“Venue Does Not Vest” – The Jurisdiction-Venue Divide Re-drawn in Arends v. State (Wash. 2025)

1. Introduction

On 14 August 2025 the Washington Supreme Court decided Arends v. State, No. 103068-1, a case that tests the boundaries between venue, jurisdiction, and the venerable—but often nebulous—doctrine of vested rights. Darren Lee Arends, whose firearm rights were lost following a 1988 South Dakota felony, petitioned for restoration in Snohomish County shortly after the legislature amended RCW 9.41 to restrict venue to the county that imposed the prohibition. Arends argued the earlier statute had given him a “vested right” to file in his county of residence. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals rejected that claim.

The Supreme Court, however, reversed—but for a different reason: venue options never vest, and although the 2023 amendment did validly narrow venue, it could not—and did not—strip Washington superior courts of their constitutional jurisdiction. Consequently, Snohomish County Superior Court had power to hear the petition notwithstanding an arguable venue defect.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• Holding: The 2023 amendment to RCW 9.41 restricting venue is procedural; rights to venue do not vest. The legislature may dictate venue, but may not curtail the original jurisdiction of Washington superior courts conferred by art. IV § 6 of the state constitution. The trial court therefore possessed jurisdiction, and the Court of Appeals’ affirmance is reversed.
• Disposition: Case remanded to Snohomish County Superior Court to decide, on the merits, whether Arends satisfies the substantive restoration criteria now codified in RCW 9.41.041.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents and Authorities Cited

• Dougherty v. Dep’t of L&I, 150 Wn.2d 310 (2003) — Established that venue is procedural; no vested right in a forum.
• ZDI Gaming, Inc. v. Gambling Comm’n, 173 Wn.2d 608 (2012) — Distinguished jurisdiction from venue and reiterated constitutional limits on legislative power to restrict superior-court jurisdiction.
• Shoop v. Kittitas County (Shoop I & II) — Clarified that statutes naming particular counties generally address venue, not jurisdiction.
• State v. Manuel, 14 Wn. App. 2d 455 (2020) — Characterised the earlier RCW 9.41 venue options as procedural.
• State v. T.K., 139 Wn.2d 320 (1999); Carrier, 173 Wn.2d 791 (2012) — Juvenile-sealing / vacation cases that the dissent suggests should be overruled; majority distinguishes them but does not disavow.
• Constitutional anchor: Wash. Const. art. IV § 6 granting “universal original jurisdiction” to superior courts.

These authorities collectively frame venue as a movable, statute-governed attribute that sits below the constitutional ceiling of jurisdiction. The court marshals them to reject Arends’ vested-rights framing and to invalidate any reading of the 2023 statute that would divest superior courts of jurisdiction.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

1. Vested Rights Doctrine Re-examined. Historically tied to property and land-use certainty, “vesting” protects expectancies once a procedurally proper application is filed. The majority surveys scholarship (Singer & Singer; Dentel) underscoring the doctrine’s modern incoherence and limits it to cognisable property interests. Venue, being procedural, falls outside.
2. Venue vs. Jurisdiction. Venue designates the geographic place; jurisdiction is the court’s power. The legislature may channel lawsuits to certain counties (venue) but cannot carve up the superior courts’ constitutionally granted power to adjudicate the subject matter (jurisdiction). Treating the 2023 amendment as a venue rule preserves its validity while avoiding constitutional infirmity.
3. Application to Arends. Because he filed after the amendment, the “proper” statutory venue would have been the South Dakota court that imposed the prohibition—an impossibility in Washington. Nevertheless, under art. IV § 6 every superior court retains power. The State’s venue objection, although properly raised, could not extinguish jurisdiction; the correct remedy is transfer or waiver, not dismissal for lack of power. Reversal follows.

3.3 Likely Impact

• Firearm-Restoration Practice. Petitioners may continue to file in any Washington superior court, but face possible transfer if the respondent insists on the county-of-conviction venue. The decision prevents total foreclosure where the conviction occurred out-of-state.
• Legislative Drafting. Statutes that appear to limit where an action may be brought will be construed narrowly to avoid trenching on constitutional jurisdiction. Future bills may include explicit transfer mechanisms rather than venue-cancelling language.
• Civil-Procedure Doctrine. The court reiterates that procedural entitlements—venue, mode of filing, sequencing—do not vest. This will dampen reliance arguments whenever the legislature alters procedural pathways.
• Debate on Vested Rights Narrowed. The majority’s refusal to extend “vesting” beyond property and contract, and the dissent’s call to overrule T.K. and Carrier, telegraph a judicial trend toward limiting the doctrine to its historic core.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Vested Right: A legal interest so fixed that the legislature cannot retroactively impair it. Classic example: a developer who files a complete permit application vests the right to have the project reviewed under the regulations then in force.
• Venue: The specific county or court location where a lawsuit starts. Think of it as choosing the “branch office” of the judicial system most logically connected to the dispute.
• Jurisdiction: The constitutional or statutory power of a court to hear a type of case. Venue can shift; jurisdiction cannot be waived or created by consent.
• Firearm-Rights Restoration: A statutory mechanism (RCW 9.41.041) allowing certain felons to regain gun possession rights after meeting waiting periods, completing sentence conditions, and showing a clean record.

5. Conclusion

Arends v. State stakes out a clear boundary: venue choices are procedural conveniences, not property-like rights. They therefore do not “vest,” and the legislature’s power to rewrite venue statutes does not erode the constitutional jurisdiction of Washington’s superior courts. The ruling simultaneously preserves the 2023 policy choice to channel petitions to the county of conviction while preventing that choice from operating as a jurisdictional bar, particularly where the prohibition originated out-of-state. Going forward, litigants should frame challenges to similar statutory amendments in terms of venue and transfer, not vested rights, and lawmakers should draft with an eye toward the persistent, constitutionally rooted authority of superior courts.