“When the Defendant Tells His Own Story” – Kentucky Clarifies the Scope of the “Inextricably Intertwined” Exception to KRE 404(b)

Introduction

In Damon R. Cruse v. Commonwealth of Kentucky (Supreme Court of Kentucky, No. 2023-SC-0384-MR, Aug. 14 2025), the Court was asked to decide whether statements captured on a police video—statements in which the defendant referenced a separate, dismissed drug-trafficking case—were inadmissible “other-crimes” evidence under Kentucky Rule of Evidence (KRE) 404(b). Damon Cruse had been convicted of three counts of first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance (methamphetamine) and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia after three controlled buys. During the final buy, Cruse lectured the confidential informant on how to avoid prosecution by never “touching” money or drugs directly, citing his experience in a dismissed Casey County case. The trial court admitted the unedited video. Cruse appealed, arguing that admission of the recording was reversible error.

The Supreme Court of Kentucky unanimously affirmed, holding that the statements were (1) relevant and highly probative of Cruse’s knowledge, plan, and absence of mistake, and (2) “inextricably intertwined” with the charged conduct, thus falling within KRE 404(b)(2). While the opinion is labelled “Not to Be Published,” it illuminates how Kentucky courts will likely treat self-inculpatory bad-act statements recorded during the commission of the charged offense—especially in the era of body-worn cameras and wired informants.

Summary of the Judgment

Issue on Appeal: Whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting an unedited video of the third controlled buy containing Cruse’s references to a prior, dismissed trafficking case—allegedly prohibited “other-crimes” evidence.
Holding: Admission was proper under KRE 404(b)(1) and (2); the video was relevant to show Cruse’s knowledge, plan, and absence of mistake and was “inextricably intertwined” with the charged conduct.
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion (because the objection was preserved).
Outcome: Convictions and twenty-year aggregate sentence affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941 (Ky. 1999) – Defines “abuse of discretion” review.
Bell v. Commonwealth, 875 S.W.2d 882 (Ky. 1994) – Three-prong test for admitting prior-bad-act evidence (relevance, probativeness, prejudice).
Clark v. Commonwealth, 223 S.W.3d 90 (Ky. 2007) – Emphasizes the exclusionary nature of KRE 404(b).
Major v. Commonwealth, 177 S.W.3d 700 (Ky. 2005) – Allows “complete, un-fragmented” narrative of events (res gestae).
Ky. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rogers, 179 S.W.3d 815 (Ky. 2005) – Explains that 404(b) evidence cannot be introduced solely for propensity.
Southworth v. Commonwealth, 435 S.W.3d 32 (Ky. 2014) – Reiterates ban on convicting by “bad character” proof alone.

The Court drew primarily on Bell for the analytic framework and on Major for the “un-fragmented narrative” principle. Clark, Rogers, and Southworth provided cautionary backdrops stressing the dangers of propensity evidence, while English supplied the deferential standard of review.

Legal Reasoning

The Court executed the Bell three-prong test as follows:

Relevance: Cruse’s monologue explained why the cash and drugs were not exchanged hand-to-hand. That explanation directly illuminated the unusual sales method the jury had to evaluate. Thus, the statements bore on material facts.
Probativeness: The statements demonstrated Cruse’s knowledge of trafficking law, his plan to circumvent liability, and the absence of mistake (he acted deliberately, not accidentally). Hence, probative value was high.
Prejudicial Effect vs. Probative Value: While the “other crime” reference was prejudicial, the Court held the prejudice did not substantially outweigh probative worth, especially because Cruse himself volunteered the information during the charged conduct.

Separately, the Court invoked KRE 404(b)(2): evidence is admissible if “inextricably intertwined with other evidence essential to the case.” Removing the statements would leave the jury with a puzzling, incomplete depiction of the transaction—the jury would see cash left on a toolbox, drugs found on a truck seat, but would not know why. That narrative gap justified allowing the unedited video.

Impact of the Decision

Body-cam & Controlled-buy Era: Law enforcement routinely captures real-time statements. The opinion signals that defendants’ spontaneous references to prior conduct are ordinarily admissible, provided they form part of the continuous transaction.
KRE 404(b) Jurisprudence: The case strengthens the “inextricably intertwined” path as an independent gateway, distinct from the traditional 404(b)(1) purposes. Attorneys will likely cite Cruse whenever seeking admission of real-time, self-narrative statements.
Trial Strategy: Defense counsel must be vigilant in moving for redaction of video/audio evidence before trial. Merely characterizing the statements as “other crimes” will not suffice if they explain the charged conduct.
Sentencing & Jury Perception: Although this was not a sentencing appeal, the case illustrates how prejudicial information can still reach a jury when intertwined, potentially influencing penalty recommendations.

Complex Concepts Simplified

KRE 404(b): A rule barring evidence of a person’s other crimes or wrongs solely to show that the person has a bad character and therefore probably committed the charged offense. It has enumerated exceptions.
Inextricably Intertwined (Res Gestae) Evidence: Facts so bound up with the charged conduct that removing them would distort the story. Think of it as watching a movie scene without its opening or closing seconds—critical context is lost.
Abuse of Discretion Standard: The appellate court defers to the trial judge’s ruling unless it is “arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.” High hurdle for appellants.
Absence of Mistake: A 404(b)(1) purpose showing the defendant knew exactly what he was doing, negating accident.

Conclusion

Though unpublished, Cruse provides a robust illustration of how Kentucky courts balance the probative force of real-time, self-inculpatory statements against the risk of undue prejudice. The decision underscores two practical lessons: (1) defendants’ spontaneous references to prior wrongdoing, when captured during the charged crime, are likely admissible because they complete the narrative; and (2) the “inextricably intertwined” exception remains a potent doctrinal tool, sometimes eclipsing conventional 404(b)(1) analysis. As technology continues to record every aspect of criminal transactions, Cruse will echo in future litigation where the line between contextual storytelling and impermissible propensity evidence must be drawn.