“Shaw v. Preservation”: The Third Department Discards its Prior Rule and Holds that a Grossly Inflated Sentencing Warning Automatically Invalidates a Guilty Plea

1. Introduction

People v. Shaw (2025 NY Slip Op 03358) is the Third Department’s first substantive application of the Court of Appeals’ 2025 decision in People v. Scott. The case concerns Antoine J. Shaw, who, facing a nine-count indictment for narcotics sales and related offenses, pled guilty only after the trial judge repeatedly told him that conviction after trial would expose him to at least 36 years in prison, and possibly more. In reality, the maximum sentence was capped at 30 years by statute. Shaw did not move to withdraw his plea or to vacate the conviction on that ground until years later, raising the voluntariness of his plea on direct appeal and in a CPL article 440 motion.

At issue was whether:

1. Shaw’s claim was preserved for appellate review despite the absence of a post-allocution motion; and
2. The plea could stand given the trial court’s misstatements.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Relying squarely on People v. Scott, the Third Department:

• Invoked the new “Scott exception” to the preservation requirement, holding that when a court grossly misstates the maximum sentence “contrary to the undisputed text of the Penal Law,” the defendant need not have preserved the claim.
• Found that the trial court’s repeated 36-year warning, coupled with suggestions of an even higher exposure, was erroneous and materially influenced Shaw’s decision.
• Determined that, under the totality of circumstances, Shaw’s plea was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.
• Reversed the conviction and remitted the matter for further proceedings; Shaw’s separate appeal from the CPL 440 denial was dismissed as academic.
• Expressly disavowed its own prior precedent, People v. Payson, to the extent it required preservation in similar circumstances.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

• People v. Scott (2025) – The Court of Appeals created the preservation exception now adopted wholesale by the Third Department. “The defendant need not preserve a challenge where the court furnishes sentencing information that is patently incorrect under the Penal Law.”
• People v. Hidalgo (1998) – Explains that voluntariness is measured by the totality of circumstances, including “nature and terms of the agreement” and the defendant’s background.
• People v. Payson (2020) – Previously required a post-allocution motion to raise misadvice on appeal; now overruled.
• Other authorities: People v. Buchanan (2021) (plea invalid where misadvice decisive), People v. Garcia (1998) (contrasting harmless advisory errors), and People v. Hidalgo — all used to calibrate how much weight misadvice carries in the voluntariness calculus.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning proceeds in two distinct steps:

1. Preservation Analysis. The panel finds Scott controlling because (a) the inaccurate 36-year figure conflicts with the “undisputed text” of Penal Law §§70.30(1)(e)(i), 70.25, 70.70, and (b) neither counsel nor the prosecution corrected the error, leaving Shaw with no “apparent reason” to question it.
2. Voluntariness Evaluation. Applying the Hidalgo factors, the court emphasizes:
• Shaw’s stated reluctance and repeated references to the looming 36-year exposure;
• His strategic motive (“get the high/low of 16/14”) that hinged on the inflated maximum; and
• The overall balance: though experienced, he plainly relied on the erroneous information.

Therefore, the plea “was not knowing, voluntary and intelligent,” requiring reversal ab initio.

3.3 Impact

The decision will ripple across New York practice in several ways:

• Department-wide alignment – The Third Department now fully conforms to Scott, erasing intra-Department splits and providing uniformity for trial courts and counsel.
• Increased scrutiny of plea colloquies – Trial judges must verify maximums with precision; any unchecked overstatement can nullify a plea years later.
• Defense counsel strategy – Practitioners can raise voluntariness claims on direct appeal without risking procedural default, provided the misstatement is clear-cut.
• Prosecutorial training – Prosecutors must correct judicial misstatements in real time to preserve convictions.
• Case law overhaul – Older Third Department cases (e.g., Payson) are effectively supplanted; appellate briefs will be rewritten to cite Shaw/Scott.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Preservation Rule – Usually, an appellate court will not consider an argument unless it was first raised in the trial court. The “Scott exception” waives this requirement when the trial judge misinforms the defendant about the maximum penalty.
• Alford Plea – A plea in which a defendant maintains innocence while acknowledging that the prosecution’s evidence would likely lead to conviction.
• Second Felony Drug Offender – A status that enhances sentencing ranges for certain narcotics convictions under Penal Law §70.70.
• Concurrent vs. Consecutive Sentences – Concurrent sentences run together; consecutive sentences run back-to-back, increasing total time.
• CPL Article 440 Motion – A post-conviction procedure allowing a defendant to vacate a judgment for specific errors not apparent on the record.

5. Conclusion

People v. Shaw cements the “Scott exception” in the Third Department, affirming that a defendant need not object contemporaneously when the trial court materially inflates the maximum sentence. By reversing Shaw’s plea-based conviction, the court underscores that accuracy in sentencing advisories is a constitutional predicate to a valid plea. Going forward, both bench and bar must treat sentencing mathematics as non-negotiable, lest pleas unravel on appeal. Shaw thus marks a pivotal step toward statewide uniformity and heightened due-process protections in New York’s plea-bargaining landscape.