“Velázquez Deadline Extension Doctrine”
Weekends and Holidays Toll the 60-Day Voluntary-Departure Period under 8 U.S.C. §1229c(b)(2)

I. Introduction

In Monsalvo Velázquez v. Bondi, No. 23-929 (Apr. 22, 2025), the United States Supreme Court resolved a deceptively narrow statutory question that carries sweeping consequences for immigration practice: When the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) grants a non-citizen a 60-day period to depart the United States voluntarily, does the period end on the 60^th calendar day even if that day is a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, or does it roll forward to the next business day?

By a 5-4 vote the Court answered that the period rol​ls forward. Writing for the majority, Justice Gorsuch held that Congress legislated in harmony with a “long-standing administrative construction” under which deadlines expressed in “days” toll when the last day falls on a non-business day. The decision overturns a Tenth Circuit judgment, deepens the Court’s recent trend of textual clarity in immigration law, and—importantly—sets a new procedural safeguard for thousands of non-citizens who accept voluntary departure.

II. Summary of the Judgment

• Jurisdiction: Sections 1252(a)(1) and (b)(9) permit courts of appeals to review “questions of law” arising from any term in a final order of removal; a petitioner need not simultaneously contest his underlying removability.
• Merits: The phrase “60 days” in §1229c(b)(2) adopts the specialized legal meaning that excludes weekends and legal holidays when they are the final day; consequently, the deadline extends to the next business day.
• Disposition: Judgment of the Tenth Circuit reversed; case remanded for proceedings consistent with the opinion.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Dada v. Mukasey (2008) — underscored the voluntary-departure bargain and the statutory penalties for overstaying; provided context for the importance of precise timing.
• Meza-Vallejos v. Holder (9th Cir. 2012) — first circuit case adopting the roll-forward rule; the Court’s decision aligns nationwide practice with Meza-Vallejos.
• Haig v. Agee (1981) & FDIC v. Philadelphia Gear (1986) — articulated the presumption that Congress legislates against settled administrative gloss.
• Nasrallah v. Barr (2020) — defined “final order of removal” and framed the jurisdictional debate; dissents relied heavily on its language.
• Niz-Chavez v. Garland (2021) — although underlying Monsalvo’s motion to reopen, it also exemplified the Court’s strict textualism in immigration statutes.
• Other interpretive cases: Powerex; Hill; United States v. Detroit Timber.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Statutory Text & Ordinary Meaning. “Days” ordinarily means calendar days, but in legal contexts involving deadlines, it often carries a specialized meaning that excludes weekends/holidays if they are the final day.
2. Administrative Backdrop. Since at least the 1950s, immigration regulations (8 C.F.R. §1.1(h) and successors) contained a universal counting rule: compute any “day” deadline by rolling over when the last day is a weekend/holiday. Congress enacted IIRIRA in 1996 against this background.
3. Presumption of Consistent Usage within IIRIRA §304. The same 1996 section set 30- and 90-day filing periods for motions to reconsider and reopen. Everyone—including the Government—agrees those periods toll for weekends/holidays. The majority held that identical language in the same section should be treated identically, rejecting a “procedural vs. substantive” distinction proposed by the Government and the dissents.
4. Regulatory Implementation Post-IIRIRA. When the Attorney General implemented §1229c(b)(2), no rule suggested a departure from the long-standing counting method, reinforcing the inference that Congress endorsed it.
5. Policy Parity. The Court noted that the tolling rule often protects non-citizens who must file last-minute motions intertwined with voluntary departure, rendering a unitary counting method both administratively simpler and fairer.

C. Jurisdictional Holding & Its Significance

The majority rejected the Government’s contention that a petition for review must include a challenge to removability. For practitioners, this means that discrete legal questions embedded in removal orders—bond conditions, departure terms, penalties—are independently reviewable, so long as they arise from the final order. The ruling avoids forcing counsel to raise meritless removability challenges merely to secure jurisdiction.

D. Potential Impact

• Nationwide Uniformity. Immigration judges and the BIA must now extend §1229c(b)(2) deadlines that land on Saturdays, Sundays, or federal holidays, ending the circuit split.
• Strategic Calculus for Counsel. Attorneys can advise clients with greater certainty regarding the “true” last day to depart or to file a protective motion.
• Administrative Efficiency. The decision may marginally increase the filing of motions on Monday holidays but averts collateral litigation over penalties under §1229c(d).
• Statutory-Interpretation Doctrine. Reaffirms the Court’s emphasis on historical regulatory practice and contextual textualism, rather than purely ordinary meaning, when statutory language emerges from a specialized administrative sphere.
• Broader Reading of §1252 Jurisdiction. The Court’s refusal to require a removability challenge may spur new, focused petitions on collateral legal issues in removal orders.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Voluntary Departure: A discretionary benefit allowing a removable non-citizen to leave the U.S. on his own within a set time, avoiding forced removal and harsh re-entry bars.
• Final Order of Removal: The agency’s conclusive decision authorizing DHS to remove a non-citizen if and when specified conditions are met.
• Motion to Reopen vs. Motion to Reconsider: Reopen introduces new evidence; reconsider argues that the agency misapplied law. Each has separate filing deadlines.
• §1252(b)(9) “Zipper Clause”: Consolidates all legal and factual issues “arising from” removal proceedings into a single petition for review, but after Velázquez that petition need not dispute removability.
• Presumption of Consistent Usage: Canon that identical words in the same statute usually mean the same thing, unless context dictates otherwise.
• Tolling for Weekends/Holidays: A procedural rule, familiar from civil and appellate rules, that extends a deadline when offices are closed on the last day.

V. Conclusion

Monsalvo Velázquez v. Bondi crystallizes a clear, administrable rule: the INA’s 60-day voluntary-departure clock pauses when its final tick coincides with a weekend or legal holiday. Beyond clarifying a small but consequential slice of immigration procedure, the decision reverberates through statutory-interpretation doctrine and jurisdictional practice. It fortifies the principle that Congress legislates against an established regulatory landscape, and it broadens access to judicial review for non-citizens confronting complex removal orders. For courts, practitioners, and immigrants alike, Velázquez supplies predictability where ambiguity once invited harsh penalties and uneven application.