“Targeted Legislative Ratification” – The New Jersey Supreme Court’s New Test for Attorney-General Supersession of Municipal Police Departments

Introduction

In Mirza M. Bulur v. New Jersey Office of the Attorney General (decided 23 July 2025), the Supreme Court of New Jersey confronted the highly charged question of whether the State Attorney General may seize day-to-day control of a municipal police department over the objection of local officials. The litigation followed Attorney General Matthew J. Platkin’s March 2023 decision to supersede the Paterson Police Department (PPD) after a fatal officer-involved shooting. Local officials—including Mayor André Sayegh, Acting Public Safety Director Mirza Bulur, and Police Chief Engelbert Ribeiro—argued that the takeover was ultra vires. The Appellate Division agreed, ordering the Attorney General to relinquish control. In a unanimous opinion by Justice Patterson, the Supreme Court reversed.

The Court did not embrace a broad, inherent power in the Attorney General to supersede any police department at will. Instead, it adopted a narrower, precedent-setting rule: a supersession is lawful where the Legislature has specifically ratified the takeover through targeted legislation and appropriations—even if no general statute expressly grants such power. This commentary explores the ramifications of what may be termed the “Targeted Legislative Ratification Doctrine.”

Summary of the Judgment

1. The Court acknowledged the constitutional and statutory foundation for municipal control of police departments (N.J. Const. art. IV, §7, ¶11; N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118).
2. It reviewed the Attorney General’s asserted sources of supersession authority (the Criminal Justice Act, N.J.S.A. 52:17B-97 et seq.; N.J.S.A. 2A:158-4, -5; N.J.S.A. 40A:14-181; and AG Directive 2022-14) but declined to decide whether those authorities alone permit unilateral supersession.
3. Focusing narrowly, the Court held that two post-supersession enactments evidenced legislative intent to authorize the Paterson takeover: (a) L. 2023, c. 94 (“Chapter 94”), facilitating the appointment of an out-of-state Officer-in-Charge, and (b) L. 2023, c. 74, appropriating $10 million for the State’s operation of PPD.
4. Because legislative ratification existed, the supersession was neither arbitrary nor ultra vires; the Appellate Division’s decision was reversed.
5. The Court expressly left open whether the Attorney General holds inherent or general statutory supersession power outside such legislative ratification.

Analysis

Precedents Cited & Their Influence

Statutory Framework
• N.J.S.A. 52:17B-106, ‑107 – Authorize AG supersession of county prosecutors, not municipal departments.
• N.J.S.A. 2A:158-4, ‑5 – Parity of powers between AG and county prosecutors used by defendants to analogize municipal supersession.
• N.J.S.A. 40A:14-181 – Internal-affairs oversight; insufficient for full takeover.
• N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118 – Core municipal authority to run police forces; serves as baseline that any state intrusion must overcome.
Case Law
• State v. Winne, 12 N.J. 152 (1953) – Recognized broad supervisory powers of AG/prosecutors.
• Passaic Cty. PBA Local 197 (2006) & Williams v. Clayton (2015) – Upheld limited supersessions by county prosecutors.
• Fraternal Order of Police v. Newark, 244 N.J. 75 (2020) – Reaffirmed constitutional limits on municipal action.
These cases illustrated supervisory breadth but did not squarely endorse a direct AG takeover of a police department. Their chief value lay in framing the debate, not dictating outcome.
Administrative Instruments
• AG Directive 2022-14 – Declared AG’s supposed authority to “supersede an entire law-enforcement agency.” The Court conspicuously refused to validate this claim, signaling that directives cannot create authority absent statutory or constitutional grounding.

Legal Reasoning

Justice Patterson employed a classic agency-deference review: was the AG’s action “arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable” or lacking “fair support in the record”? Because municipal autonomy is strong but not absolute, any State intrusion must be traceable to legislative will.

Identifying Legislative Ratification
• Chapter 94 was Paterson-specific, retroactive to March 1 2023, and facilitated only an AG-appointed Officer-in-Charge when the AG has “superseded a law-enforcement agency” in a “city of the first class” under 200,000 population (Paterson fits uniquely).
• The FY 2024 Appropriations Act earmarked funds for “Paterson Police Department – State Costs,” expressly contemplating ongoing supersession activities.
Implication Doctrine
By enacting practical measures indispensable to the takeover’s success, the Legislature implicitly ratified the supersession. The Court analogized this to post-hoc statutory approval in other administrative-law contexts.
Limiting the Holding
The Court emphasized it was not relying on the broader statutes the AG had cited. This restraint preserves future judicial flexibility while inviting the Legislature to clarify statewide policy if desired.

Impact of the New Doctrine

Legislative Gatekeeping: Future statewide or local supersessions will likely require express or implicit legislative endorsement—through either targeted bills or line-item appropriations—to survive judicial scrutiny.
Role of Appropriations: Budget language can operate as substantive law when it unmistakably allocates funds for a contested executive action. Fiscal statutes are now precedential evidence of legislative intent, not mere housekeeping.
Strategic Considerations for Stakeholders
• Municipalities opposing a takeover may lobby the Legislature to withhold ratifying measures.
• The Attorney General’s office must secure legislative buy-in early, especially where local consent is absent.
• Policymakers are pressed to decide whether to codify generalized supersession criteria or continue ad-hoc ratifications.
Judicial Modesty: The Court adhered to a minimalist philosophy—resolving only what was necessary and expressly reserving judgment on broader AG powers. This likely foreshadows incremental rather than sweeping developments in this area.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Supersession: A legal mechanism by which a higher authority (here, the Attorney General) temporarily displaces local control over a law-enforcement agency, assuming operational command.
Targeted Legislative Ratification: When the Legislature, after an executive action has already begun, enacts a narrowly focused statute or appropriation that implicitly approves and supports that action, thereby validating its legality.
Appropriations Bill as Substantive Law: Although budget bills chiefly allocate funds, courts will treat them as evidence of substantive policy intent if the appropriation’s language unmistakably references and supports a disputed executive initiative.
Arbitrary, Capricious, or Unreasonable Standard: A deferential judicial test asking whether an agency’s action lacks a rational basis or ignores relevant evidence. If legislative intent clearly supports the action, courts almost invariably uphold it.

Conclusion

Bulur v. OAG establishes a pivotal but measured principle: State takeover of a municipal police department is lawful when the Legislature has expressly or implicitly ratified that specific takeover through focused statutory action or dedicated appropriations. While the opinion stops short of blessing a universal AG power of supersession, it signals that municipal autonomy—though constitutionally protected—yields where the Legislature speaks unequivocally.

For practitioners, the case underscores the importance of tracking not just codified statutes but also appropriations language and “one-off” bills that may silently determine the legality of controversial executive actions. Legislators are now on notice that silence may equate to disapproval; explicit ratification creates the decisive legal foundation. Whether future sessions will provide a comprehensive framework or continue case-by-case ratifications remains an open—and politically charged—question.