“The Recency Rule” in Asylum Adjudication: Seventh Circuit Clarifies Government-Protection and Internal-Relocation Standards
Introduction
In Dania Martinez-Martinez v. Pamela J. Bondi, No. 24-3281 (7th Cir. Aug. 14, 2025), the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit revisited two perennial questions in U.S. asylum law: (1) When is a foreign government “unable or unwilling” to protect its citizens from private persecution? and (2) Under what circumstances is internal relocation within the home country a reasonable alternative to asylum?
Petitioners Dania Yamile Martinez-Martinez and her minor son Eduar sought review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision denying asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection. Although the factual backdrop involved the violent aftermath of land-reform activism in Honduras, the ultimate appellate focus lay squarely on evidentiary sufficiency and the proper analytical lenses for evaluating governmental protection and relocation.
The Seventh Circuit denied** the petition, but in doing so it articulated a refined doctrinal approach—what this commentary will label the “Recency Rule”—for weighing country-condition evidence: more recent, specific, and concrete governmental actions will usually trump older, generalized reports when assessing state protection.
Summary of the Judgment
Judge Maldonado, writing for a unanimous panel (Lee and Kolar, JJ.), held that substantial evidence supported the agency’s findings that:
- The Honduran government is both able and willing to control the private actors (former cooperative leader Celio Rodriguez and his associates) whom the petitioners fear.
- Even if residual risk exists, the petitioners could reasonably relocate within Honduras, rendering asylum unnecessary.
Because the burden of proof for withholding of removal is higher than for asylum, failure on the asylum claim necessarily defeated the withholding claim as well. CAT protection was waived on appeal.
Analysis
1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence
- Osorio-Morales v. Garland, 72 F.4th 738 (7th Cir. 2023) — Reiterated that isolated enforcement failures do not equal governmental “inability”; applicants must show systemic or “persistent” inaction.
- Perez v. Garland, 83 F.4th 630 (7th Cir. 2023) — Emphasized reasonableness of expecting an applicant to at least attempt to seek local police assistance, even amid severe violence.
- Borjas Cruz v. Garland, 96 F.4th 1000 (7th Cir. 2024) — Restated standards of deference under “substantial evidence” review.
- Meza v. Garland, 5 F.4th 732 (7th Cir. 2021) — Clarified that the reviewing court looks to the IJ’s opinion as modified by the BIA.
- Pineda-Teruel v. Garland, 16 F.4th 1216 (7th Cir. 2021) — Warned that speculation and unproven hypotheticals cannot establish a well-founded fear.
- Velasquez-Banegas v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 258 (7th Cir. 2017) and Shaikh v. Holder, 702 F.3d 897 (7th Cir. 2012) — Provided baseline asylum and withholding standards.
These authorities collectively supplied the doctrinal backbone for the panel’s ruling, but the court’s novel contribution lies in applying them through a temporal-priority lens: conditions on the ground can evolve, and applicants must present current evidence that governmental efforts remain deficient.
2. The Court’s Legal Reasoning
The analysis proceeded in two independent but mutually reinforcing steps:
a. Ability and Willingness of the Honduran Government
- Evidence Weighed: The Immigration Judge credited a 2018 U.S. State Department report noting violence “far below its 2012 peak,” along with documented arrests, prosecutions, and convictions (most notably the extradition and conviction of enforcer Osvin Caballero) related to violence at La Confianza.
- Applicant’s Omissions: Martinez-Martinez had never reported threats to Honduran authorities, leaving a vacuum in the evidentiary record regarding governmental response to her specific situation.
- Standard Applied: Following Osorio-Morales, the court required proof of persistent, systemic inability, not merely an un-apprehended fugitive (Rodriguez) or imperfect policing.
- Conclusion: The panel found substantial evidence that Honduras is making bona fide, ongoing efforts to capture Rodriguez and that the policing landscape has materially improved since the older reports.
b. Reasonableness of Internal Relocation
- The court noted extensive family presence (mother, grandparents, daughters) still residing in La Confianza without harm.
- It contrasted the petitioners’ circumstances with the one MUCA member killed outside the cooperative, emphasizing that victim’s possession of uniquely sensitive information.
- Applying 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(3) and citing Oryakhil, the court examined country size, reach of persecutor, and the applicant’s demonstrated ability to travel internationally. All factors pointed toward reasonable relocation.
3. Impact of the Judgment
The opinion’s chief contribution is to crystallize a methodological emphasis on current, concrete governmental efforts when adjudicating “unable or unwilling” arguments. Future petitioners within the Seventh Circuit (and likely beyond) will now confront several practical repercussions:
- Timeliness of Evidence: Submissions should foreground the most up-to-date country reports, NGO findings, and affidavits available. Older reports must be linked to ongoing patterns or recent corroboration.
- Reporting Requirement Reinforced: Applicants who never alerted local authorities to threats now face steeper hurdles, as the panel re-affirmed the reasonableness of expecting at least an attempted report in most circumstances.
- Internal Relocation Analysis Strengthened: Presence of unharmed family members in the home country will weigh heavily against claims of a nationwide threat unless petitioners can demonstrate individualized targeting mechanisms.
- Agency Deference Preserved: The case underscores the deferential “substantial evidence” standard, signaling that appellate courts will rarely second-guess fact-intensive IJ determinations absent compelling contrary evidence.
Complex Concepts Simplified
- Substantial Evidence Standard: A highly deferential appellate review threshold. A petitioner must show that the evidence not only supports but actually compels a different outcome.
- Unable or Unwilling Test: Even private actors can constitute persecutors, but asylum law protects only where the home government cannot or will not control them. Occasional failure is insufficient; systemic failure is required.
- Internal Relocation: If an applicant can avoid persecution by safely relocating within their own country, asylum is generally precluded—unless the initial persecution emanates from the national government itself.
- Protected Grounds: Race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or particular social group (PSG). Harm not linked to one of these grounds falls outside asylum’s reach.
Conclusion
Martinez-Martinez v. Bondi does not break wholly new doctrinal ground, but it refines existing standards in a way that will shape litigation strategy in the Seventh Circuit. By privileging recent, specific evidence of state action over older, generalized reports, and by reiterating that internal relocation must be viewed through a pragmatic, fact-driven lens, the court has effectively promulgated a “Recency Rule” in evaluating government protection. Going forward, asylum advocates will need to craft evidentiary records that show contemporary, systemic governmental incapacity and individualized, inescapable threats to overcome the dual barriers reaffirmed here.
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