“Sequential-Instruction Due-Process Clause Conflicts”
Comprehensive Commentary on Black v. Tennessee, 606 U.S. ___ (2025)

Introduction

On 30 June 2025 the Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari in Black v. Tennessee, a case that would have confronted the constitutionality of Tennessee’s pattern jury instructions on voluntary manslaughter. Justice Sotomayor, joined by no other member of the Court but writing respecting the denial, issued a pointed six-page statement identifying what she called “serious federal constitutional questions” in the State’s methodology. Her opinion—although non-precedential—articulates a powerful due-process critique of “sequential” jury instructions that prevent jurors from ever reaching the crime of voluntary manslaughter once they unanimously find the elements of second-degree murder.

The parties are:

• Landon Hank Black – Petitioner, convicted in Tennessee state court of second-degree murder arising out of the fatal shooting of Brandon Lee outside a sports bar.
• State of Tennessee – Respondent, defending the conviction.

The petition questioned whether Tennessee’s statutory framework—and the jury-charge protocol it generates—violates (1) Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), by shifting the burden of disproving heat of passion to the defendant and (2) the broader due-process right to “a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.”

Summary of the Judgment

The Court denied certiorari. Justice Sotomayor agreed with the denial only because the constitutional questions had not been squarely confronted by Tennessee’s appellate courts and thus remained “unripe” for Supreme Court review. Nonetheless, her statement:

• Explains how Tennessee’s definition of voluntary manslaughter contains more elements than second-degree murder, although the former is the lesser felony.
• Criticizes the sequential-consideration instruction that bars jurors from moving to voluntary manslaughter after finding second-degree murder elements.
• Invokes Mullaney (burden on prosecution to disprove heat of passion) and Crane v. Kentucky (right to a complete defense) as potential constitutional violations.
• Encourages the Tennessee Supreme Court to repair the doctrinal “confusion.”

No binding precedent was established, but the statement effectively places state courts and legislatures on notice that similar instruction schemes may be struck down in a future case.

Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

1. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975)
   Requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of heat of passion once that issue is “properly presented.” Tennessee’s regime reverses this logic by treating heat of passion as an additional element the State must prove before the jury can reach manslaughter—yet the jury never reaches it if it convicts of second-degree murder first. Sotomayor views this as incompatible with Mullaney.
2. Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986) and California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984)
   Stand for the proposition that defendants are entitled to a “meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.” Tennessee’s instructions extinguished Black’s provocation defense before the jury could hear it.
3. Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705 (1989)
   Adopted the “elements” test for identifying lesser-included offenses. Tennessee’s statutory scheme contradicts this approach because voluntary manslaughter has extra elements not contained in second-degree murder.
4. State-law cases (Williams, Donaldson, Lumpkin, Wilson, Humphrey, Benesch) illustrate the internal confusion and “absurd results” produced by treating provocation as an element.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

Justice Sotomayor’s reasoning unfolds in three steps:

1. Elemental Mismatch – Under Tennessee statutes, voluntary manslaughter equals second-degree murder plus adequate provocation. Logically a crime with an extra element cannot be “lesser included” in the crime lacking that element.
2. Sequential Instruction Problem – Tennessee Pattern Instruction directs jurors to stop deliberating once they unanimously agree on the first crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Because second-degree murder elements are encompassed within voluntary manslaughter, jurors will always arrive at second-degree murder first and never assess provocation. The instruction thus forecloses the statutory manslaughter option.
3. Constitutional Overlay – (a) Due Process (Mullaney, In re Winship) mandates the State to disprove heat of passion where the defense is raised;
   (b) Sequential instructions eliminate the defendant’s ability to obtain a manslaughter verdict, violating the right to present a defense;
   (c) The confusion undermines reliability of verdicts, an essential due-process value.

3.3 Likely Impact

• State-Level Reform – Tennessee Supreme Court is “on the clock.” Failure to act invites future certiorari that could result in a precedential decision invalidating the entire framework.
• Instructional Templates Nationwide – Several states employ sequential-consideration instructions. Justice Sotomayor’s analysis gives defense counsel a fresh road-map for constitutional attack.
• Plea-Bargaining Leverage – Prosecutors may hesitate to charge manslaughter as a lesser until the statutory fix is in place, potentially lowering plea offers or encouraging second-degree-murder pleas.
• Academic Commentary and Model Penal Code Influence – Expect renewed scholarship on how best to calibrate heat-of-passion offenses and burdens of proof.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Heat of Passion / Adequate Provocation – A centuries-old doctrine that reduces murder to manslaughter when the killer acted in sudden passion that would overwhelm an ordinary person (e.g., discovering a spouse’s infidelity). It recognizes diminished moral blameworthiness.
• Lesser-Included Offense – A crime whose elements are entirely contained within a more serious crime (e.g., theft within robbery). Jurors may convict of the lesser if the greater is not proven.
• Sequential Jury Instructions – Deliberation regime telling jurors to decide charges “from greatest to least,” moving down the ladder only if they unanimously acquit (or have reasonable doubt) of the higher charge.
• Burdens of Proof – The prosecution must prove every element beyond a reasonable doubt (Winship). A state cannot shift to the defendant the burden of disproving an element that increases punishment.
• Denial of Certiorari – When the Supreme Court declines review, the lower-court judgment stands; however, statements respecting denial, like Justice Sotomayor’s, often signal unresolved issues ripe for future review.

Conclusion

While Black v. Tennessee produced no binding Supreme Court precedent, Justice Sotomayor’s statement reverberates through criminal jurisprudence. She resurrects Mullaney’s due-process command and exposes a doctrinal Gordian knot: Tennessee cannot logically label voluntary manslaughter a lesser-included offense yet impose an additional element and prevent the jury from ever evaluating it. The commentary foreshadows either (1) rapid state-court correction or (2) a future Supreme Court decision that may invalidate sequential-instruction models nationwide. For defense lawyers, prosecutors, judges, and legislators alike, the message is unambiguous: jury instructions must permit genuine consideration of provocation defenses, and burdens of proof must align with constitutional imperatives. In the broader legal landscape, the case is a cautionary tale of how subtle statutory alterations can collide with foundational due-process principles, requiring vigilance, doctrinal clarity, and, ultimately, reform.