“Situational-Awareness” and Contributory Negligence:
The Precedential Reach of Moseley v. Hendricks (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 2025)

1. Introduction

Moseley v. Hendricks is a sharply divided decision of the North Carolina Supreme Court that crystallises an old rule—contributory negligence—but does so in a modern fact pattern involving texting, alcohol consumption, and a municipal golf driving range. The majority opinion (Justice Allen) affirms summary judgment for both a private golfer and the City of Wilson after an errant practice-tee shot blinded the plaintiff, Glenn Moseley. In doing so the Court stakes out a clear doctrinal marker: where the danger is “open and obvious” to an objectively reasonable person, a plaintiff’s near total lack of situational awareness—even if caused by intoxication or cell-phone distraction—constitutes contributory negligence as a matter of law, foreclosing trial.

The precedential weight of the case lies in two principal holdings:

1. “Situational-Awareness” Test. The Court converts a series of earlier open-and-obvious dicta into a consolidated standard: whether an objectively prudent person in the plaintiff’s position would have perceived and avoided the risk by maintaining minimal situational awareness.
2. Summary Judgment Calibration. Building on Draughon and Cullen, the decision clarifies that when the undisputed evidence shows line-of-sight to danger, contributory negligence can be decided as a matter of law even amid factual skirmishes about minutiae (e.g., precise cart position).

2. Case Background

• Parties. • Plaintiff: Glenn Moseley, recreational golfer • Defendant 1: Johnny A. Hendricks, Jr., fellow golfer who hit the ball • Defendant 2: City of Wilson, owner/operator of Wedgewood Municipal Golf Course.
• Incident. 23 Dec 2018. After a whiskey-laced round, the group moved to the municipal driving range. Moseley, heavily intoxicated and texting in a golf cart, was struck in the eye by Hendricks’s mis-hit ball approximately 30 yards down-range.
• Procedural Path. Superior Court – summary judgment for both defendants (contributory negligence & governmental immunity). Court of Appeals (2-1) affirmed. Supreme Court review followed the dissent rule under repealed N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2).
• Issues Presented.
  1. Whether contributory negligence barred Moseley’s negligence claims as a matter of law;
  2. Whether the “last clear chance” doctrine resurrected the claim;
  3. Secondary: municipal governmental immunity (not reached).

3. Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court (5-2) affirmed without reaching governmental immunity:

• Contributory Negligence. Plaintiff’s inattentiveness—resulting from intoxication and cell-phone use—breached his duty of self-care. Because the danger (being 30 yd in front of a tee box) was open and obvious, that breach proximately caused the injury.
• Factual Disputes Immaterial. Disagreements over the exact resting point of the cart did not defeat summary judgment; all credible versions still placed Moseley within obvious danger and with clear line-of-sight had he looked.
• Last Clear Chance. Not preserved for Supreme Court review; even if considered, Hendricks had committed to the swing and lacked time/opportunity to avoid harm.
• Dissent (Earls, J.). Emphasised jury function in negligence; saw genuine disputes about cart movement, timing, and visibility—precluding judgment as a matter of law.

4. Analysis

4.1 Precedents Cited

1. Cullen v. Logan Developers, Inc., 386 N.C. 373 (2024).
   – Articulated principle that plaintiffs cannot recover for open-and-obvious risks if reasonable self-protective steps were available.
   – Moseley adopts and operationalises “open-and-obvious” into a fact-specific, driving-range setting.
2. Draughon v. Evening Star Holiness Church, 374 N.C. 479 (2020).
   – Provided the litmus that judgment as a matter of law is appropriate where the hazard is objectively open and obvious.
3. Pierce v. Murnick, 265 N.C. 707 (1965).
   – Attendee at wrestling match barred from recovery; used here to analogise prior knowledge of activity hazards.
4. Smith v. Fiber Controls Corp., 300 N.C. 669 (1980).
   – Confirmed that contributory negligence is gauged by an objective, not subjective, standard of prudence.
5. McWilliams v. Parham, 269 N.C. 162 (1967) & 273 N.C. 592 (1968).
   – Golf-ball injury cases emphasising warning shout (“Fore!”); distinguished in Moseley on posture (assumption of risk vs. contributory negligence) and venue (course v. range).
6. Procedural Precedents. Cases such as Marcus Brothers, Caldwell, and Value Health Solutions were cited for summary-judgment standards.

4.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

The majority’s syllogism proceeds in three steps:

1. Open and Obvious Danger. Sitting 30 yd down-range in direct line of flight from a tee box is a condition that any ordinarily intelligent person using his eyes in an ordinary manner would detect.
2. Breach of Self-Care Duty. Moseley’s failure to look up—due to texting and alcohol—constituted an objective lack of due care regardless of subjective impairment.
3. Proximate Cause Undisputed. The causal chain ran straight from breach (inattention) to injury (golf ball impact). Minor factual disputes (exact cart location; whether cart rolled) were collateral because, in every version, plaintiff remained observable from the tee and the risk was knowable to him.

The Court therefore held that plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. Its treatment of the dissent underscores a second pillar: summary judgment is not defeated by speculative narratives absent evidentiary footing in the plaintiff’s own theory of the case. In short, a court need not credit hypothetical inferences that the non-movant never advanced.

4.3 Potential Impact

• Recreational-Sports Litigation. Operators of golf courses, driving ranges, and similar venues may invoke Moseley to obtain early dismissal where the participant’s inattentiveness or distraction is evident.
• Cell-Phone & Intoxication Cases. The decision illustrates judicial willingness to treat modern distractions (texting) as classic negligence factors, reinforcing objective standards.
• Municipal Liability Context. Although immunity was not reached, cities can capitalise on contributory-negligence defenses early, limiting exposure without litigating governmental-function nuances.
• Summary-Judgment Doctrine. Litigants should note the Court’s emphasis on “line-of-sight” as a dispositive fact obliterating minor inconsistencies. Attorneys opposing summary judgment must provide not just alternate speculation but record-anchored facts.
• Last Clear Chance Narrowing. By declining to consider the doctrine absent proper briefing—even where a dissent relied on it—the Court signals tighter procedural discipline for appellants.

5. Complex Concepts Simplified

5.1 Contributory Negligence (North Carolina)

Unlike most states that follow comparative fault, North Carolina still applies the traditional rule: if the plaintiff’s own negligence contributes in any degree to the injury, recovery is barred. It is an “all-or-nothing” defense.

5.2 Open and Obvious Hazard

A danger is “open and obvious” when a reasonable person, using ordinary senses, would notice it without special expertise. Think of seeing a pothole in daylight or, here, recognizing that sitting down-range at a golf practice area poses an obvious risk of being struck.

5.3 Last Clear Chance Doctrine

This doctrine acts as a plaintiff’s escape hatch. Even if the plaintiff was negligent, he may still recover if the defendant discovered (or should have discovered) the peril in time to avoid it but failed to do so. Moseley suggests that once a golfer has begun his downswing, there is no “last clear chance.”

5.4 Governmental Immunity

Local governments are generally immune from negligence suits for “governmental” (as opposed to “proprietary”) functions unless immunity is waived. The Court’s decision here rests solely on contributory negligence, so the immunity question remains legally open for future cases.

6. Conclusion

Moseley v. Hendricks cements a pragmatic, 21^st-century refinement of North Carolina’s contributory-negligence doctrine. The decision teaches that:

• Maintaining minimal situational awareness is an objective legal duty—and modern distractions offer no reprieve.
• Summary judgment may be appropriate even amid factual variations if every plausible version evidences an open-and-obvious risk perceivable by the plaintiff.
• Plaintiffs must thoughtfully preserve and brief doctrines such as last clear chance or risk waiver; silence equals forfeiture.
• For municipal defendants, contributory negligence can dispose of claims without delving into governmental-immunity complexities.

For practitioners, the case is a cautionary tale: in North Carolina’s contributory-negligence regime, a distracted glance at a phone—or any lapse that an ordinary person could avoid—may erase an otherwise viable negligence claim. Moseley thus stands as the leading authority on “situational-awareness” negligence in recreational settings and will likely influence summary-judgment motions far beyond the golf course.