“The Voluntary-Acceptance Rule”
Supreme Court of West Virginia Clarifies When Failure to File Financial Disclosure Will Not Upset a Divorce Settlement

Introduction

Anne Y. v. Daniel Y., decided on 27 June 2025 by the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia (“SCAWV”), resolves a seemingly routine post-divorce dispute that nonetheless raises a perennial question in family law: What happens when one spouse never files the statutorily-required financial disclosure statement, yet both spouses proceed to sign and obtain judicial approval of a settlement agreement?

The petitioner, Anne Y. (“Anne”), sought to set aside the parties’ settlement after learning her former husband, Daniel Y. (“Daniel”), later left the law firm in which he had an ownership interest. She relied primarily on Daniel’s admitted failure to file a financial disclosure. Both the Family Court of Cabell County and the Intermediate Court of Appeals (“ICA”) refused to reopen the decree. In a 4-1 memorandum decision, the SCAWV affirmed, over a vigorous dissent by Justice Charles S. Trump IV.

The decision crystallises what this commentary labels the “Voluntary-Acceptance Rule.” Under this rule, when:

• both parties are represented (or demonstrably sophisticated),
• they knowingly proceed without the errant disclosure, and
• no evidence of fraud, duress, or unconscionability surfaces,

a later motion for reconsideration under W. Va. Code § 51-2A-10 cannot rely solely on the missing disclosure to unravel the bargain. The Court therefore signals that statutory disclosure requirements, though mandatory in theory, are waivable in practice by informed conduct.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court’s majority adopted the following key holdings:

1. The family court did not abuse its discretion in approving the settlement despite Daniel’s failure to file a financial disclosure statement, because Anne “with full knowledge” elected to proceed and sign the agreement.
2. When a party moves for reconsideration under § 51-2A-10 based solely on the absence of an opponent’s disclosure, the movant must additionally demonstrate fraud, duress, unconscionability, or some other equity-defeating circumstance. Absent that showing, the family court may rely on § 48-7-206 to deem the submitting party’s statements “accurate.”
3. The ICA correctly affirmed the family court’s denial of Anne’s motion, and no reversible error or unsettled legal question warranted further relief.

Justice Trump dissented, arguing that the statutory duty to disclose is non-waivable and that the family court could not certify the agreement as “fair and reasonable” without seeing the missing numbers.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

• State ex rel. St. Clair v. Howard, 244 W. Va. 679 (2021) – emphasised the mandatory nature of financial disclosure and the court’s duty to ensure equitable distribution after full transparency.
• Preece v. Preece, 195 W. Va. 460 (1995) – held that a settlement’s validity hinges on parties’ full disclosure enabling a fairness determination.
• Christopher P. v. Amanda C., 250 W. Va. 53 (2024) – supplied the three-tier standard of review (clear-error, abuse-of-discretion, and de novo).

The majority cited these cases mainly for standards of review and general equitable-distribution duties, but distinguished them factually. In St. Clair, for example, a spouse was prevented from cross-examining due to nondisclosure; here, Anne allegedly willingly proceeded despite knowing disclosure was missing.

Legal Reasoning

1. Statutory Safe-Harbour – § 48-7-206. The family court “may accept” one party’s disclosure when the other party fails to file. The majority read “may” as permissive, giving trial courts discretion to overlook the defect where equitable considerations permit.
2. Informed Waiver. The Court stressed that Anne was not an “unsophisticated litigant”: she is a financial analyst-realtor who had counsel and personally identified the contested asset in her own disclosure. By proceeding anyway, she ostensibly waived the statutory protection.
3. Absence of Equity-Defeating Factors. The family court found no fraud, duress, or unconscionability, invoking § 48-7-102(1) & (3). Without those, the settlement stands.
4. Scope of Reconsideration under § 51-2A-10. The Court held that clause (5) (“any other reason justifying relief”) does not automatically encompass a disclosure omission that could have been raised before the decree.

Impact

While technically a memorandum decision, the ruling carries persuasive weight and potentially shapes practice in three concrete ways:

• Settlement Finality. Lawyers may now rely more heavily on post-hearing waivers to shield settlements from later attack, provided the waiver appears informed and voluntary.
• Strategic Behaviour. Delaying or omitting a disclosure can sometimes escape sanction if the other spouse does not press the issue before entry of the order—raising ethical concerns the dissent highlights.
• Family-Court Gatekeeping. Trial judges retain discretion either to demand the missing disclosure or to proceed without it; appellate courts will review only for abuse of discretion.

Practitioners should, however, note that an egregious nondisclosure or one coupled with evidence of deceit would still trigger relief under the very same statutes.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Equitable Distribution. West Virginia follows an “equitable” (fair, not necessarily equal) approach to dividing marital property upon divorce.
• Financial Disclosure. Each spouse must list assets, debts, and income so the court can evaluate fairness. Think of it as a mandatory balance sheet.
• Motion for Reconsideration (§ 51-2A-10). A procedural tool allowing a party to ask the family court to revisit its order for reasons like mistake, newly-discovered evidence, or fraud, within set time limits.
• Fraud, Duress, Unconscionability. • Fraud: Intentional deception to secure unfair gain. • Duress: Improper pressure depriving a party of free will. • Unconscionability: So one-sided that enforcing it shocks the conscience.
• Standard of Review. • Clear error (facts) – appellate court defers unless findings are plainly wrong. • Abuse of discretion (application of law to facts) – a high bar. • De novo (pure law) – no deference.

Conclusion

Anne Y. v. Daniel Y. introduces the “Voluntary-Acceptance Rule,” signalling that the statutory requirement of mutual financial disclosure in divorce can be effectively waived when a party, aware of the omission, voluntarily signs a settlement and later seeks to unwind it without proof of fraud or inequity. The ruling underscores three lessons:

1. Statutory protections are only as strong as the parties’ willingness to invoke them before the decree becomes final.
2. Family courts possess—and appellate courts will respect—broad discretion in policing disclosure failures.
3. Practitioners must be vigilant: knowingly proceeding without full financial information may foreclose later relief.

Whether other jurisdictions will follow West Virginia’s permissive stance remains to be seen, but the decision undoubtedly tightens the window for post-divorce challenges premised solely on a missing disclosure. It thus serves as both a cautionary tale for litigants and a practical guide for attorneys navigating the delicate interplay between statutory mandates and contractual autonomy in family law.