“Truthful-but-Misleading” Communications, Limited Proximate Cause, and Line-and-Scope Constraints: The Alabama Supreme Court’s New Framework for Tortious Interference in Flickinger v. King (2025)

Introduction

The decision in Daniel Flickinger v. Lawrence Tracy King and King Simmons Ford & Spree, P.C. (Supreme Court of Alabama, 22 Aug 2025) is the Court’s second opinion in the same dispute and significantly re-calibrates Alabama law on tortious interference with a business relationship. The parties are:

Appellant / Plaintiff: Daniel Flickinger – former associate at Wainwright, Pope & McMeekin, P.C. (“WPM”).
Appellees / Defendants:
- Lawrence “Larry” King – partner and sole equity owner of King Simmons Ford & Spree, P.C. (“KSFS”).
- King Simmons Ford & Spree, P.C. – the law firm (together with King, “the King defendants”).

The litigation stems from King’s late-night June 2020 text to two WPM partners containing a “screenshot” of Flickinger’s controversial Facebook post concerning George Floyd. Flickinger resigned the next day after WPM gave him an ultimatum, and he sued King and KSFS for, inter alia, tortious interference. In its first appeal (Flickinger v. King, 385 So.3d 504 (Ala. 2023)) the Court revived only that interference claim. On remand the circuit court granted summary judgment for both King and KSFS; Flickinger appealed again.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court:

Affirmed summary judgment as to KSFS, holding no vicarious liability because King’s conduct was outside the line and scope of his employment and conferred merely an “incidental benefit.”
Reversed summary judgment as to King individually, finding genuine issues of material fact on:
- Whether King’s text was a substantial factor in Flickinger’s termination (the “causation” question).
- Whether King’s conduct was justified under Restatement (2d) of Torts § 772(a) (truthful-information defense).
Affirmed trial-court denials of (i) a motion to compel King’s cellphone records and (ii) a continuance, holding Flickinger failed to show relevance or necessity.
Remanded for jury trial solely against King on the tortious interference claim.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited & Their Influence

Shades Ridge Holding Co. v. Cobbs, Allen & Hall Mortgage Co., 390 So.2d 601 (Ala. 1980) – leading authority that proximate cause plays a “more limited” role in intentional torts; the Court relies heavily on its “substantial factor” language.
Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 767 & 772 – adopted in Gross v. Lowder Realty, 494 So.2d 590 (Ala. 1986), and more recently parsed in Cobbs, Allen & Hall, Inc. v. EPIC Holdings, Inc., 335 So.3d 1115 (Ala. 2021). The Court again distinguishes between the general balancing test (§ 767) and the absolute defense of truthful information / honest advice (§ 772).
QHG of Enterprise, Inc. v. Pertuit, 323 So.3d 1171 (Ala. 2020) & Madasu v. Shoals Radiology Assocs., 378 So.3d 501 (Ala. 2022) – articulate modern Alabama rules on respondeat superior; the Court borrows their “personal motive” / “incidental benefit” language to absolve KSFS.
EPIC Holdings (2021) – provides the structure for assessing § 772 defenses and reiterates that justification usually presents a jury question.

2. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

a) Corporate Liability & Scope of Employment

Even a managing partner’s acts can be outside the “line and scope” when pursued for purely personal reasons. The Court re-states Alabama’s two-pronged test: an act is within scope only if (i) it is part of the employee’s duties or (ii) it confers a real (not incidental) benefit on the employer. King’s late-night texting spree—motivated by personal outrage and friendship with WPM partners—failed both prongs. Result: KSFS is out of the case.

b) Causation in Intentional Torts

The circuit court had treated causation as if this were a negligence case, requiring proximate cause and absence of “independent intervening causes.” The Supreme Court corrects the approach:

In intentional torts, foreseeability limits are relaxed; liability may attach even for “very remote” consequences if the defendant’s act was a substantial factor.
The Court finds ample evidence to let a jury decide whether King’s text “set in motion” the termination—even if WPM partners later reviewed additional posts or received the same screenshot from a different lawyer.

c) § 772 “Truthful Information” Defense

King invoked § 772(a): transmitting truthful information is absolutely privileged. The Court reframes the inquiry: information must be truthful and not misleading. Because King affirmatively told WPM that the composite image was on Flickinger’s own Facebook (“Yes. His FB”)—despite knowing it had been created by a third party—the “truthfulness” of the communication is a disputed fact for the jury.

d) Discovery & Continuance

Absent a showing of relevance, trial courts need not compel expansive third-party phone records or delay summary-judgment proceedings. Flickinger conceded he could not obtain message content from the carrier, undermining relevance. Hence, no abuse of discretion.

3. Impact of the Judgment

Narrowing Respondeat Superior. Alabama entities cannot automatically be dragged into interference claims for a partner’s or officer’s personal social-media crusades. Firms must receive more than reputational “halo” benefits before vicarious liability attaches.
Causation Standard Clarified. Trial courts must apply the “substantial factor” test, not classic negligence proximate cause, in intentional torts. This eases plaintiffs’ evidentiary burden at the summary-judgment stage.
“Truthful Information” Redefined. A communication that is technically accurate but omits context—or conveys a half-truth—may forfeit § 772 protection. Practitioners must vet the completeness and potential for misinterpretation when advising third parties.
Discovery Discipline Upheld. The opinion affirms trial courts’ discretion to quash broad cell-phone subpoenas lacking a concrete link to material facts.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Line and Scope of Employment: Acts an employee performs as part of assigned duties or that genuinely benefit the employer. Personal favors, vendettas, or hobbyhorse activism fall outside.
Substantial Factor: A cause that plays a significant role in bringing about the harm, even if others also contribute. In intentional torts, courts ask whether the defendant’s conduct “set the events in motion,” not whether it was the sole cause.
§ 772 Defense: An absolute shield when the defendant merely passes along truthful facts or honest advice requested. The shield evaporates if the information is materially misleading, incomplete, or furnished with an improper motive.
Incidental Benefit Rule: If the employer’s gain is only an unintended or trivial by-product of the employee’s personal act, respondeat superior does not apply.

Conclusion

Flickinger v. King delivers three doctrinal takeaways:

Respondeat superior in interference cases remains tightly cabined; personal activism, even by firm leadership, is rarely “within scope.”
Intentional-tort causation in Alabama is now explicitly governed by the substantial-factor test, marking a clearer divide from negligence doctrine.
The § 772 truthful-information safe harbor demands not just literal truth but contextual accuracy; “truthful-but-misleading” statements will reach a jury.

Collectively, these holdings modernize Alabama’s interference tort, balance free exchange of information with accountability for reputational harm, and provide firms and practitioners a sharper blueprint for social-media-era risk management.

“Truthful-but-Misleading” Communications, Limited Proximate Cause, and Line-and-Scope Constraints: The New Framework from Flickinger v. King (Ala. 2025)