“Sua Sponte” Assessment of Mandatory State-Attorney Costs: Parks v. State of Florida and the End of the “Request” Requirement
1. Introduction
Jourdan Daniel Parks v. State of Florida, decided by the Florida Supreme Court on 12 June 2025, resolves a long-standing conflict among Florida’s district courts regarding the imposition of “costs for the state attorney” under § 938.27(8), Florida Statutes (2019).
The essential dispute was whether trial courts may add the statutory minimums ($50
for misdemeanors; $100
for felonies) to a defendant’s sentence without a specific request from the State Attorney’s Office.
The First District Court of Appeal (DCA) in Parks v. State, 371 So.3d 392 (Fla. 1st DCA 2023) answered “yes,” while the Second DCA in D.L.J. v. State, 331 So.3d 227 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021) answered “no,” relying on the “if requested” language in § 938.27(1). The Supreme Court’s decision approves Parks, disapproves D.L.J., and firmly holds that Florida trial courts must impose the minimum state-attorney costs in every criminal case, whether or not the prosecution asks for them.
2. Summary of the Judgment
Justice Canady, writing for a unanimous court, employs whole-text statutory interpretation to conclude that § 938.27(8) contains an unequivocal mandate: “Costs for the state attorney must be set in all cases….” Because subsection (8) is specific, later-enacted, and self-contained, it overrides any implication in subsection (1) that a prosecutorial request is a condition precedent. Therefore:
- The trial court correctly imposed the
$100
felony cost on Mr Parks despite the prosecution’s silence. - D.L.J. and its progeny—Vandawalker, Davis, and Mercado—are disapproved to the extent they require a request for subsection (8) costs.
- No prejudice to defendants arises from the absence of a request because proof of amount is unnecessary at the statutory minimum.
3. Analysis
3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence
- Hills v. State, 90 So.3d 927 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) – Recognized that the 2008 amendments created mandatory minimum costs; relied on by the trial court and approved by the Supreme Court.
- Brown v. State, 348 So.3d 31 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022) – Suggested a request was required but offered no textual analysis; implicitly limited.
- Richards v. State, 288 So.3d 574 (Fla. 2020) – Concerned investigative costs under § 938.27(1); cited in error in Brown; distinguished because it never addressed subsection (8).
- D.L.J. v. State, 331 So.3d 227 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021) – Found a request necessary; expressly disapproved.
- Canon cases – LabCorp v. Davis, Tsuji v. Fleet, Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Glenville—cited for interpretive principles (whole-text, harmonious-reading, specific-over-general).
3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning
- Whole-Text Reading. Subsection (1) covers broadly defined “costs of prosecution and investigative costs,” conditioned on a request by the relevant agency. Subsection (8), however, expressly targets only “Costs for the state attorney” and commands imposition “in all cases,” with no mention of a request.
- Specific Over General. Because subsection (8) is more specific (state attorney costs) and subsection (1) more general (all prosecution/investigative costs), the specific provision controls in the event of conflict.
- Chronological Superiority. Subsection (8)’s mandatory language was added in 2008—after many cases that had required a request—indicating legislative intent to alter the prior discretionary scheme.
- Absence of Proof Requirement. For minimum amounts, no factual predicate is needed; hence no request is logically necessary. Proof becomes relevant only when the State seeks more than the minimum—then a request and evidence are indispensable.
3.3 Impact on Future Cases and the Criminal-Cost Landscape
The ruling harmonises statewide practice, sparing trial courts and litigants from post-sentencing motions and appeals over unrequested state-attorney costs. Expected consequences include:
- Uniform Sentencing Orders. Clerk and judicial software can now automatically include mandatory costs without verifying a request, reducing clerical error.
- Budgetary Predictability. State Attorney offices may rely on a steady revenue stream from criminal judgments, easing local funding allocations.
- Litigation Strategy. Defense counsel will shift focus from contesting imposition to challenging financial indigency findings or negotiating alternative sanctions.
- Precedential Clarification. DCAs must revisit or overrule prior decisions premised on D.L.J.; pending appeals citing that line will be resolved under Parks.
- Legislative Signal. The opinion underscores that the Legislature can create automatic financial liabilities in criminal cases and that courts will enforce them absent constitutional infirmity.
4. Complex Concepts Simplified
- Costs of Prosecution vs. Costs for the State Attorney – “Costs of prosecution” is an umbrella term embracing investigative expenses by law-enforcement, fire departments, or regulatory agencies. – “Costs for the state attorney” is a subset covering internal prosecutorial expenses. Subsection (8) speaks only to this latter category.
- Sua Sponte – Latin for “of one’s own accord.” A court acts sua sponte when it performs an action unprompted by either party. Here, the sentencing judge may impose the statutory minimum on his or her own initiative.
- Statutory Canons Referenced
- Whole-Text Canon: Read all provisions together, not in isolation.
- Harmony Canon: Interpret provisions to avoid conflict when reasonably possible.
- Specific-Over-General Canon: A narrower, later-specific clause prevails over a broader, earlier one.
- Mandatory Minimum – A statutory floor that removes judicial discretion below a stated amount. Departure below the minimum is legally impermissible.
5. Conclusion
With Parks v. State of Florida, the Supreme Court cements a clear rule: trial courts must impose the statutory minimum state-attorney costs under § 938.27(8) regardless of prosecutorial request. The decision restores doctrinal cohesion, privileging a holistic, text-centric reading of criminal-cost statutes and signaling that legislatively mandated financial obligations will not be thwarted by procedural technicalities. Practitioners should update plea colloquies, sentencing checklists, and appellate templates to reflect the automatic nature of these costs, reserving challenges for amounts above the statutory minimum or for constitutional arguments related to indigency and due-process notice. As of June 2025, the “request” requirement for subsection (8) costs is history; the new precedent ensures every judgment will carry at least a $50 (misdemeanor) or $100 (felony) line item for the prosecuting attorney—no request required, no questions asked.
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