“The Marriott Rule” – Administrative Appeals Abate at Death Absent Statutory Survival

Introduction

Marriott v. Wilhelmsen (2025 UT 35) squarely confronted an unsettled issue in Utah law: Does an administrative appeal survive the death of the original claimant when the underlying statute is silent and the claim is not one recognised at common law as survivable? Randy Marriott had sought judicial review of the Utah State Engineer’s 2018 denial of his 1997 application to appropriate water. When he died during the district-court proceedings, his counsel moved—under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 25(a)—to substitute his estate’s personal representative, Kami Marriott, as plaintiff. The district court denied substitution and dismissed the action. On direct appeal, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed, holding that:

Absent a statutory survival clause or a recognised common-law analogue (such as property-damage or conversion claims), an administrative appeal abates upon the claimant’s death; consequently, substitution under Rule 25(a) is impermissible.

This decision crystallises a new principle—the “Marriott Rule”—that will shape future litigation involving agency decisions, water rights, and the survivability of civil actions in Utah.

Summary of the Judgment

Burden of Proof: The movant under Rule 25(a) bears the burden of showing the claim survives; abatement is not an affirmative defence.
No Common-Law Survival: Only tort claims for property damage or conversion (and most contract actions) survived at common law. An administrative appeal is neither.
No Statutory Survival: Utah Code § 73-3-14 (judicial review of State Engineer orders) is silent on survival. Assignability of water-right applications (§ 73-3-18) does not imply survivability.
Unperfected Water Right ≠ Property: A denied application confers no present property interest; injury to an unperfected, speculative interest is not “injury to property.”
Holding: The action abated on Marriott’s death; substitution was properly denied; dismissal affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Gressman v. State, 2013 UT 63 – Distinguished between survivable property-damage torts and nonsurvivable personal torts. Marriott relied on the property strand; the Court limited it.
Mason v. Union Pac. Ry., 24 P. 796 (Utah 1890) – Recognised survival of most contract claims; cited to illustrate categories, not to save Marriott’s tort-like claim.
Little Cottonwood Water v. Kimball, 289 P. 116 (Utah 1930); Loosle v. First Fed. S&L, 858 P.2d 999 (Utah 1993) – Explained that an approved (let alone denied) application does not create a perfected water right.
Federal district cases (Sevastopoulos 2020; Slavens 2013) – Movant’s reliance to show broad property-related survival was rejected; those cases turned on concrete property damage or statutory survival.

Legal Reasoning

Rule 25 Framework. Substitution requires: (a) timely motion; (b) proper party; (c) claim that “is not thereby extinguished.” The rule’s default is dismissal; hence the movant bears the burden.
Common-Law Inquiry. The Court found no Utah authority on survival of administrative appeals. Applying Gressman’s dichotomy, it held an inchoate water right is not current property; therefore the denial was not “property damage.”
Analogical Limits. The estate argued inchoate rights, lien analogies, and dower-type precedents. The Court found these speculative interests unlike actual property rights at common law.
Statutory Silence. Because the Legislature omitted any survival language in §§ 73-3-14 to ‑18, the Court presumed the omission intentional under ordinary canons. Assignability ≠ survivability; indeed, Utah precedent (Lawler v. Jennings, 1898) first asks whether a right would survive, then whether it may be assigned.

Impact of the Decision

Water-Right Litigation: Applicants must pursue appeals expeditiously; death of the applicant likely ends the contest unless statutory amendments are enacted.
Administrative Law Generally: By extending the principle beyond water law, the Court signals that any silent statutory scheme—ranging from tax appeals to professional-license revocations—faces the same abatement risk.
Estate Planning & Asset Structuring: Practitioners may advise clients to file applications in entity names (LLCs, trusts) rather than individually, ensuring continuity.
Legislative Prompt: The ruling puts the onus on the Legislature to enact survival clauses where continuity is deemed important to public policy (e.g., ongoing environmental permitting).
Procedural Clarity: The case clarifies that Rule 25(a) motions must affirmatively establish survivability, tightening practice in district courts.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Survival vs. Substitution: A party can be substituted only if the underlying claim continues to exist after death. Think of survival as the “life” of the claim; substitution is merely the procedural act of swapping parties.
Inchoate Right: “Inchoate” means not yet fully formed. A water-right applicant has no current right to the water—only a chance to obtain one if all statutory steps succeed. Under Marriott, an inchoate right alone is not enough to keep a lawsuit alive.
Property-Damage Tort vs. Personal Tort: Damaging someone’s land or chattel is a property-damage tort; defaming someone or assaulting them is a personal tort. Only the former survives at common law.
Assignability ≠ Survivability: You may transfer (assign) many rights while alive, but if you die, only those recognised by common law or statute as “survivable” pass to your estate for continuing litigation.

Conclusion

Marriott v. Wilhelmsen establishes a bright-line rule in Utah: an administrative appeal, by itself, does not survive the claimant’s death unless either (a) the legislature expressly provides for survival, or (b) the claim falls within a recognised common-law category of survivable actions (property-damage torts or contracts). The Court’s careful statutory and historical analysis underscores a deferential stance to legislative design and limits judicial expansion of survival doctrines. Going forward, litigants, attorneys, and lawmakers must account for the fragility of administrative appeals in the face of mortality, while considering whether policy goals warrant statutory reform.