“Still Presumptively Lawful” – Eleventh Circuit’s Post-Rahimi Endorsement of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) in United States v. Williams

Introduction

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Decision Date: 11 August 2025
Parties: United States (Appellee) v. Johnathan Anton Williams (Appellant)

After the Supreme Court’s watershed Second Amendment decisions in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen (2022) and United States v. Rahimi (2024), lower courts have wrestled with challenges to numerous federal gun regulations. Johnathan Williams—a repeat felon found with drugs and two loaded pistols—renewed the perennial attack on 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), contending that the felon-in-possession ban violates both the Second Amendment and the Commerce Clause. Although an Eleventh Circuit panel had previously rejected these arguments, the Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated, and remanded for reconsideration in light of Rahimi. On remand, the Eleventh Circuit once again affirmed Williams’s conviction, holding that:

• Section 922(g)(1) remains constitutional under the Second Amendment—even after Bruen and Rahimi—because prohibitions on felons are “presumptively lawful.”
• The statute is also valid under the Commerce Clause so long as the firearm travelled in interstate commerce, a “minimal nexus” easily satisfied here.
• The written judgment contained only a clerical mis-citation, correctable under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.

Summary of the Judgment

The Eleventh Circuit, per curiam, affirmed Williams’s felon-in-possession conviction and rejected his constitutional challenges. Relying on its own precedent (United States v. Rozier, United States v. Dubois II) and the Supreme Court’s express language in Heller, Bruen, and Rahimi, the panel held that § 922(g)(1) survives scrutiny because the Founding-era tradition allows the disarmament of felons. On the Commerce Clause issue, the court repeated that proof the firearm crossed state lines meets constitutional demands. Finally, the panel vacated and remanded solely to correct the judgment’s statutory citation from “§ 924(a)(2)” to “§ 924(a)(8).”

Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008)
   • Recognized an individual right to bear arms, yet labeled felon-dispossession laws “presumptively lawful.”
2. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) – Incorporated the Second Amendment against the states.
3. New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022)
   • Articulated the current text-and-history test, jettisoning tiers-of-scrutiny analysis.
4. United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024)
   • Upheld § 922(g)(8) (domestic-violence restraining orders); reaffirmed felon prohibitions as presumptively lawful.
5. United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768 (11th Cir. 2010) – First Eleventh Circuit case post-Heller sustaining § 922(g)(1).
6. United States v. Dubois II, 139 F.4th 887 (11th Cir. 2025) – Reinstated after Rahimi; identical holding as Rozier.
7. Commerce Clause precedents: United States v. McAllister (11th Cir. 1996), United States v. Scott (11th Cir. 2001), United States v. Wright (11th Cir. 2010).

Each precedent served to fortify the Eleventh Circuit’s position that § 922(g)(1) is constitutionally sound. Notably, Rahimi, though hailed by some as destabilizing gun-control laws, in fact underscored Heller’s felon-dispossession carve-out. The panel leveraged that explicit reaffirmation to declare its earlier rulings untouched.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Second Amendment Framework
   • Step One – Text: As a threshold matter, the right to “keep and bear Arms” applies to “the people,” a phrase the Supreme Court has linked to “law-abiding, responsible citizens.” Convicted felons fall outside this protected class.
   • Step Two – History: Historical tradition indicates that legislatures have long disarmed groups perceived as dangerous or untrustworthy (e.g., felons, loyalists, Native Americans in certain periods). Therefore, a permanent ban on felons possessing firearms accords with that tradition.
   • Binding Precedent: Under the Eleventh Circuit’s prior decisions, lower panels may not disregard Rozier unless the Supreme Court clearly overrules it, which Rahimi did not.
2. Commerce Clause Analysis
   • Section 922(g) contains an explicit jurisdictional element: the firearm must have moved in or affected interstate commerce.
   • Eleventh Circuit precedent requires only a “minimal nexus.” Evidence showed the pistols and ammunition were manufactured in Brazil, Serbia, and the Philippines or Montana, necessarily crossing state (and national) lines.
   • Thus, § 922(g)(1) falls within Congress’s Commerce power.
3. Clerical Error
   • The incorrect citation (using § 924(a)(2) instead of § 924(a)(8)) is a non-substantive clerical mistake correctable under Fed. R. Crim. P. 36.

C. Impact of the Decision

• Second Amendment Litigation: Williams cements a growing consensus that felon-in-possession prosecutions remain viable post-Bruen and Rahimi. Defendants in the Eleventh Circuit must now overcome multiple layers of precedent to prevail on a Second Amendment attack against § 922(g)(1).
• Commerce Clause Jurisprudence: The “minimal nexus” test stays intact, meaning prosecutors need only prove out-of-state manufacture—an often uncontested fact.
• Precedential Synergy: By declaring that Rahimi “reinforces—not undermines—Rozier,” the panel signals to district courts that attempts to read Rahimi expansively are misguided.
• Clarity for Sentencing & Drafting: The correction under Rule 36 reminds practitioners to review judgments for accuracy; such errors, though clerical, can complicate Bureau of Prisons classifications and appellate review.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Presumptively Lawful Regulation

A regulation historically accepted or blessed by the Supreme Court as compatible with the Second Amendment unless an extraordinary showing proves otherwise.

Facial vs. As-Applied Challenge

Facial: Attacks every conceivable application of a statute.
As-Applied: Claims the statute is unconstitutional only under the specific facts of the challenger’s case.

Text-and-History Test (Bruen)

Two-step inquiry: (1) Does the plain text cover the regulated conduct? If yes, (2) does historical tradition support the regulation?

Minimal Nexus (Commerce Clause)

The government’s burden to prove the firearm traveled in interstate commerce—even once—is enough to satisfy constitutional scrutiny.

Rule 36 (Clerical Errors)

Allows courts to correct minor, non-substantive errors in a judgment at any time without altering the sentence’s substance.

Conclusion

United States v. Williams reaffirms a core limitation on the Second Amendment: convicted felons remain outside its protections. The Eleventh Circuit meticulously harmonized Bruen and Rahimi with its own precedent to uphold § 922(g)(1) and maintained the long-standing, commerce-based jurisdictional theory of the statute. Beyond bolstering felon-in-possession prosecutions, the decision sends a broader message: post-Bruen textual-historical scrutiny is not an open invitation to dismantle every federal gun regulation, especially those the Supreme Court itself has repeatedly called “presumptively lawful.” Future challengers must marshal compelling historical evidence or face near-certain defeat—particularly in circuits, like the Eleventh, bound by robust intra-circuit precedents.