence dictates that the ad hoc DA, once appointed, should ideally oversee all subsequent key procedural steps, including the appointment of an EO if not already validly done.

Judicial Scrutiny of Actions by Ad Hoc Disciplinary Authorities

Actions taken by ad hoc DAs are subject to judicial review on the same grounds as those by regular DAs, with additional scrutiny often directed at the validity and scope of the ad hoc appointment itself.

Grounds for Challenge and Judicial Review

Challenges can arise from:

  • Lack of valid appointment: If the ad hoc DA was not appointed by a competent authority or through a legally sound procedure (Sri Yash Malviya v. UoI, 2024 AHC; Assistant Educational Officer, Kuthuparamba, 1968 Ker HC).
  • Exceeding jurisdiction: If the ad hoc DA deals with matters beyond the scope of their specific appointment (as argued in P.P. Surendran, 2010 CAT).
  • Violation of natural justice: Including bias by the ad hoc DA, denial of fair hearing, or non-compliance with procedural safeguards (Rattan Lal Sharma, 1993 SC; A.K. Kraipak, 1969 SC).
  • Procedural irregularities: Non-compliance with statutory rules governing disciplinary proceedings (Surjit Ghosh, 1995 SC; B.V. Gopinath, 2014 SC).
  • Proportionality of punishment: The punishment imposed must not be shockingly disproportionate (Chairman-Cum-Managing Director, Coal India Limited And Another v. Mukul Kumar Choudhuri And Others, 2009 SC).
The scope of judicial review, as reiterated in CHANDRA PRAKASH v. RAILWAY (Central Administrative Tribunal, 2023), is generally a review of the decision-making process, not the merits of the decision, unless it is vitiated by errors of jurisdiction, non-compliance with natural justice, or perversity of findings.

Analysis of Key Precedents

The judgment in Asstt. Supdt. Of Post Offices v. G. Mohan Nair (1998 SC) is pivotal. It legitimizes the concept of ad hoc DAs in situations of necessity (DA being a witness) and adopts a prejudice-based approach to procedural technicalities, thereby preventing proceedings from being quashed on hyper-technical grounds. However, this should not be interpreted as a license for casual procedural compliance. The P.P. Surendran line of cases from the CAT highlights ongoing challenges regarding the precise scope of an ad hoc DA's authority and the persistent issue of perceived bias, even when an ad hoc DA is appointed to ostensibly cure bias. The Allahabad High Court's consideration in Sri Yash Malviya (2024 AHC) of challenges to a "self styled 'Ad hoc Disciplinary Authority'" due to lack of proper notification emphasizes that the very foundation of an ad hoc DA's power – the appointment itself – must be unassailable.

Ad Hoc Arrangements: Balancing Necessity with Procedural Integrity

The Supreme Court in Dr. Siya Ram Singh (Petitioner) v. Director Of Higher Education U.P And Others (S) (Allahabad High Court, 1992, citing a Supreme Court judgment) commented on the "Malady of Adhocism" in the context of appointments, noting that ad hoc appointments are "a convenient way of entry usually from backdoor at time even in disregard of rules and regulations." While this observation pertains to initial appointments to service, the underlying caution against unregulated ad hoc arrangements can be metaphorically extended to the realm of ad hoc DAs. If the appointment and functioning of ad hoc DAs are not governed by clear guidelines and transparency, there is a risk of such arrangements being used arbitrarily or without genuine necessity, potentially undermining the stability and predictability of disciplinary processes. The requirement for approval from higher authorities for imposition of major penalties, as seen in some regulations (e.g., ST. MARYS EDUCATION SOCIETY v. RAJENDRA PRASAD BHARGAVA, Supreme Court Of India, 2022, regarding approval of a committee), could serve as an additional check, even for decisions by ad hoc DAs.

Conclusion

The institution of an ad hoc Disciplinary Authority serves a crucial role in Indian service jurisprudence by ensuring that disciplinary proceedings can be conducted fairly and effectively even when the designated authority is unable or unsuited to act. Judicial precedents affirm the legitimacy of such appointments, particularly to obviate bias or when the regular DA is a witness. However, the appointment, scope of authority, and functioning of ad hoc DAs must be grounded in clear legal provisions and adhere strictly to the principles of natural justice and procedural fairness. While the judiciary has shown pragmatism in not allowing proceedings to be nullified on minor technicalities where no prejudice is caused, the fundamental requirements of valid authorization for appointment and impartial conduct remain non-negotiable. Ensuring that ad hoc arrangements are resorted to only out of genuine necessity and are executed with utmost procedural integrity is vital to maintain the credibility of disciplinary mechanisms and protect the rights of public servants.