“Say It or Lose It” – The Supreme Court of Georgia Clarifies the Statutory Notice Requirement for Abusive-Litigation Claims under OCGA § 51-7-84(a)

1. Introduction

P&J Beverage Corporation v. The Bottle Shop, LLC, S25G0016 (Ga. Aug. 12, 2025) marks the Supreme Court of Georgia’s most significant construction of Georgia’s abusive-litigation statute in more than a decade. The dispute originates from a licence-revocation action concerning a package store in Columbus, Georgia, but ultimately turned on whether an e-mail referencing a “wrongful injunction” satisfied the statutory notice a putative plaintiff must serve before suing for abusive litigation. The Court’s decision vacates a sizeable jury verdict—over half-a-million dollars in combined damages and fees—and articulates a bright-line rule: to satisfy OCGA § 51-7-84(a), the pre-suit notice must both (i) identify the specific civil proceeding and (ii) signal that the sender contends that the proceeding constitutes “abusive litigation,” or language amounting to the same.

Key Actors

• P&J Beverage Corporation (“P&J”) – Competitor who secured an injunction halting The Bottle Shop’s operations.
• The Bottle Shop, LLC (“Bottle Shop”) – Package-store owner; plaintiff in underlying abusive-litigation/wrongful-injunction suit.
• Supreme Court of Georgia – Warren, P.J., writing for a unanimous (with two non-participating) bench.

Core Issues

• Does an e-mail threatening a future “wrongful-injunction” claim also satisfy the statutorily mandated notice for an “abusive-litigation” claim?
• If the notice is deficient, what happens to a jury verdict awarding damages for both abusive litigation and wrongful injunction on a general verdict form?

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Court holds that the Bottle Shop’s e-mail failed to meet the notice requirements of OCGA § 51-7-84(a) because it did not state—or reasonably imply—that the injunction obtained by P&J was abusive litigation. Consequently, the statutory condition precedent to an abusive-litigation action was never satisfied; all damages traceable to that tort must be set aside. The Court vacates the trial court’s judgment and remands for proceedings to segregate wrongful-injunction damages (if any) from the invalid abusive-litigation award and determine whether retrial is required.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents and Authorities Cited

• Bates v. Howell, 352 Ga. App. 733 (2019) – Defines “wrongful injunction.” Used by Bottle Shop; distinguished by the Court as conceptually distinct from abusive litigation.
• Cox v. Altus Healthcare & Hospice, Inc., 308 Ga. App. 28 (2011) – Iterates the “injunction at your peril” principle; cited in the contested e-mail.
• Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170 (2013) – Canon of statutory construction: plain-meaning rule.
• City of Guyton v. Barrow, 305 Ga. 799 (2019) – Text must be read in context “as a whole.”
• Hall Cnty. Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Westrec Props., Inc., 303 Ga. 69 (2018) – “Shall” is generally mandatory.
• Multiple definitional cross-references within OCGA § 51-7-80 et seq. (malice, without substantial justification, wrongful purpose, etc.).

3.2 Legal Reasoning

3.2.1 Statutory Text Controls

“Such notice shall identify the civil proceeding … which the injured person claims constitutes abusive litigation.” – OCGA § 51-7-84(a)

The Court parses the statutory language into two mandatory components:

1. Identification – The notice must pinpoint the particular “civil proceeding, claim, defense, motion, appeal, civil process, or other position.”
2. Characterization – The notice must affirmatively indicate that the sender believes the identified proceeding is abusive litigation.

An e-mail referencing only a “wrongful injunction” satisfies Component 1 (identification) but not Component 2 (characterization).

3.2.2 Wrongful Injunction ≠ Abusive Litigation

Under Georgia common law a “wrongful injunction” exists when, in hindsight, the restrained party was entitled to act freely; the tort is strict-liability-like and does not demand malice or lack of substantial justification. By contrast, abusive litigation under OCGA § 51-7-81 requires malice and no substantial justification. Because the two torts differ in mental-state and proof requirements, reference to one cannot logically place a defendant on statutory notice of the other.

3.2.3 Purpose of Statutory Notice

The notice serves a remedial function akin to an anti-SLAPP safe-harbor: it offers the alleged abuser a chance to “voluntarily withdraw, abandon, discontinue, or dismiss” the offending litigation before exposure to damages. That purpose is defeated unless the recipient knows which action is challenged and why (i.e., as abusive).

3.2.4 Remedy and Procedure on Remand

Because the verdict form commingled damages for wrongful injunction and abusive litigation, and the Court cannot discern allocation, the entire judgment is vacated. The trial court must now:

• Determine what parts of the verdict stand solely on wrongful-injunction grounds.
• Order a new trial if damages cannot be segregated.

3.3 Likely Impact

• Higher Drafting Standards – Plaintiff’s counsel must now expressly label the target proceeding as “abusive litigation” or use synonymous statutory language. Boilerplate reservation letters or generic threats will be ineffective.
• Increased Motion Practice – Defendants will scrutinize pre-suit notices and move for dismissal or directed verdict whenever the two-part test is unmet.
• Clearer Demarcation of Torts – The opinion disentangles wrongful-injunction claims from statutory abusive-litigation claims, guiding trial courts on jury-instruction separation.
• Potential Legislative Response – If the bar perceives the requirement as overly formalistic, the General Assembly may amend § 51-7-84(a) to provide a safe-harbor for “substantial compliance.”

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Abusive Litigation (a/k/a Malicious Prosecution of Civil Proceedings) – Filing or maintaining a lawsuit with malice and without a reasonable basis. Think of it as weaponizing the court system.
• Wrongful Injunction – Getting a temporary court order to stop someone, which later proves unfounded. No bad motive is required; it is “wrong” simply because the order should not have issued.
• Condition Precedent – A legal prerequisite. Failure to satisfy it bars the later claim entirely.
• Directed Verdict / JNOV – Trial-stage and post-verdict motions asking the judge to rule as a matter of law because no reasonable jury could find otherwise.

5. Conclusion

P&J Beverage Corp. v. The Bottle Shop, LLC cements a critical procedural checkpoint within Georgia’s abusive-litigation framework. A plaintiff must do more than threaten litigation; the pre-suit notice must unambiguously communicate that the identified proceeding is deemed “abusive litigation” (or its statutory equivalent). By giving the statutory text teeth, the Court promotes early dispute resolution and deters overbroad claims predicated on ambiguous communications. Going forward, Georgia litigants should draft § 51-7-84(a) notices with precision—failure to “say it” means you may irrevocably “lose it.”