“The Stipulated-Facts Exception”: Sixth Circuit Permits Interlocutory Review Yet Affirms Denial of Qualified Immunity in Sterusky v. Cooper

1. Introduction

Christopher Scott Sterusky v. Detrick Cooper is the Sixth Circuit’s latest excessive-force decision, arising from a fatal roadside encounter in Elizabethtown, Kentucky. The case sits at the intersection of three doctrinal pillars: the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable seizures, the qualified-immunity shield for police officers, and the strict limits on appellate jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals under Johnson v. Jones. The estate of Christopher Sterusky sued Officer Detrick Cooper under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that Cooper’s use of deadly force—seventeen shots in fewer than six seconds—was objectively unreasonable. After the district court denied summary judgment and qualified immunity, Cooper pursued an interlocutory appeal. Unusually, he stipulated to the plaintiff’s version of the disputed facts to unlock appellate review, yet still sought immunity on the merits.

The Sixth Circuit accepted jurisdiction but ultimately affirmed the district court, holding that, even under the facts as Cooper now conceded, the use of deadly force violated clearly established law. The opinion therefore simultaneously (1) articulates a narrow “stipulated-facts exception” to the Johnson bar on interlocutory appeals, and (2) restates in emphatic terms that officers may not employ deadly force against a fleeing, unarmed suspect who no longer presents an immediate threat.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Jurisdiction: Although interlocutory appeals from denials of qualified immunity are ordinarily barred where fact disputes remain, the court held that Cooper’s express concessions eliminated those disputes and therefore created a purely legal question suitable for immediate review.
Qualified Immunity Denied: Accepting Cooper’s stipulations (e.g., Sterusky was unarmed, was seated in his car, was fleeing, and any threat had abated), the panel concluded that shooting Sterusky violated the Fourth Amendment and that the unlawfulness was clearly established by Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit precedent.
Affirmed: The district court’s denial of summary judgment and qualified immunity stands; the case will proceed toward trial (or settlement) on liability and damages.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 (1995) – Bars interlocutory appeals that merely dispute facts. By conceding the plaintiff’s version, Cooper navigated around Johnson, allowing the Sixth Circuit to reach the merits.
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985) – Establishes the general rule permitting immediate appeals from denial of qualified immunity when questions are purely legal.
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) – Holds that deadly force is permissible only when the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm. Cited as the core substantive standard.
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) – Supplies the three-factor test (severity of crime, immediate threat, active resistance/flight) governing objective reasonableness. Forms the backbone of the court’s analysis.
King v. Taylor, 694 F.3d 650 (6th Cir. 2012);
Bouggess v. Mattingly, 482 F.3d 886 (6th Cir. 2007) – Sixth Circuit cases on shooting fleeing suspects; demonstrate that a non-threatening, fleeing suspect may not be shot.
Moore v. City of Memphis, 853 F.3d 866 (6th Cir. 2017) – Illustrates that an officer’s mistaken belief that a suspect is armed can sometimes justify force, but only if reasonable—distinguished here because Cooper conceded Sterusky was unarmed and no longer threatening.
Barnes v. Felix, 145 S. Ct. 1353 (2025) – Recent Supreme Court decision emphasizing totality-of-the-circumstances in force cases; cited to underscore need for contextual analysis.

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

Step 1 – Jurisdiction. Normally, disputed facts defeat interlocutory review (Johnson). By stipulating that (a) Sterusky was unarmed, (b) in the car, (c) fleeing, and (d) any threat had ended, Cooper converted the appeal into a purely legal question—whether, on those facts, the Constitution was violated.
Step 2 – Constitutional Violation. Applying Graham:
  a. Severity of crime: minor traffic/license infractions.
  b. Immediate threat: none; suspect was unarmed and inside a vehicle moving slowly backward.
  c. Active resistance/flight: mere retreat did not justify lethal force.
Thus, shooting was objectively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
Step 3 – Clearly Established Law. Precedent from Garner, Bouggess, King, and others clearly forbade shooting a non-threatening, fleeing suspect. No reasonable officer could believe the conduct lawful.

3.3 The Judgment’s Impact

The opinion’s significance is two-fold:

Procedural Impact – “Stipulated-Facts Exception.”
Litigants may now see a structured path to interlocutory review: an officer can concede the plaintiff’s factual version to raise a pure legal question. However, the tactic is double-edged—those same concessions often doom the immunity defense on the merits, as here.
Substantive Impact – Reinforced Limits on Deadly Force.
The Sixth Circuit reaffirms that officers cannot use deadly force against a suspect who is (1) unarmed or only minimally armed, (2) attempting to flee, and (3) no longer posing an immediate threat. The decision will guide district courts, police training, and settlement valuations across the circuit.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Qualified Immunity: A legal doctrine shielding government officials from civil liability unless their conduct violates “clearly established” rights—a right so definite that any reasonable official would understand it. It is decided early (often at summary judgment) to spare officials the burdens of trial.
Interlocutory Appeal: An appeal taken before the trial court issues a final judgment. Usually prohibited, but allowed for qualified-immunity denials when only legal issues are presented.
Summary Judgment: A decision made by a court without a full trial, appropriate when no genuine dispute of material fact exists and one side is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Johnson v. Jones Bar: The rule that appellate courts cannot review fact-based qualified-immunity denials; they may review only purely legal determinations.
Objective Reasonableness (Fourth Amendment): A standard asking what a hypothetical reasonable officer would have done under the circumstances, not what the defendant officer actually intended.

5. Conclusion

Sterusky v. Cooper carves out an important procedural nuance: an officer’s strategic factual concessions can create immediate appellate jurisdiction, but those concessions simultaneously strip away any plausible claim to qualified immunity when the conceded facts depict an obvious constitutional violation. Substantively, the decision reiterates that deadly force is impermissible once a suspect’s threat has dissipated, especially for minor infractions. As police departments refine training protocols and lawyers chart litigation strategies, the Sixth Circuit’s message is unmistakable—convenience in obtaining appellate review cannot override the Constitution’s demand for reasonableness in the use of lethal force.