“Some Harm,” Not “Unreasonable Interference”: Sixth Circuit Extends McNeal/Muldrow Hostile-Work-Environment Standard to ADA Claims and Clarifies Limits of Remote-Work Accommodations Where Onsite Essential Functions Exist

Introduction

In LaNetra Kellar v. The Yunion, Inc. (Sixth Circuit, Oct. 31, 2025), the court affirmed summary judgment for a nonprofit employer on an array of federal and state claims arising from workplace safety concerns after a building flood, a request to work remotely due to alleged mold sensitivities, and pandemic-era budget contractions. The opinion is most notable for explicitly carrying forward two watershed developments from McNeal v. City of Blue Ash (6th Cir. 2024) and Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (U.S. 2024) into the ADA/PWDCRA hostile-work-environment framework:

• Courts may consider the ancillary impacts of separately actionable adverse employment actions as evidence of a hostile work environment.
• Plaintiffs need show only that a hostile environment produced some harm respecting an identifiable term or condition of employment, not the pre‑McNeal “unreasonable interference with work performance.”

The court also underscores core ADA accommodation principles: remote work may be a reasonable accommodation where consistent with policy and job demands, but an employee is not “qualified” if essential functions require onsite performance and the proposed accommodation would eliminate or reallocate those functions. The panel further rejects retaliation and wrongful-termination theories for lack of causation and evidentiary support.

Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit (Judge McKeague) affirmed summary judgment for The Yunion on all claims:

• Hostile Work Environment (ADA and Michigan PWDCRA): Applying McNeal/Muldrow’s updated standards to disability claims, the court concluded that, even considering the ancillary impacts of discrete acts and the lowered harm threshold, Kellar offered no evidence from which a jury could find an objectively hostile environment that produced “some harm” to a term or condition of employment and that was based on disability.
• Adverse-Employment-Action Disability Discrimination and Failure to Accommodate: Although extended remote work could be a reasonable accommodation in the abstract, Kellar was not a “qualified individual” because essential functions—hard-copy case file management required by the funder’s audit regime—had to be done onsite. Reallocating those tasks to interns or others was not required.
• Retaliation (ADA/PWDCRA and Michigan Whistleblower Protection Act): Kellar failed to establish causation for alleged retaliatory acts. The accommodation (temporary shift to part-time to permit remote work) was not an “adverse action” in the retaliation sense; long temporal gaps defeated inference; and budgetary reasons for later reclassification to contractor status were non-pretextual.
• Wrongful Termination (Michigan public policy): The claim was abandoned below and inadequately briefed on appeal. In any event, the record did not show termination, much less a constructive discharge.

Detailed Analysis

1) Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• McNeal v. City of Blue Ash, 117 F.4th 887 (6th Cir. 2024):
  • Resolved confusion over the line between discrete adverse actions and harassment; while discrete acts are different “in kind,” their ancillary impacts can be considered as evidence of a hostile environment.
  • Imported Muldrow’s “some harm” standard to hostile environment claims, eliminating any heightened harm requirement like “unreasonable interference with work performance.”
  • In Kellar, the panel expressly extends McNeal’s reasoning—previously developed in the age-discrimination context—to ADA/PWDCRA hostile-work-environment claims.
• Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346 (2024):
  • Title VII discrimination claims no longer require “significant” harm; “some harm” to a term or condition suffices.
  • McNeal adapted Muldrow to hostile environment claims; Kellar confirms that extension applies equally in ADA cases.
• National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002):
  • Distinguished discrete acts (independently actionable) from cumulative hostile environments.
  • McNeal, and thus Kellar, refine how courts may treat discrete acts’ collateral effects as part of the environment.
• Hostile Environment Baselines:
  • Harris v. Forklift Systems, Faragher v. Boca Raton, Oncale—objective hostility, totality of the circumstances, “simple teasing” and isolated incidents generally insufficient. These benchmarks remain intact post-Muldrow.
• ADA Qualification/Accommodation:
  • Williams v. AT&T Mobility, Rorrer v. City of Stow, Thompson v. Fresh Products—essential functions analysis and burdens of proof.
  • Tchankpa v. Ascena Retail and Kennedy v. Superior Printing—employers may seek medical documentation showing medical necessity; a mere recommendation is insufficient.
  • Kleiber, Cooper v. Dolgencorp—employers need not reallocate or eliminate essential functions or create new positions.
• Retaliation Framework and Standards:
  • McDonnell Douglas burden shifting applies to retaliation (ADA/PWDCRA/WPA).
  • Burlington Northern v. White defines “material adversity” for retaliation; contrasted with Muldrow’s “some harm” for discrimination/hostile environment.
  • Michigan WPA causation requires more than temporal proximity (West v. GM).

2) Legal Reasoning

A. Hostile Work Environment (ADA/PWDCRA) after McNeal/Muldrow

The court sets out an updated four-part test for disability-based hostile work environment:

1. The plaintiff is disabled (undisputed here for analytical purposes).
2. He or she was subjected to harassment, through words or actions, based on disability.
3. The harassment created an objectively intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment that produced some harm respecting an identifiable term or condition of employment.
4. There is a basis to impute liability to the employer.

Two doctrinal shifts matter. First, courts may consider how discrete acts (e.g., pay cuts, benefit changes) contribute to the environment via their ancillary impacts, even though the acts themselves remain separately actionable. Second, “unreasonable interference” with work performance is no longer required; the harm bar is lowered to “some harm.”

Applying those rules, the panel found Kellar’s proof wanting. She pointed to a denied mileage claim, delayed paystubs, temporarily reduced hours during an accommodation, the prospect of reclassification to an independent contractor, and a stray text from the executive director with a shrug emoji about firing her. The court held:

• No evidence tied these incidents to disability-based animus, nor that they were deployed as harassment designed to foster hostility toward a protected trait.
• Policy-based mileage denial and across-the-board paystub corrections did not suggest selective, disability-based harassment.
• The temporary part-time arrangement was the very accommodation she sought; its existence cut against a hostile animus narrative.
• The stray text—unconnected to disability, temporally remote, and contradicted by the employer’s subsequent accommodation—could not reasonably establish an objectively hostile environment or even “some harm” based on disability.
• Unsubstantiated assertions raised for the first time in a reply brief (exclusion, mockery, being “told she was the problem”) lacked record support.

In short, even under the modernized standard, the evidence did not permit a reasonable jury to find an objectively hostile, disability-based environment that caused “some harm” to a term or condition of employment.

B. Adverse-Employment-Action Discrimination and Failure to Accommodate

For both theories, the pivotal question was whether Kellar was a “qualified individual” who could perform essential job functions with a reasonable accommodation. The court assumed, favorably to Kellar, that extended remote work could be a reasonable accommodation because Yunion allowed periodic remote work and could modify policies to make remote work accessible. But the inquiry does not end there.

The record (including Kellar’s own testimony) established that an essential function of the case manager role was onsite, hard-copy case file maintenance—mandated by Wayne County contracts, subject to unannounced audits, and especially critical preceding an audit. During audit prep, case managers spent roughly half their time on onsite file work. Key points:

• Essential functions are identified by employer judgment, job descriptions, time spent, and consequences of nonperformance (29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)).
• Reallocating essential functions to interns or colleagues is not required; the ADA does not compel elimination or redistribution of essential duties.
• Producing electronic versions offsite did not supplant the need to maintain complete, accurate, hard-copy originals onsite to satisfy funder audits.

Because extended remote work would have prevented Kellar from performing an essential onsite function, she was not “qualified” with her proposed accommodation. That failure proved fatal to both the adverse action and the failure-to-accommodate claims.

C. Retaliation (ADA/PWDCRA; Michigan WPA)

The court applied McDonnell Douglas burden shifting. On the ADA/PWDCRA prong:

• Protected activity: requesting an accommodation and filing a disability complaint with the Michigan Department of Civil Rights.
• Adverse action: the temporary part-time arrangement—the accommodation itself—was not materially adverse in the retaliation sense (Burlington Northern), as it would not dissuade a reasonable worker from seeking accommodation.
• Causation: year-long gaps between the protected activity and the alleged termination, plus the employer’s grant of the requested accommodation and continued employment, defeated temporal proximity. The stray text was too remote and contradicted by subsequent events.

For the Michigan Whistleblower Protection Act claims (complaints to MIOSHA and the Department of Labor about safety, mileage, and paystubs), temporal proximity alone is insufficient under Michigan law, and Kellar offered no additional causation evidence.

Even if a prima facie case existed, the employer’s budgetary explanation for reclassifying the position to contractor status (COVID-related collapse of reimbursable caseloads; PPP loan insufficient and organization-wide) was well supported and unrebutted as pretext. Hiring in other departments or later engaging contractors did not undermine the rationale.

D. Wrongful Termination under Michigan Public Policy

The claim was deemed abandoned in the district court and inadequately briefed on appeal. Moreover, the record reflected that Kellar’s employment ended when she declined both the contractor role and severance—not an involuntary termination or constructive discharge.

3) Impact and Practical Implications

A. New Precedent for ADA Hostile Work Environment Claims

This opinion cements in the ADA/PWDCRA space what McNeal and Muldrow established for other statutes:

• Courts may consider the ancillary effects of discrete adverse acts as environmental evidence.
• The harm threshold is lowered to “some harm” to an employment term or condition; no “unreasonable interference” requirement.
• But the objective hostility bar remains high—courts will look for a work culture “permeated” with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, or insult directed at the protected trait.

Going forward, ADA hostile environment plaintiffs in the Sixth Circuit can use a broader evidentiary palette and need not prove severe work impairment. Yet conclusory allegations or isolated, non-disability-related slights will not survive summary judgment.

B. Remote-Work Accommodations in a Post-Pandemic World

The case offers a practical blueprint for remote-work disputes:

• Extended remote work can be a reasonable accommodation where consistent with policy and job design.
• Employees must show their proposal allows them to perform all essential functions; where essential functions are inherently onsite (e.g., contractually required hard-copy audits), remote-only proposals fail.
• Employers can require medical documentation of necessity, not just recommendations, and may decline accommodations that would eliminate or reassign essential duties.

C. Retaliation and Evidence

• Granting an accommodation—especially one the employee requested—will typically not qualify as a retaliatory adverse action.
• Temporal proximity, without more, is rarely sufficient to establish causation (especially with long gaps) and cannot alone prove pretext.
• Budgetary justifications, if substantiated and coherent across staffing decisions, are difficult to rebut absent countervailing facts.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Hostile Work Environment (HWE): A pattern of discriminatory conduct that makes the workplace objectively hostile or abusive toward a protected trait. Post-Muldrow/McNeal, the plaintiff must show the environment caused “some harm” to a term or condition of employment; not necessarily serious or “unreasonably” interfering harm.
• Discrete Adverse Action vs. Harassment: A discrete action (e.g., pay cut, termination) is separately actionable; harassment is cumulative. Under McNeal, the ancillary impacts of discrete acts may be considered as part of the HWE picture, even though the acts themselves remain distinct.
• Essential Functions: The fundamental job duties—not marginal tasks. Factors include employer’s judgment, job description, time spent, and consequences of omission. Eliminating or reallocating essential functions is generally not a “reasonable” accommodation.
• Reasonable Accommodation: A modification enabling a qualified individual to perform essential functions (e.g., policy adjustments, schedule changes, job restructuring). It must be medically necessary when the employer asks for proof.
• “Qualified Individual” (ADA): Someone who can perform essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation. If an accommodation would preclude performance of essential duties, the individual is not “qualified.”
• Retaliation (Burlington Northern standard): Any employer action that would dissuade a reasonable worker from engaging in protected activity. Different from the discrimination standard post-Muldrow.
• Temporal Proximity: Close timing between protected activity and adverse action. Helpful, but generally insufficient by itself to prove causation or pretext, especially with long intervening periods.
• Pretext: A false reason offered by the employer to hide unlawful motive. Can be shown by demonstrating the reason has no basis in fact, didn’t actually motivate the decision, or was insufficient to motivate it.

Practice Notes

• For Employers:
  • Maintain clear job descriptions identifying essential functions, and document why they are essential (e.g., audit or regulatory mandates).
  • When remote work is requested, evaluate whether essential functions can be performed remotely without eliminating or reassigning them. Offer alternatives if feasible.
  • Request medical documentation of necessity (not mere recommendations) where appropriate; keep the interactive process constructive and documented.
  • Be cautious with written communications (texts, emails) that could be misconstrued; a single ill-phrased message can become exhibit A even if not outcome-determinative.
  • Budget-based reclassifications should be supported by contemporaneous financial data; explain department-level versus organization-level funding distinctions.
• For Employees:
  • When seeking accommodation, provide documentation that the requested change is medically necessary and enables you to perform all essential functions.
  • Propose concrete ways to perform essential tasks; avoid proposals that shift essential duties to others.
  • For hostile environment claims, collect specific, documented instances of disability-based comments or conduct and link them to identifiable harms in work terms/conditions.
  • For retaliation, develop evidence beyond timing—e.g., statements, deviations from policy, comparator evidence, or inconsistencies undermining the employer’s stated reasons.

Conclusion

Kellar v. The Yunion, Inc. is a significant Sixth Circuit decision for two reasons. First, it expressly brings ADA/PWDCRA hostile-work-environment claims into alignment with McNeal and Muldrow: courts may consider discrete acts’ ancillary impacts as evidence and require only “some harm” to an employment term or condition, while retaining the objective-hostility requirement. Second, it reaffirms foundational ADA accommodation doctrine in the remote-work era: extended remote work can be reasonable in principle, but not where essential functions are inherently onsite and the requested accommodation would eliminate or reassign them.

On the facts, the case demonstrates the evidentiary rigor required to survive summary judgment. Conclusory allegations, a single stray text, or timing alone will not carry hostile environment or retaliation claims. Employers that document essential functions, engage in the interactive process, and marshal coherent budgetary rationales—especially during volatile funding cycles—are well positioned to withstand litigation. Plaintiffs, conversely, should be prepared to substantiate disability-based animus, medical necessity, and causal links with specific, admissible evidence.

Bottom line: The opinion both modernizes ADA hostile-work-environment analysis in the Sixth Circuit and offers a practical, fact-intensive roadmap for litigating remote-work accommodations and retaliation claims in a post-pandemic workplace.