“Uses Force” Under Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(d): Bodily Harm Inflicted Before or During Nonconsensual Penetration Suffices

Introduction

In State of Minnesota v. Clifford Robert Letourneau, III, 23 N.W.3d 386 (Minn. 2025), the Minnesota Supreme Court resolved a recurring question under the reformed criminal sexual conduct (CSC) statutes: what does it mean to “use[] force” under Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(d) (2024) in first-degree CSC cases involving adult victims? The Court held that the phrase “uses force,” which is cross-defined as “the infliction by the actor of bodily harm” (Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 3(1)), is satisfied when the perpetrator inflicts bodily harm either before or during the act of nonconsensual sexual penetration. The statute does not require that force be used “to accomplish the act” or “to cause the complainant to submit.”

The case arises from a pretrial dismissal of a first-degree CSC charge. The district court read the statute to require force to accomplish penetration and relied on the pattern jury instruction (CRIMJIG 12.05). The court of appeals reversed, emphasizing 2021 statutory amendments. The Supreme Court affirmed the reversal, but on plain-language grounds, clarifying that subdivision 1(d) contains no “to accomplish” or “to cause submission” limitation and that the infliction of bodily harm concurrent with penetration falls squarely within its ambit.

The opinion has significant repercussions for charging decisions, jury instructions, and trial strategy in Minnesota CSC prosecutions. It distinguishes the distinct roles of “bodily harm” (subd. 1(d)) and “personal injury” with duress-type force or coercion (subd. 1(c)), and aligns with Minnesota precedent rejecting any requirement of “extrinsic force” beyond the force inherent in the conduct that causes harm.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court held that:

• Under Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(d), a defendant commits first-degree CSC when the State proves nonconsensual sexual penetration and that “the actor uses force as defined in section 609.341, subdivision 3, clause (1)”—that is, that the actor inflicted “bodily harm” (Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 7: physical pain or injury, illness, or impairment of physical condition).
• “Uses force” does not mean “uses force to accomplish the act” or “to cause the complainant to submit.” The Legislature included such limiting phrases elsewhere in § 609.342 but omitted them from subd. 1(d). The omission is intentional and controlling.
• Read in context, subdivision 1(d) describes a “circumstance” accompanying or conditioning the penetration. The circumstance exists if the infliction of bodily harm occurs before or during the penetration. It need not precede the act, and it need not be the means by which the act is accomplished.
• Because the complaint alleged that K.L. suffered vaginal tearing and bleeding during the nonconsensual penetration, the State established probable cause that Letourneau “used force” within the meaning of subd. 1(d). The district court’s dismissal was error.

The Court concluded the statute is unambiguous and therefore did not apply the rule of lenity or rely on legislative history, even though the court of appeals had consulted the 2021 amendments.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The Court’s reasoning draws on several strands of Minnesota law: text-focused statutory interpretation, established CSC doctrine concerning force, and procedural rules governing pretrial State appeals.

• Textual Canons and Plain Meaning:
  • State v. Robinson, 921 N.W.2d 755, 758 (Minn. 2019) and Minn. Stat. § 645.16 anchor the interpretive objective of effectuating legislative intent through statutory text.
  • Dupey v. State, 868 N.W.2d 36, 39 (Minn. 2015) and State v. Degroot, 946 N.W.2d 354, 360 (Minn. 2020) inform the ambiguity inquiry and the enforcement of plain meaning.
  • State v. Friese, 959 N.W.2d 205, 210 (Minn. 2021), State v. Pakhnyuk, 926 N.W.2d 914, 920 (Minn. 2019), Hagen v. Steven Scott Mgmt., Inc., 963 N.W.2d 164, 170 (Minn. 2021), and State v. Thompson, 950 N.W.2d 65, 69 (Minn. 2020) reinforce whole-statute reading, ordinary meaning, and the canon against surplusage.
  • State v. Schwartz, 957 N.W.2d 414, 419 (Minn. 2021) supplies the omission canon: where limiting words appear in one part of a statute but not another, courts do not add them back in.
• CSC-Specific Precedents on Force and Timing:
  • State v. Mattson, 376 N.W.2d 413, 415 (Minn. 1985); In re Welfare of D.L.K., 381 N.W.2d 435, 437–38 (Minn. 1986); State v. Middleton, 386 N.W.2d 226, 230 (Minn. 1986): these decisions hold that Minnesota’s CSC statutes do not require “extrinsic force” beyond the force inherent in the sexual act, and that coercion or force elements may be satisfied by words or conduct concurrent with the sexual contact. The Letourneau Court invokes this line to reject any “precedent act of force” requirement and to confirm that harm inflicted during penetration can satisfy “uses force.”
• Procedural/Jurisdictional Precedents:
  • Kingbird v. State, 973 N.W.2d 633, 637 (Minn. 2022); State v. Underdahl, 767 N.W.2d 677, 681, 684 (Minn. 2009); State v. Zais, 805 N.W.2d 32, 36 (Minn. 2011): these cases frame the State’s right to appeal pretrial orders and the “critical impact” threshold under Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.04. Dismissal of a charge has critical impact even if others remain.
  • State v. Lopez, 778 N.W.2d 700, 703 (Minn. 2010): probable cause exists where facts show a reasonable probability that the person committed the crime.
  • State v. Dixon, 981 N.W.2d 387, 392 (Minn. 2022): de novo review of dismissals based on legal determinations.
• Lenity:
  • State v. Thonesavanh, 904 N.W.2d 432, 440 (Minn. 2017): the rule of lenity is a last resort applicable only to irreducibly ambiguous statutes. The Court declines to apply lenity because § 609.342, subd. 1(d) is unambiguous.

Collectively, these authorities support the Court’s textual approach and its emphasis on timing and context: a “circumstance” can accompany or condition an act, and Minnesota CSC law has long permitted force or coercion to be established by conduct concurrent with sexual contact.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s analysis proceeds in four steps: the statutory framework, the meaning of “uses,” the combined phrase “uses force,” and application to probable cause.

1) Statutory Framework

Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1 defines first-degree CSC involving adult victims and lists “circumstances” that elevate nonconsensual penetration to first degree. Subdivision 1(d) specifies the circumstance at issue: “the actor uses force as defined in section 609.341, subdivision 3, clause (1).” Clause (1) defines “force” as “the infliction by the actor of bodily harm.” “Bodily harm” means “physical pain or injury, illness, or any impairment of physical condition” (Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 7). Separately, “sexual penetration” is itself statutorily defined to require lack of consent (Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 12).

By design, then, subd. 1(d) elevates nonconsensual penetration to first-degree if the actor inflicts bodily harm in connection with that act. No additional weapon, accomplice, or coercion element is present in this subdivision, in contrast to other subdivisions that use specific limiting phrases.

2) The Meaning of “Uses”

Both parties invoked dictionary definitions of “use,” converging on “to put into service” or “to employ.” The defense pressed a more restrictive gloss—“to employ for the purpose of accomplishing the act of penetration”—which would effectively read a “purpose” requirement into subd. 1(d).

The Court rejected that gloss based on the structure of § 609.342, subd. 1. Where the Legislature intended a causal or purposive limitation, it said so explicitly: e.g., subd. 1(b) (dangerous weapon “used or fashioned” and “uses or threatens to use” it “to cause the complainant to submit”); subd. 1(c)(i) (actor “uses coercion to accomplish the act”); subd. 1(e)(i)-(ii) (aided by accomplices and “uses force or coercion to cause the complainant to submit,” or uses/threatens to use a weapon “to cause the complainant to submit”). The omission of any such limiting phrase in subd. 1(d) is legally significant and counsels against reading “for the purpose of” into “uses.”

Applying the whole-statute canon and the canon against surplusage, the Court concluded that “uses” in subd. 1(d) carries its ordinary meaning—“to put into service” or “to employ”—without an embedded “to accomplish” or “cause submission” component.

3) The Combined Phrase “Uses Force” and Timing

The defense next argued that when “uses” is combined with the statutory definition of “force” (infliction of bodily harm), the infliction must logically precede the act it is “used for.” The Court rejected this too, grounding its analysis in the structure of § 609.342, subd. 1, which predicates liability on whether a specified “circumstance” exists.

Relying on dictionary definitions, the Court treated a “circumstance” as an “event accompanying, conditioning, or determining” the act. This reading accommodates force that occurs:

• Before the penetration (conditioning or determining it), or
• During the penetration (accompanying it).

Crucially, the Court’s formulation—“before or during”— excludes force that occurs only after the act has concluded. An injury inflicted solely after the sexual act would not “accompany” or “condition/determine” the penetration and, under this reading, would not satisfy subd. 1(d) (though it might support other charges).

4) Distinguishing Subdivision 1(c) from 1(d)

The defense warned that allowing “during-the-act” harm to satisfy subd. 1(d) would make subd. 1(c) superfluous. The Court disagreed, stressing two differences:

• Different kinds of “force”: Subd. 1(d) incorporates “force” as “infliction of bodily harm” (clause (1)), i.e., assaultive physical force. By contrast, subd. 1(c)(ii) uses “force” as defined in clause (2): “attempted infliction, or threatened infliction” of bodily harm or threat of any other crime that causes a reasonable belief in the ability to execute the threat—i.e., duress-type force.
• Different harm thresholds: “Personal injury” in subd. 1(c) includes bodily harm or severe mental anguish or pregnancy (Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 8), which is broader than the “bodily harm” required by subd. 1(d). Thus, subd. 1(c) can be satisfied without any actual physical injury (e.g., severe mental anguish), provided its additional conditions are met.

Because the provisions target different modalities of force and cover distinct harm categories, neither renders the other superfluous.

5) Application to Probable Cause

The State’s complaint alleged that K.L. did not consent and that the penetration caused vaginal tearing and bleeding. The State supplemented with a recorded interview consistent with the complaint. Under Lopez and Dixon, those allegations establish a reasonable probability that Letourneau “used force”—inflicted bodily harm either before or during the nonconsensual penetration. Dismissal was therefore erroneous, and the State’s pretrial appeal was properly before the courts under Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.04 because dismissal of a count has “critical impact” (Underdahl).

Impact

This decision clarifies and, in practice, broadens the reach of first-degree CSC under subd. 1(d) relative to the pre-2021 landscape and to interpretations that grafted a “to accomplish the act” requirement from pattern instructions. Key consequences include:

• Charging and Proof:
  • Prosecutors can charge first-degree CSC under subd. 1(d) when evidence shows nonconsensual penetration and contemporaneous bodily harm—even if the harm resulted from the penetration itself and even in the absence of weapons, accomplices, or explicit coercive threats.
  • “Bodily harm” includes “physical pain,” so testimonial evidence of pain, corroborated where possible by medical or physical findings (e.g., bleeding, tearing), can support the force element. The severity of injury is not dispositive; the statutory threshold is relatively low.
  • Timing matters: harm occurring after penetration ends will not suffice for subd. 1(d). Parties should develop concrete evidence on when the injury occurred.
• Jury Instructions and CRIMJIG:
  • The district court relied on CRIMJIG 12.05, which stated the defendant must have used “force to accomplish the act [of penetration].” The Supreme Court’s interpretation indicates that instruction is inconsistent with the statute. Pattern instructions will likely need revision to reflect the “before or during” standard without a “to accomplish” limitation.
• Subdivision Interplay:
  • Subd. 1(d) (assaultive, actual bodily harm) and subd. 1(c)(ii) (duress-type, attempted or threatened force), and subd. 1(c)(i) (coercion) now sit in clearer doctrinal lanes. Prosecutors may plead in the alternative when facts support multiple circumstances but should avoid surplus theories at trial that risk juror confusion.
• Negotiations and Trial Strategy:
  • Defenders can no longer argue that first-degree liability under subd. 1(d) requires force used to accomplish penetration. Defense focus will shift to challenging proof of “bodily harm” (including whether pain was more than de minimis), the timing of harm, and consent.
  • Prosecutors should make a record on the sequence of events and the nature of harm, and ensure medical and testimonial evidence ties injury to the period before or during penetration.
• Doctrinal Clarity and Lenity:
  • Because the Court found the statute unambiguous, the rule of lenity does not apply. This diminishes prospects for defense arguments premised on perceived textual ambiguity in “uses force.”

Practice Notes

• Elemental Framework After Letourneau: To prove § 609.342, subd. 1(d), the State must establish (1) nonconsensual sexual penetration (Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 12), and (2) that the actor inflicted “bodily harm” (Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 7) before or during the penetration.
• Evidence of Bodily Harm: Medical records, SANE examinations, photographic evidence, and contemporaneous statements describing pain or impairment are highly probative. Where harm is pain alone, detail intensity, duration, and functional impairment.
• Timing Proof: Witness accounts, timestamps, and forensic findings should be marshaled to show that harm accompanied or conditioned the act. Post-act assaultive conduct should be clearly segregated in proofs to avoid timing challenges.
• Instructional Requests: Parties should request jury instructions that track the statute and this decision’s timing formulation (“before or during”). Avoid language implying a “to accomplish” requirement.
• Alternative Theories: Where threats or coercion are also present, consider charging subd. 1(c)(i) or 1(c)(ii) in the alternative. But at trial, craft verdict forms and instructions that minimize overlap and clarify each theory’s distinct elements.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Uses force” (subd. 1(d)): Means the actor inflicted bodily harm. There is no requirement that the harm was inflicted to make the victim submit or to get the act done. It is enough that the harm was inflicted before or during the penetration.
• “Bodily harm”: Physical pain or injury, illness, or any impairment of physical condition (Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 7). Pain alone can suffice.
• “Personal injury” (used in subd. 1(c)): A broader category that includes bodily harm, severe mental anguish, or pregnancy (Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 8).
• Clause (1) vs. Clause (2) “force”: Clause (1) = actual infliction of bodily harm (assaultive force). Clause (2) = attempted or threatened infliction of bodily harm or other crime causing a reasonable belief the threat can be carried out (duress-type force).
• “Circumstance” in § 609.342, subd. 1: A condition or event that accompanies or conditions the act. This is why timing is “before or during,” not after.
• “Extrinsic force” (not required): Minnesota law does not demand force beyond that inherent in the act that causes harm; harm concurrent with the penetration can satisfy “uses force.”
• Rule of lenity: A tiebreaker for truly ambiguous criminal statutes. Not used here because the Court found the text clear.
• State pretrial appeal and “critical impact”: The State may appeal certain pretrial orders, but must show the ruling critically impacts the case. Dismissal of a count satisfies that requirement.

Conclusion

Letourneau provides a definitive construction of “uses force” under Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(d): the State need prove only that the defendant inflicted bodily harm before or during nonconsensual penetration. The Court’s plain-meaning analysis emphasizes statutory structure and the Legislature’s deliberate use (and omission) of limiting phrases across different subdivisions. By clarifying that no “to accomplish the act” or “to cause submission” showing is required under subd. 1(d), the decision aligns with longstanding Minnesota precedent that force or coercion may be established by conduct occurring concurrently with the sexual act and that “extrinsic force” is unnecessary.

Practically, the decision streamlines the path to first-degree CSC in cases featuring contemporaneous physical injury or pain, requires updates to pattern jury instructions, and refines the doctrinal boundary between subd. 1(d)’s assaultive force and subd. 1(c)’s duress-type force with broader “personal injury.” For courts and practitioners, the message is crisp: focus on whether bodily harm occurred and when—if it accompanied or conditioned the penetration, subd. 1(d) is satisfied.