“The Boyer Confirmation” – Wyoming Re-Affirms that Dispatch-Derived License Information and a Single Observed Traffic Infraction Jointly Supply Reasonable Suspicion for a Stop

“The Boyer Confirmation” – Wyoming Re-Affirms that Dispatch-Derived License Information and a Single Observed Traffic Infraction Jointly Supply Reasonable Suspicion for a Stop

Introduction

Andrew Lee Boyer v. State of Wyoming (2025 WY 93) presented the Wyoming Supreme Court with another test of the outer contours of “reasonable suspicion” under both Article 1, §4 of the Wyoming Constitution and the Fourth Amendment. The appellant, Andrew Boyer, conditionally pled guilty to felony methamphetamine possession after his motion to suppress drug evidence—found following a traffic stop—was denied. On appeal, Boyer argued that Deputy Derek Lang lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop because: (1) his overtaking manoeuvre at an intersection was lawful; and (2) the officer’s reliance on dispatch information erroneously indicating Boyer’s license was invalid could not justify the seizure once it proved mistaken.

The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that in the “totality of the circumstances” both the intersection manoeuvre and the dispatch report provided independent, particularised, and objective grounds to suspect a violation of Wyoming traffic laws. The case therefore confirms—and modestly extends—Wyoming precedent in two ways:

  • By explicitly tying Kansas v. Glover (U.S. 2020) to Wyoming traffic stops: an officer may stop a vehicle when dispatch records show the registered owner lacks a valid licence, absent information negating the inference that the owner is driving.
  • By clarifying that overtaking on the right within a single “through/right-turn” lane may amount to a safety-based violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-206, even if the overtaking vehicle never leaves the paved roadway.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court (Phillips, D.J., writing; Boomgaarden, C.J., and Gray, Fenn, Jarosh, JJ., concurring) affirmed the Campbell County District Court’s refusal to suppress. Key holdings:

  1. The traffic stop satisfied the first prong of the Terry test—an objectively reasonable basis for suspicion—because either of two facts supported it:
    • Boyer’s overtaking/passing manoeuvre, which Deputy Lang reasonably construed as dangerous and violative of § 31-5-206; and
    • Dispatch confirmation that the vehicle’s registered owner lacked a valid licence, suggesting a violation of § 31-7-106(a).
  2. Subsequent confirmation that Boyer in fact possessed a valid licence did not vitiate the stop; reasonableness is judged on information available at the time—consistent with Kansas v. Glover.
  3. The pursuit distance and the deputy’s brief speeding to catch up (≈1.5 miles) did not render the stop unreasonable, distinguishing Levenson v. State (2022 WY 51).
  4. Because Boyer offered no independent, analytically distinct argument under Article 1, §4, the Court applied a Fourth-Amendment analysis but observed that Wyoming and federal standards are functionally identical in this context.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited & Their Influence

  • Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) – Provides the two-step framework: (i) justification at inception, (ii) scope/duration reasonableness. Only prong (i) was contested on appeal.
  • Kansas v. Glover, 589 U.S. 376 (2020) – The U.S. Supreme Court held that an officer may infer the registered owner is the driver and stop the vehicle if the owner’s licence is revoked, absent contrary information. The Boyer Court adopts this reasoning for Wyoming.
  • Levenson v. State, 508 P.3d 229 (Wyo. 2022) – Suppressed evidence where a trooper created a traffic violation by tailgating at 111 mph to manufacture reasonable suspicion. Boyer distinguishes Levenson because Lang observed an existing violation before pursuit and did not coerce new violations.
  • Ramirez v. State, 532 P.3d 230 (Wyo. 2023) & Labbe, Klomliam, Pryce – Reiterate the totality-of-circumstances test and near-identity of state and federal standards.
  • Several Wyoming cases approving reliance on dispatch / databases: Phelps (2012), Gibson (2019), Clay (2016), Elmore (2021).

2. Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning unfolds in three concentric layers:

  1. State-constitutional primacy procedural disposition. Although Boyer invoked Article 1, §4 below, he abandoned any distinct analytical argument on appeal. Citing O’Boyle and Flood, the Court therefore proceeded solely under the Fourth Amendment while noting the overlap.
  2. Terry prong one – existence of reasonable suspicion.
    • Observed infraction: § 31-5-206(b) forbids overtaking on the right “unless conditions permit the movement in safety”. Deputy Lang personally saw Boyer accelerate past a stationary SUV in a through/right-turn lane, raising a safety concern because two vehicles then turned right from the same lane. Though dashcam evidence was unavailable, the district court credited the deputy’s testimony; the Supreme Court defers unless clearly erroneous.
    • Dispatch licence check: After the manoeuvre, Lang learned via NCIC/Wyoming database that Boyer’s driving privilege was “invalid.” Under Glover, such data, combined with the commonsense inference that the owner is driving, creates reasonable suspicion of § 31-7-106(a) violation. Any later discovery that the licence was actually valid is irrelevant.
  3. Terry prong two – scope/duration. Although Boyer raised scope below, he abandoned it on appeal, so the Court did not reach it. Nonetheless, the opinion hints the sniff and citation-writing were contemporaneous and thus “not unnecessarily extended.”

3. Impact on Future Litigation and Law Enforcement Practice

a) Cementing the Dispatch-Reliance Rule in Wyoming. While Phelps and other cases permitted dispatch reliance, Boyer explicitly grafts the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2020 Glover rationale onto state law. Officers may now confidently rely on:

  • Vehicle registration information tying the owner to the car; and
  • Database flags showing a suspension, revocation, or non-issuance of a driver’s licence

unless contemporaneous evidence (e.g., the driver’s sex or age conflicts with the registered owner) negates that inference.

b) Clarifying § 31-5-206 Overtaking Violations. The case alerts drivers that passing on the right within a single multi-purpose lane—without leaving the pavement—can still be unlawful when it creates a foreseeable safety hazard. Prosecutors may cite Boyer to defend stops where officers subjectively believe safety is compromised.

c) Distinguishing Pre-Textual Pursuits Post-Levenson. Levenson caused uncertainty about aggressive catching-up tactics. Boyer clarifies the distinction: Levenson condemnation attaches when the pursuit itself manufactures the later violation; mere speed to close distance, after seeing an existing infraction, is permissible.

d) Minimalist v. Independent State-Constitutional Analysis. Defense counsel are put on notice: a bare citation to Article 1, §4 will not preserve a separate state claim. Future litigants desiring the potentially more protective “reasonableness under all circumstances” standard must provide a “precise and analytically sound approach.”

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Reasonable Suspicion vs. Probable Cause – “Probable cause” is a higher threshold (roughly 40–51% certainty) required for arrest/search warrants. “Reasonable suspicion” is lower (around 20–30% certainty), sufficient for a brief investigatory stop (traffic stop, frisk). The court emphasises that reasonable suspicion rests on specific, articulable facts, not hunches.
  • Terry Two-Prong Test – (1) Was the stop justified at its start? (2) Did officers limit themselves to what was necessary to pursue that justification? Boyer contests only (1).
  • Mistake of Fact Doctrine – Officers may rely on information later shown wrong, so long as the mistake was reasonable. Here, dispatch’s record that Boyer’s licence was invalid turned out wrong; still, reliance was reasonable.
  • Free-Air Sniff – A dog sniff conducted outside a lawfully stopped vehicle is not a “search” under the Fourth Amendment, so long as it does not prolong the stop beyond the time needed for the traffic mission (Rodriguez v. U.S.). In Boyer, the sniff occurred during the routine licence/insurance check.
  • Article 1, §4 vs. Fourth Amendment – Wyoming’s constitutional text mirrors the federal but allows the Wyoming Supreme Court to craft broader protections. Without detailed argument, however, the Court treats them the same.

Conclusion

Andrew Lee Boyer v. State reinforces—and labels with Wyoming authority—the proposition that dispatch-derived licence information, coupled with an observed traffic infraction, furnishes adequate reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop, even when later facts undercut one ground. The decision also supplies practical guidance on overtaking-on-the-right violations and clarifies that Levenson does not bar officers from accelerating to close distance where an antecedent violation exists. Going forward, defense attorneys must present robust, separate state-constitutional analyses to avoid default to federal standards. For law enforcement, the “Boyer Confirmation” provides a clear, two-pronged shield: see a violation, or rely on reliable database information—either suffices; both together are iron-clad.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court of Wyoming

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