“Speculation Is Not Probable Cause” – The Michigan Supreme Court’s Implicit Re-affirmation of Robust Gatekeeping at the Preliminary Examination in People v. Amaree Darvell Terry

1. Introduction

On 25 July 2025 the Michigan Supreme Court issued an order in People of the State of Michigan v. Amaree Darvell Terry, denying leave to appeal from an interlocutory decision of the Court of Appeals that had refused to disturb a district-court bindover on multiple felony counts, including second-degree murder. Although the Court’s majority disposed of the matter in a single sentence, Justice Kyra H. Bolden authored a detailed dissent that crystallises an important doctrinal point: probable cause at the preliminary examination must rest on evidence, not conjecture. Her opinion contends that the magistrate and circuit court abused their discretion by relying on “hypothetical culpability” rather than concrete proof of the statutory elements—particularly causation and aiding-and-abetting intent.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• Majority Action: Motion for immediate consideration granted; application for leave to appeal denied without explanation.
• Dissent (Bolden, J.): Would remand to the Court of Appeals “as on leave granted” because the bindover appeared unsupported by probable cause. Justice Bolden emphasised:

The constitutional and statutory importance of the preliminary examination as a gatekeeping device (MCL 766.13).
The absence of any record evidence that Terry’s conduct factually or proximately caused the fatality, or that he aided and abetted the principal driver.
Parallels to People v. Stafford, where bindover based on speculation was ruled an abuse of discretion.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

People v. Yost (468 Mich 122, 2003) – Defines the statutory role of the preliminary exam; cited to underscore that probable cause is a substantive screening device.
People v. Weston (413 Mich 371, 1982) – First articulated the hardship of an “unsupported bindover,” framing the dissent’s fairness concerns.
People v. Anderson (501 Mich 175, 2018) & People v. Shami (501 Mich 243, 2018) – Restate the abuse-of-discretion standard and the requirement that each element be supported by evidence sufficient to convince a person of ordinary prudence.
People v. Schaefer (473 Mich 418, 2005) & People v. Feezel (486 Mich 184, 2010) – Provide the dual doctrine of factual and proximate causation, crucial to Bolden J.’s view that Hudson’s collision was a superseding cause.
People v. Robinson (475 Mich 1, 2006) – Sets out elements of aiding-and-abetting liability; used to highlight the void of proof that Terry encouraged or shared intent with Hudson.
People v. Stafford (434 Mich 125, 1990) – A direct analogue: the magistrate in both cases bound over on broad assumptions, reversed in Stafford; Bolden implies the same outcome should follow here.

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

Because the majority declined review, the only articulated reasoning appears in Justice Bolden’s dissent, which proceeds as follows:

Statutory Framework – MCL 766.13 requires discharge absent probable cause.
Element-by-Element Scrutiny
- Aiding & Abetting: No communication, coordination, or encouragement tying Terry to the principal’s act.
- Causation: Evidence shows Terry’s car never struck the victims; thus “but-for” and proximate causation are missing.
- Malice: Excessive speed while fleeing might satisfy malice, but malice alone cannot supply missing causation.
Abuse of Discretion Standard Applied – Bindover statements such as “he could have hit someone too” mirror the speculative rationale condemned in Stafford; therefore, the magistrate’s decision sits outside the “principled range of outcomes.”

3.3 Potential Impact on Michigan Criminal Procedure

Practical Guidance for Magistrates – Even without a precedential syllabus, Bolden’s dissent furnishes a cautionary template: do not rely on hypothetical dangers; demand concrete record evidence.
Defense Strategy – Defense counsel will likely cite this dissent to bolster motions to quash where causation or aider/abettor links are attenuated.
Prosecutorial Charging Decisions – Prosecutors may rethink broad felony-murder or second-degree murder charges stemming from multi-vehicle police chases, ensuring they can prove both causal nexus and shared intent.
Appellate Landscape – Although not binding, the dissent could prime the Court for a future case presenting the same issue on a more developed record, potentially leading to a majority opinion tightening bindover standards.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Preliminary Examination / Bindover: A mini-hearing where a district-court magistrate decides whether there is enough evidence (probable cause) to send a felony case to the circuit court for trial.
Probable Cause (in the bindover context): Evidence sufficient to make a reasonable person believe the defendant likely committed each element of the charged crime.
Aiding and Abetting: Not a separate crime; a theory that makes an accomplice equally liable if they assisted or encouraged the principal with knowledge of the principal’s intent.
Factual vs. Proximate Cause: Factual (“but for”) cause asks whether the harm would have occurred absent the defendant’s act. Proximate cause asks whether that act was closely enough connected to the harm, or whether some unforeseen “intervening act” broke the chain.
Malice (in second-degree murder): The intent to kill, to cause great bodily harm, or to act with wanton disregard for life.

5. Conclusion

While formally a one-sentence denial, People v. Terry has generated a powerful dissent that may shape Michigan criminal practice. Justice Bolden re-frames the preliminary examination as a substantive safeguard, demanding evidence, not hypotheticals. Key takeaways:

Magistrates must ground bindover decisions in record facts satisfying each statutory element.
Speculative statements such as “he was a missile too” echo the invalid reasoning of Stafford and risk reversal.
Incomplete proof of causal connection or aider/abettor intent cannot be papered over by the presence of malice alone.
Although the majority offered no opinion, the dissent’s rigorous analysis will likely influence trial courts, prosecutors, and defense attorneys alike, reinforcing the principle that speculation is not probable cause.

In the broader legal context, the decision underscores courts’ ongoing responsibility to prevent unjustified prosecutions from advancing to trial—protecting both defendants’ rights and judicial economy.