“Using” an Identity without Impersonation
United States v. Kristen Williams and the Expansive Reading of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A in the Eleventh Circuit

1. Introduction

United States v. Kristen Williams, No. 24-10633 (11th Cir. May 13, 2025) is an unpublished—but still highly instructive—per curiam decision in which the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a postal employee’s convictions for conspiracy to commit bank fraud, substantive bank fraud, aggravated identity theft, and theft/possession of a U.S. Postal Service “arrow key.” The case arose out of a mail-based check-fraud ring operating in southern Alabama. The central issue on appeal was whether the evidence at trial was sufficient to support each count, particularly the aggravated identity-theft charge under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1). In addressing that question, the Court reaffirmed—and slightly extended—its broader interpretation of what it means to “use” another person’s “means of identification.” The judgment thus serves as the Eleventh Circuit’s latest clarification that impersonation is not a necessary element of “use,” so long as the defendant appropriates personal identifiers to deceive or facilitate an underlying predicate felony.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Court, applying the familiar Rule 29 sufficiency standard, held that a rational jury could find Williams guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on all counts. Key evidentiary points included:

• Eye-witness testimony from co-conspirator Sean White that Williams stole and sold him an arrow key and allowed fraudulent checks to be deposited into her bank account.
• Williams’s own recorded admissions to Postal Inspector Michael Maxey linking her to White’s check-fraud scheme.
• Bank records and corroborating testimony showing two specific counterfeit checks—$9,975.21 and $4,000—deposited into her account.
• Text messages indicating Williams’s prior sale of an arrow key and discussion of selling another for $4,000.

Relying on this evidence, the panel found each statutory element satisfied:

• Conspiracy (§ 1349): knowledge and voluntary participation in White’s scheme were shown by Williams’s own admissions and actions.
• Bank Fraud (§ 1344): intentional execution of a scheme to defraud federally insured institutions via counterfeit checks.
• Aggravated Identity Theft (§ 1028A): use of Wilshire Royale Hotel’s and Akbar Talebi’s names, signatures, and account numbers during bank-fraud offenses.
• Theft/Possession of a Postal Key (§ 1704): sale of a USPS arrow key for $2,500 demonstrated knowing unlawful possession with intent to dispose.

Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Williams’s Rule 29 motions and her convictions on all counts.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• United States v. Vernon

723 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2013) – Establishes the three-part test for proving conspiracy under § 1349 (existence, knowledge, voluntary joinder). The panel used Vernon to structure its discussion of the conspiracy evidence.

• United States v. McCarrick

294 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2002) – Defines the two elements of bank fraud under § 1344(1). The Court imported McCarrick’s framework to show how the June 14 and June 21 counterfeit checks satisfied each element.

• United States v. Barrington

648 F.3d 1178 (11th Cir. 2011) – Articulates the four elements of aggravated identity theft. Barrington provided the baseline test that the Court applied to Williams’s conduct.

• United States v. Gladden

78 F.4th 1232 (11th Cir. 2023) – Clarified that “use” of a means of identification does not require impersonation, only the deceptive appropriation of another’s identifiers. Gladden is the linchpin precedent the panel invokes to reject Williams’s “no impersonation, no use” argument.

• United States v. Chafin, Holmes, Clay

These cases collectively reaffirm the deferential sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard: viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the government and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the jury verdict.

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The analysis tracks each count, but the most doctrinally significant reasoning concerns § 1028A. Williams argued that because she never pretended to be Wilshire Royale Hotel or Akbar Talebi, she could not have “used” their identifiers. The Court rejected this, relying on Gladden to explain that “use” encompasses any deceptive deployment of another’s identifying information to accomplish a predicate felony. Bank fraud inherently relies on conveying false authorization; therefore, employing real names, routing numbers, signatures, or business addresses on counterfeit checks constitutes “use,” even absent literal impersonation.

Regarding sufficiency, the Court methodically matched record evidence to each element, emphasizing:

• Direct admissions by Williams (rare in sufficiency appeals) that she knew of and participated in the check-fraud scheme.
• Objective corroboration (bank footage, postal scanner logs, testimonial evidence) rebutting any inference of innocent conduct.
• The high deference owed to jury credibility determinations.

3.3 Anticipated Impact

Although unpublished, the opinion:

• Consolidates Gladden’s interpretation of “use,” making it harder for defendants in the Eleventh Circuit to evade § 1028A liability simply by arguing a lack of impersonation.
• Signals the Court’s willingness to affirm aggravated identity-theft convictions where defendants merely facilitate the deposit of counterfeit instruments displaying genuine account information.
• Provides a template for prosecutors handling USPS-related frauds: combine postal-scanner data, co-conspirator testimony, and banking records to withstand Rule 29 challenges.
• May influence district-court jury instructions on § 1028A by explicitly distinguishing “use” from “impersonation,” thereby simplifying the government’s burden of proof.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

4.1 “Means of Identification”

Any name or number that can identify a specific individual or business. This includes signatures, bank-account numbers, addresses, or even digital identifiers such as routing codes.

4.2 “Use,” “Transfer,” and “Possess” under § 1028A

• Use: deploying another’s identifier in a way that furthers a crime, even if you are not pretending to be that person.
• Transfer: moving the identifier to someone else (e.g., selling a stolen Social Security number).
• Possess: simply having the identifier in your control with criminal intent.

4.3 Postal “Arrow Key”

A universal key that can open blue USPS collection boxes and certain cluster mailboxes. Because of the broad access it grants, possession or sale of an arrow key without authorization is a federal crime (18 U.S.C. § 1704).

4.4 Rule 29 Motion for Judgment of Acquittal

A procedural mechanism through which a defendant asks the trial judge to enter a verdict of “not guilty” on the ground that the evidence is legally insufficient. On appeal, sufficiency is reviewed de novo, but courts must view the evidence most favorably to the prosecution.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Kristen Williams reinforces two core propositions in federal criminal law. First, sufficiency challenges rarely succeed when the record contains direct admissions, corroborated by objective evidence, that tie a defendant to a fraudulent scheme. Second—and more doctrinally significant—the Eleventh Circuit continues to interpret “use” under § 1028A broadly: deceptive application of another’s identifying information, not impersonation, is the touchstone. For prosecutors, this decision provides a clear roadmap for charging and proving aggravated identity theft in check-fraud prosecutions. For defense counsel, it underscores the importance of contesting the underlying deceitful appropriation of identifiers, not merely the absence of impersonation. Altogether, the opinion strengthens the government’s hand in combating mail-related financial crimes and augments the jurisprudence on identity theft within the Eleventh Circuit.