“Something More” Still Means More: Second Circuit Reaffirms Narrow Defamation Jurisdiction Under CPLR 302(a)(1) and Rejects Property-Based Hook Under 302(a)(4) for Third-Party USPS “Known Office of Publication”

“Something More” Still Means More: Second Circuit Reaffirms Narrow Defamation Jurisdiction Under CPLR 302(a)(1) and Rejects Property-Based Hook Under 302(a)(4) for Third-Party USPS “Known Office of Publication”

Introduction

In Donner v. Der Spiegel GMBH & Co. KG, et al. (2d Cir. Oct. 23, 2025) — a non-precedential summary order — the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the Southern District of New York’s dismissal of a defamation suit for lack of personal jurisdiction. New York author Rebecca Donner sued German media entities Der Spiegel GMBH & Co. KG and Spiegel-Verlag Rudolf Augstein GMBH & Co. KG, alleging defamation from an article critiquing her nonfiction book, “All the Frequent Troubles of Our Days.” The central jurisdictional questions were whether New York’s long-arm statute, CPLR 302(a)(1) (“transacting business”) or 302(a)(4) (ownership/use of real property), permitted the exercise of specific jurisdiction over Der Spiegel based on:

  • Minimal New York print sales of the issue containing the article (17 copies out of 128,857 sold worldwide),
  • Access to the article via a paid SPIEGEL+ online subscription service available to New Yorkers through an interactive website, and
  • Use of a USPS “Known Office of Publication” in Buffalo operated by an independent third party (Data Media Inc.), linked through another intermediary (IPS) — not by Der Spiegel directly.

The panel (Wesley, Merriam, and Kahn, JJ.) held that none of these contacts sufficed under New York’s long-arm statute in a defamation case, and it affirmed the district court’s refusal to transfer. Because this is a Second Circuit summary order, it carries no precedential effect under Local Rule 32.1.1, but it is citable under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and is persuasive authority that reinforces the already demanding “something more” requirement in defamation-based personal jurisdiction.

Summary of the Opinion

The Second Circuit affirmed dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction, concluding:

  • CPLR 302(a)(1) (“transacting business”): In defamation actions, New York courts construe “transacting business” narrowly. Mere distribution of allegedly defamatory content, even via an interactive, paywalled website accessible in New York, and even with some New York print sales, is insufficient without “something more” that ties the allegedly defamatory publication to New York activity. Here, the reporting and authorship took place outside New York (Arizona and Germany); the plaintiff was in California and traveled to Berlin for the interview; and Der Spiegel’s New York presence was minimal and mediated through third parties. No articulable nexus linked any New York transaction to the alleged defamation.
  • CPLR 302(a)(4) (real property): The claim did not “arise from” the ownership, use, or possession of real property in New York. The Buffalo “Known Office of Publication” was operated by a non-contracting third party (Data Media Inc.) and, in any event, the alleged defamation did not arise from that property’s use. Thus, 302(a)(4) could not support jurisdiction.
  • Due process not reached: Because the contacts failed under the state long-arm statute, the Court did not reach the constitutional due process analysis.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

The Court anchored its reasoning in a line of cases that require rigor in defamation-based jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(1), and that impose a causal nexus under 302(a)(4):

  • Best Van Lines, Inc. v. Walker, 490 F.3d 239 (2d Cir. 2007):
    • Sets the de novo review standard for jurisdictional dismissals and the “prima facie” showing framework.
    • Most importantly, it articulates the defamation-specific narrowing of 302(a)(1): mere distribution of defamatory content, or simply posting content on a website accessible in New York, does not amount to “transacting business” in the state. Plaintiffs must show “something more.”
    • Also rejects reliance on the mere receipt of payments from New York absent an articulable nexus to the alleged defamatory conduct.
  • American Girl, LLC v. Zembrka, 118 F.4th 271 (2d Cir. 2024):
    • Confirms that, at the motion-to-dismiss stage, courts construe pleadings and affidavits in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and resolve doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. Even under that generous standard, Donner’s showing fell short.
  • Johnson v. Ward, 4 N.Y.3d 516 (2005) and SPCA of Upstate N.Y., Inc. v. American Working Collie Ass’n, 18 N.Y.3d 400 (2012):
    • Establish the two-step 302(a)(1) inquiry: (1) “transacts business,” and (2) whether the cause of action “arises from” that transaction — meaning an articulable nexus or substantial relationship.
  • Legros v. Irving, 38 A.D.2d 53 (1st Dep’t 1971) and Sovik v. Healing Network, 244 A.D.2d 985 (4th Dep’t 1997):
    • Examples of what can qualify as “something more” in defamation cases — extensive New York-based research, negotiation, contract execution, and active involvement in authoring and distributing the allegedly defamatory statements within the state.
  • Talbot v. Johnson Newspaper Corp., 71 N.Y.2d 827 (1988):
    • Clarifies “arising from”: the defamation claim must be substantially related to the defendant’s New York transactions; unrelated New York contacts won’t do.
  • Vaval v. Stanco, LLC, 219 A.D.3d 1466 (2d Dep’t 2023) and Zeidan v. Scott’s Dev. Co., 173 A.D.3d 1639 (4th Dep’t 2019):
    • For 302(a)(4), the claim must arise from the defendant’s ownership/use/possession of New York real property. Mere ownership/use is not enough if the property bears no causal relation to the plaintiff’s claim.
  • Charles Schwab Corp. v. Bank of America Corp., 883 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2018) and Whitaker v. American Telecasting, Inc., 261 F.3d 196 (2d Cir. 2001):
    • Reiterate the plaintiff’s prima facie burden and the two-step jurisdictional analysis: satisfy the state long-arm statute first; then consider due process if necessary.

Legal Reasoning

The panel’s analysis hews closely to established doctrine, but its application to the modern distribution chain and paywalled media is particularly instructive.

1) CPLR 302(a)(1): No “Transacting Business” and No “Arising From” Nexus

  • Defamation-specific narrowing and the “something more” requirement: The Court emphasized that New York construes “transacting business” more narrowly in defamation cases than in other tort contexts. Here, the alleged libel — an article researched and written by authors in Arizona and Germany, with the plaintiff in California who traveled to Berlin for the interview — had no meaningful New York locus of activity. Minimal New York sales (17 copies), an interactive subscription portal accessible to New Yorkers, and third-party subscription management do not satisfy “something more.”
  • Third-party USPS “Known Office of Publication” in Buffalo: Der Spiegel did not own or directly operate the Buffalo location. Instead, a chain of intermediaries existed: Der Spiegel contracted with IPS in Germany; IPS partnered with Data Media Inc. in Buffalo, which ran the “Known Office of Publication” and marketed/managing U.S. subscriptions. Even if one accepts some attenuated link to Der Spiegel, the Court held that mere distribution through this office is insufficient in a defamation case to constitute “transacting business” in New York. This conclusion aligns with Best Van Lines’ caution that more than in-state distribution is required.
  • Interactive, paywalled website accessible in New York: The Court reiterated that an accessible website (even with payment interfaces like PayPal/Visa and subscriber sign-ups from New York) does not, without more, constitute transacting business in New York for defamation jurisdiction. The content’s creation, editorial decisions, and publication activities tied to the allegedly defamatory article occurred outside New York.
  • No articulable nexus between New York contacts and the alleged defamation: Even assuming arguendo that some New York business was transacted, Donner’s claims must “arise from” that business. The alleged injury arises from statements in a globally available article, not from the Buffalo office’s existence, the fact that New Yorkers could subscribe online, or that New York subscribers paid through particular processors. The Court highlighted Talbot’s rule: unrelated New York transactions do not supply the necessary nexus.

2) CPLR 302(a)(4): No Property-Based Jurisdiction

  • Arising-from causation is required: Section 302(a)(4) applies only if the claim arises from the defendant’s ownership, use, or possession of New York real property. Donner’s defamation claims arise from the article’s content and its production and publication decisions, not from the use or operation of the Buffalo “Known Office of Publication.” Vaval and Zeidan confirm that property connections unconnected to the tort are insufficient.
  • Agency issue not reached: Because the claim did not arise from the Buffalo property, the panel did not decide whether Data Media’s actions could be imputed to Der Spiegel under agency principles. This underscores that even a successful agency attribution would not bridge the missing causal nexus.

3) Due Process Unnecessary

New York’s long-arm statute does not extend to the constitutional limits in all circumstances. Failing under CPLR 302 ends the analysis. The panel, therefore, did not reach minimum contacts, purposeful availment, or reasonableness under the Due Process Clause.

Impact and Practical Implications

While non-precedential, this decision fortifies and modernizes the application of familiar principles to contemporary media distribution:

  • Foreign and out-of-state publishers: Minimal New York print sales, a paywalled website accessible in New York, and compliance with USPS mailing requirements through a third-party “Known Office of Publication” will not, without more, expose publishers to defamation jurisdiction in New York. This is particularly salient for global outlets whose reporting and editorial work occur outside New York.
  • Digital platforms and paywalls: The presence of interactive features (e.g., subscriber logins, payment gateways, targeted marketing) does not by itself establish “transacting business” for defamation claims. Plaintiffs will need to tie the alleged defamation to New York-centric activities, such as New York reporting, editing, interviews, or other affirmative conduct in the state directly connected to the challenged publication.
  • Third-party distribution structures: Use of intermediaries (like IPS and Data Media) weakens jurisdictional hooks, especially where the outlet does not directly own, operate, or contract for a New York office. Even if agency could be shown, the 302(a)(4) “arising from” requirement remains a separate hurdle.
  • Strategic litigation choices for plaintiffs: Plaintiffs will likely need to identify concrete New York-based activities connected to the creation or distribution decisions of the specific defamatory content, or consider alternative forums where such connections exist. New York’s defamation-specific narrow reading of 302(a)(1) makes generalized distribution and web accessibility poor anchors for jurisdiction.
  • Consistency with Best Van Lines: The order harmonizes with the Second Circuit’s 2007 guidance, shaping a stable body of persuasive authority: “something more” means targeted, content-related New York conduct — not merely passive or incidental New York availability.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Personal jurisdiction (specific vs. general): This case concerns specific jurisdiction — whether New York can hear this particular dispute due to a connection between the state and the claims. It does not involve general jurisdiction (being “at home” in New York), which plainly did not apply to German publishers headquartered in Germany.
  • CPLR 302(a)(1) — “Transacting Business” in defamation cases: For defamation, New York demands more than just making content available or selling a few copies in the state. Courts look for “something more” — concrete, New York-based activity tied to the creation, editing, or distribution of the allegedly defamatory content.
  • “Arising from” / “Articulable nexus” / “Substantial relationship”: The lawsuit must stem from the New York transaction. If your claim is about an article’s content, you must show a New York-based activity that helped produce or disseminate that specific content — not merely unrelated New York contacts.
  • CPLR 302(a)(4) — Property-based jurisdiction: Owning or using property in New York does not create jurisdiction unless the claim arises from that property’s use. For defamation, unless the property was used in a way that bears on the allegedly defamatory publication, 302(a)(4) will not apply.
  • USPS “Known Office of Publication”: This is an administrative designation that helps periodicals obtain mailing privileges. Having such an office — especially when operated by an independent vendor — does not by itself create personal jurisdiction for unrelated claims like defamation.
  • Why the Court skipped Due Process: Courts first ask whether state law (here, CPLR 302) allows jurisdiction. Only if it does do they ask whether the U.S. Constitution’s Due Process Clause permits it. Because CPLR 302 was not satisfied, there was no need to undertake the constitutional analysis.

Conclusion

Donner v. Der Spiegel underscores a durable rule in New York defamation jurisdiction: plaintiffs must show “something more” than incidental in-state distribution or web accessibility to satisfy CPLR 302(a)(1), and they must establish a true “arising from” nexus between any alleged New York transaction and the defamatory publication. It also clarifies that CPLR 302(a)(4) is an ill-fit when the claim does not stem from the defendant’s use or possession of New York property — particularly where a third party operates a USPS “Known Office of Publication” with no causal link to the alleged defamation.

Although this is a non-precedential summary order, it is a careful application of established New York and Second Circuit principles to contemporary media operations — including global distribution chains and paywalled online content. For media defendants, the decision reinforces that limited New York availability and third‑party logistics will rarely suffice to hale foreign publishers into New York courts for defamation. For plaintiffs, it signals the continuing necessity of identifying concrete, New York-centered actions tied to the specific publication at issue if they intend to invoke New York’s long-arm jurisdiction in speech cases.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

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