“Speak Now or Lose Later” – The Third Circuit’s Firm Stance on Appellate Forfeiture and FTCA Timeliness in Manivannan v. Department of Energy

1. Introduction

Ayyakkannu Manivannan, a former materials specialist at the Department of Energy’s National Energy Technology Laboratory (NETL), brought a battery of federal claims after an acrimonious sequence of criminal, administrative, and civil proceedings stemming from his interactions with a former student intern. The instant Third Circuit opinion, although expressly “Not Precedential,” offers an unusually concise restatement of two recurring procedural flash-points in federal litigation:

Appellate Forfeiture – the principle that a party’s failure to challenge each independent ground of a district court’s ruling results in affirmance, regardless of the merits not briefed; and
Strict Enforcement of FTCA Limitation Periods – the mandatory dismissal of Federal Tort Claims Act suits filed even a day outside the statute’s six-month window, absent properly preserved equitable-tolling arguments.

In addition, the Court revisits familiar but important elements of the Privacy Act’s civil-remedy provision and Pennsylvania’s tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED).

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Third Circuit affirmed the Western District of Pennsylvania’s complete disposal of Manivannan’s surviving claims:

Conversion under the FTCA – dismissed as untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b).
Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. § 552a) – summary judgment for the Government; Manivannan forfeited review of three independent reasons supporting judgment by failing to brief them.
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED) – summary judgment; the Department’s provision of subpoenaed documents in the state prosecution was not “extreme and outrageous” as a matter of law.

Accordingly, no claims survived. The Court employed de novo review for both the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal and the Rule 56 grant of summary judgment.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

United States v. Wong, 575 U.S. 402 (2015) – confirmed the FTCA’s dual-limitation scheme (two-year presentment / six-month suit) is subject to equitable tolling but otherwise jurisdictional.
Quinn v. Stone, 978 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1992) – articulated the four-part prima facie test for Privacy Act damages actions.
Laningham v. U.S. Navy, 813 F.2d 1236 (D.C. Cir. 1987) – defined “willful or intentional” Privacy Act violations as those “so patently egregious and unlawful” that the actor should have known them unlawful.
Hoy v. Angelone, 720 A.2d 745 (Pa. 1998) – described the high bar for IIED under Pennsylvania law (“beyond all possible bounds of decency”).
Barna v. Panther Valley S.D., 877 F.3d 136 (3d Cir. 2017) & In re Wettach, 811 F.3d 99 (3d Cir. 2016) – reiterated the rule that issues insufficiently argued in an opening brief are forfeited.

These authorities provided the legal scaffolding for the panel’s reasoning: Wong supplied the strict FTCA timing rule; Quinn the Privacy Act test; Laningham the culpability threshold; Hoy the outrageous-conduct threshold; and Barna/Wettach the forfeiture doctrine that ultimately sank Manivannan’s appeal on the Privacy Act claim.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

FTCA Timeliness – Because the DOE mailed a final denial on 10 January 2019, the statute required suit to be filed by 10 July 2019. Manivannan filed on 11 July. He attached the denial letter to his complaint, rendering the timing defect “indisputably authentic” and fatal under Rule 12(b)(6). Importantly, he did not invoke equitable tolling in his opening brief, so the Court declined to analyze that rescue.
Privacy Act Disclosure Claim – The district court granted summary judgment on five distinct grounds (three statutory exceptions, lack of willfulness, and lack of actual damages). On appeal, Manivannan argued only that the “routine use” exception was wrongly applied and offered a cursory assertion of willfulness. He made no argument on (a) the two other exceptions, (b) the district court’s separate willfulness rationale, or (c) the damages holding. Under Third Circuit precedent, failure to engage each independent ground waives the issue; thus, affirmance followed automatically.
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress – The only surviving factual predicate was DOE’s compliance with a subpoena in the state criminal case. The Court deemed this conduct a far cry from the type of outrageous behavior required by Hoy. Absent evidence of falsification, bad-faith defiance of law, or gratuitous humiliation, the claim failed.

C. Impact and Prospective Significance

Although marked “Not Precedential,” the decision embodies rules that routinely control outcomes in the Third Circuit and beyond:

Appellate Practitioners’ Reminder: An appellant must confront every alternative basis supporting judgment below. Overlooking even one ground results in automatic affirmance.
FTCA Caution: The six-month post-denial filing window is unforgiving; equitable tolling must be pled early and specifically.
Privacy Act Litigation: Plaintiffs must marshal proof of “willful or intentional” agency conduct and actual economic damages; mere disclosure, absent those elements, will rarely survive summary judgment.
IIED Claims vs. Government Actors: Pennsylvania’s outrage standard is extraordinarily high when the conduct is confined to lawful subpoena compliance.

As persuasive authority, district courts within the Third Circuit may cite Manivannan for these procedural propositions, particularly on forfeiture and FTCA timing.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Appellate Forfeiture – If you do not argue why each reason the lower court gave is wrong, the appellate court treats you as conceding those unchallenged reasons.
Privacy Act “System of Records” – A database where personal information is retrieved by a person’s name or unique identifier; only disclosures from such systems are covered.
“Willful or Intentional” under the Privacy Act – More than negligence; the agency must know, or be reckless in not knowing, that its disclosure violates the Act.
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) Clock – Two steps:
(i) Presentment: file an administrative claim within two years of the tort;
(ii) Suit: if denied, file in federal court within six months of the mailing date on the denial.
IIED – “Extreme & Outrageous” Conduct – Conduct so appalling that society calls it intolerable. Normal litigation activities, such as responding to subpoenas, rarely qualify.

5. Conclusion

While Manivannan v. DOE resolves no novel constitutional puzzle, it is a tutorial in procedural exactitude. The panel:

Reinforced the strict deadlines governing FTCA claims;
Demonstrated how Privacy Act plaintiffs often falter on willfulness, damages, and exception analysis;
Illustrated Pennsylvania’s towering IIED threshold; and
Delivered a stern caution on appellate briefing: leave no alternative ground untouched or forfeit the fight.

Consequently, this case stands as a compact, persuasive reminder that procedural missteps—missing a deadline by a single day or omitting an argument in a brief—can prove just as fatal as weak merits. Litigants and counsel who heed these lessons will navigate future Privacy Act and FTCA claims with sharper precision and, perhaps, greater success.