“Remedy-Driven Review” – The Kentucky Supreme Court Harmonises Remedies for Illegal Plea-Based Sentences

1. Introduction

Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Darrell Strunk, 2025-SC-0518-DG, marks the latest and most explicit synthesis of Kentucky jurisprudence on illegal sentences that arise out of plea bargains. The Supreme Court of Kentucky (“SCoK”) unanimously agreed that Strunk’s 30-year aggregate sentence for two Class C felonies violated KRS 532.110(1)(c), yet the Court splintered over how that violation should be cured. A five-Justice majority (Conley, J.) adopted a bright-line, remedy-driven framework: when the only defect attacked is the sentence, courts must remand solely for resentencing to the highest permissible term; only when the plea itself is attacked must the defendant receive an opportunity to withdraw it. Two Justices (Thompson, J., joined by Nickell, J.) would instead void the entire bargain as an indivisible, illegal contract.

The decision therefore occupies three intersecting contexts:

• The substantive cap on consecutive sentences for Class C felonies (20 years).
• The non-waivability of statutory sentencing limits.
• The distinction between procedural posture (direct appeal vs. collateral CR 60.02 attack) and the relief requested.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Strunk pleaded guilty to two second-degree robberies, each enhanced to 10–20 years under the second-degree persistent felony offender (“PFO-2”) statute. The plea called for 20 years on the business robbery, plus 10 years consecutive on the home robbery—an aggregate of 30 years. Defence counsel flagged a potential statutory cap problem, but the trial court nevertheless imposed the negotiated sentence. Years later, Strunk filed a CR 60.02 motion, asking only for resentencing to the lawful ceiling of 20 years. Both the Court of Appeals and SCoK agreed the sentence was illegal; the dispute was whether the remedy should be (a) resentencing, or (b) permission to withdraw the plea. Relying primarily on Phon v. Commonwealth, the majority chose option (a) and ordered the trial court to impose “the highest legal sentence,” i.e., 20 years. The sentence is affirmed as corrected; the conviction survives untouched.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. McClanahan v. Commonwealth, 308 S.W.3d 694 (2010) – The Court first declared that KRS 532.110’s caps are non-waivable and any over-cap sentence is per se illegal. McClanahan, however, had moved to withdraw his plea; thus the remedy was plea withdrawal.
2. Phon v. Commonwealth, 545 S.W.3d 284 (2018) – A youthful offender received an unauthorised sentence (LWOP). Phon sought only sentencing relief via CR 60.02. The Court remanded for re-imposition of the highest valid sentence (LWOP-25), keeping the plea intact. Phon becomes the majority’s template.
3. Commonwealth v. Moreland, 681 S.W.3d 102 (2023) – Addressed an illegal “split” sentence (prison + delayed probation). Because multiple lawful configurations remained, the Court remanded for a full resentencing hearing without dictating a specific term. Moreland illustrates that why a sentence is illegal (excessive length vs. wrong structure) affects the scope of remand.
4. Goldsmith v. Commonwealth, 363 S.W.3d 330 (2012) – Clarified that KRS 532.110 applies to “crimes rather than indictments,” killing the Commonwealth’s argument that separate informations escape the cap.
5. Earlier waiver-friendly cases (Myers, Blackburn) were implicitly or expressly abandoned.

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The majority’s logic unfolds in three syllogisms:

1. Illegality. KRS 532.110(1)(c) caps consecutive sentences at “the longest extended term … for the highest class of crime” (§-20 years for Class C). Two PFO-enhanced Class C robberies sentenced together may not exceed 20 years.
2. Non-waiver. McClanahan’s anti-waiver rule controls; neither defendant nor Commonwealth can “contract around” the statute in a plea bargain.
3. Remedy-Driven Review. The remedy depends on (a) the relief the defendant actually requests and (b) the nature of the illegality.
   • If the plea’s validity is challenged → allow plea withdrawal (McClanahan).
   • If only the sentence is challenged → correct the sentence (Phon/Moreland).
     • If illegality = excess length → impose the statutory maximum (Phon).
     • If illegality = structural defect → order full resentencing (Moreland).
   Because Strunk attacked only the sentence (under CR 60.02) and the illegality was purely excessive length, the Court must simply shave off the unlawful 10 years and leave the plea intact.

3.3 Impact of the Decision

• Clarifies Remedy Doctrine. Lawyers now have a clear, hierarchical test for illegal plea-based sentences:
  1. Identify who is challenging what (plea vs. sentence).
  2. Pinpoint the defect (excess length, split, impermissible probation, etc.).
  3. Apply the corresponding remedy track (withdrawal, max lawful term, or full resentencing).
• Puts Negotiating Burden on Prosecutors. The Court underscores that the Commonwealth, as “non-sentencing authority,” must ensure negotiated terms are possible. Illegal bargains will be unilaterally trimmed if the defendant later complains.
• Victim-Impact Debate Highlighted. Thompson, J.’s dissent warns that automatic “lopping off” may undermine victims’ expectations and prosecutorial leverage. Future plea drafting may become more granular—e.g., using separate indictments with explicit “severability” clauses.
• Potential Legislative Response. If the General Assembly believes 20 years is too low a ceiling for aggregated Class C robberies, it must amend KRS 532.110, else courts remain bound.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• KRS 532.110(1)(c) – Think of it as a governor on a vehicle. No matter how many Class C felonies you “add together,” the combined consecutive sentence may not drive past 20 years.
• PFO Enhancement – “Persistent Felony Offender” status enhances the range of punishment (e.g., turning 5–10 years into 10–20 years) but does not upgrade the class of the felony. Therefore the Class C cap still governs.
• CR 60.02 – Kentucky’s catch-all post-judgment relief rule. Subsection (f) (“any other reason”) allows attacks on illegal sentences “within a reasonable time,” even years later.
• Hammer Clause – A plea term that threatens a harsher sentence if the defendant violates pre-sentencing conditions (e.g., fails to appear). If the clause produces a sentence outside statutory limits, it becomes unenforceable.

5. Conclusion

Commonwealth v. Strunk solidifies a pragmatic, two-track approach to illegal sentences produced by plea deals. By tethering the remedy to (1) the defendant’s chosen relief and (2) the type of illegality, the Kentucky Supreme Court supplies prosecutors, defence counsel, and trial judges with a predictable roadmap:

Illegal because it is too long? –> Cut to the statutory cap.
Illegal for other structural reasons? –> Resentence from scratch.
Plea itself challenged? –> Allow withdrawal.

This “remedy-driven review” respects legislative sentencing ceilings, preserves plea bargains when possible, and ensures defendants cannot be incarcerated beyond what the law authorises—even if they once agreed to it. At the same time, the sharp dissent signals ongoing tension between contract principles and victim-centred justice, foreshadowing continued debate in Kentucky and beyond.