“Remedies, Not Claims”:
Gonzalez v. Texas Medical Board and the Scope of the Redundant-Remedies Doctrine in Texas Administrative Law

I. Introduction

In Reynaldo "Rey" Gonzalez, Jr., M.D., J.D. v. Texas Medical Board, No. 24-0340 (Tex. Oct. 31, 2025), the Supreme Court of Texas addressed a procedurally intricate but practically important question: when does the existence of judicial review under the Texas Administrative Procedure Act (APA) bar independent declaratory and injunctive actions under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA)?

The case lies at the intersection of administrative law, separation of powers, and free speech. A congressional candidate with a medical degree—who never obtained a medical license—used the titles “Dr.” and “physician” in his campaign. The Texas Medical Board (TMB) treated this as the unlicensed practice of medicine and issued a cease-and-desist order backed by substantial civil penalties. Gonzalez, in turn, challenged both the Board’s authority and the constitutionality of the governing statute.

The Supreme Court did not reach the merits of Gonzalez’s First Amendment and Texas constitutional claims. Instead, it clarified two foundational procedural doctrines:

• The Redundant-Remedies Doctrine: UDJA claims are barred only if the existing statutory review mechanism affords the same remedy, not merely the opportunity to raise the same issues or claims.
• Limits on Agency Power to Create Judicial Review: An agency rule cannot independently confer subject-matter jurisdiction on a district court; only a statute (or a constitutional right) can.

These clarifications significantly affect how litigants can structure challenges to agency action—especially when they seek prospective relief from ongoing or future enforcement, including in sensitive areas like political speech.

II. Background: Facts and Procedural History

A. The Parties and the Dispute

Reynaldo “Rey” Gonzalez, Jr. holds both an M.D. and a J.D. He is:

• Licensed to practice law,
• Not licensed to practice medicine,
• An adjunct professor at the University of Texas, and
• A member of the American Board of Legal Medicine.

Gonzalez chose not to pursue a medical license and instead built a legal career. Later, he ran for a seat in the United States House of Representatives. In campaign materials and public statements, he:

• Referred to himself as “Dr. Gonzalez,” and
• Described himself as a “physician.”

His campaign biography included statements such as:

By God's grace I am a physician and an attorney. I adopted a motto years ago which appears on my office's logo. It says in Latin, "Vocatus ad Sanandum," which means, "Called to Heal." My calling to serve in medicine was to heal the sick. My calling to serve in law is to heal my fellow man who is wronged by a third party. My most recent calling, to serve in the United States House of Representatives, is to contribute to the healing and a return to civility to our nation.

A complaint to the TMB alleged that Gonzalez was falsely holding himself out as a physician and using the title “Dr.” in violation of:

• The Texas Medical Practice Act, and
• The Healing Art Identification Act, particularly Texas Occupations Code § 104.004.

The core factual dispute is not over what Gonzalez said—those statements are largely undisputed—but whether TMB may treat such campaign speech as professional misrepresentation subject to medical regulation.

B. The Board’s Investigation and Cease-and-Desist Order

TMB opened an investigation to determine if Gonzalez’s campaign use of “Dr.” and “physician” constituted the unlicensed practice of medicine or unlawful title usage. After a hearing, TMB concluded that Gonzalez:

• Violated the Medical Practice Act and the Healing Art Identification Act, and
• Was improperly holding himself out as a physician.

TMB then issued a cease-and-desist order directing Gonzalez to:

• Stop using the titles “doctor,” “physician,” and “Dr.” (as in “Dr. Gonzalez”) unless he explicitly “designat[ed] the authority giving rise to those titles.”

In practice, this meant that if Gonzalez wanted to call himself “Dr. Gonzalez” or a “physician” in any campaign speech or material, he would be required to add clarifying language that he:

• Holds an M.D., but
• Is not licensed to practice medicine in Texas.

TMB warned that each violation of the order would carry civil penalties of up to $5,000.

Gonzalez sought rehearing, which was overruled by operation of law. Eighty-one days after the order became final, he filed suit in Travis County District Court.

C. Gonzalez’s Claims in the District Court

Gonzalez’s live petition asserted several theories that the Supreme Court sensibly grouped into four:

1. Substantial-Evidence Challenge: The cease-and-desist order was not supported by substantial evidence and was unlawful.
2. As-Applied Constitutional Challenge: Texas Occupations Code § 104.004 was unconstitutional as applied to him, because it unlawfully restricted his constitutionally protected speech.
3. Facial Constitutional Challenge: § 104.004 was unconstitutional on its face because it generally prohibits individuals with medical or other doctoral degrees from truthfully describing their education and training if they lack a license.
4. Ultra Vires Claim: TMB exceeded its statutory authority by regulating Gonzalez at all, because:
   • He is not licensed to practice medicine, and
   • He had neither practiced nor attempted to practice medicine in Texas.

As relief, Gonzalez requested, among other things:

• Reversal (or setting aside) of the cease-and-desist order,
• Declaratory relief that TMB exceeded its statutory authority,
• Temporary injunctive relief barring enforcement of the cease-and-desist order, and
• “Such other and further equitable relief to which the plaintiff is entitled both at law and in equity.”

D. Lower Courts’ Rulings

1. District Court

The district court dismissed all claims for want of jurisdiction, agreeing with TMB that Gonzalez’s action was barred (for the most part) by the redundant-remedies doctrine and/or untimely under the APA.

2. Court of Appeals

The Third Court of Appeals (Austin) largely affirmed, reported at 716 S.W.3d 664 (Tex. App.—Austin 2023), but with one important exception:

• It held that Gonzalez’s facial constitutional challenge to § 104.004 was not barred by the redundant-remedies doctrine, because a declaration that the statute is facially unconstitutional would “go beyond reversal” of the particular order.
• It concluded, however, that his as-applied constitutional claim and his ultra vires claim were barred as redundant, because they could have been litigated via APA judicial review of the cease-and-desist order.
• It treated the cease-and-desist proceeding as a “contested case” under the APA, triggering the 30-day deadline for judicial review in Tex. Gov’t Code § 2001.176(a), which Gonzalez had missed.

The court of appeals thus:

• Affirmed dismissal of most claims, but
• Reversed and remanded only the facial challenge.

Gonzalez petitioned for review; TMB did not file a cross-petition. The Supreme Court therefore reviewed only those aspects of the decision adverse to Gonzalez.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Opinion

A. Holdings

Justice Sullivan, writing for the Court (Justice Hawkins not participating), held:

1. The redundant-remedies doctrine did not bar Gonzalez’s ultra vires and as-applied constitutional claims. Even though he could have raised the same issues in an APA proceeding, the remedies available under the APA (reversal of the particular order) are narrower than the prospective declaratory and injunctive relief he sought in his UDJA-based suit.
2. The substantial-evidence claim was properly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Gonzalez disclaimed reliance on the APA and instead argued that a TMB rule created an independent right to judicial review with no deadline. The Court held that:
   • Judicial review of agency action exists only if authorized by statute or required by the constitution, and
   • An agency rule cannot itself confer that jurisdiction.
3. Remand was required for three claims:
   • Gonzalez’s facial constitutional challenge to § 104.004 (already remanded by the court of appeals),
   • His as-applied constitutional challenge, and
   • His ultra vires claim.

B. The Court’s Framing

Crucially, the Court emphasized what it was not deciding:

• It did not decide whether § 104.004 is constitutional, either facially or as applied.
• It did not decide whether TMB has statutory authority to regulate someone in Gonzalez’s position.
• It did not decide whether the cease-and-desist proceeding was, in fact, a “contested case” under the APA.

Instead, it opened the courthouse doors for those issues to be litigated on remand, concluding with a pointed remark:

If the Texas Medical Board thinks it has the power to police campaign speech, it will have to defend that position on the merits.

IV. Analysis

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. Serafine v. Branaman, 810 F.3d 354 (5th Cir. 2016)

The Court opens by situating this case next to Serafine v. Branaman, in which the Fifth Circuit held that the Texas State Board of Examiners of Psychologists violated a political candidate’s First Amendment rights by forbidding her from using the title “psychologist” in campaign communications.

The citation is marked “Cf.” and used not as binding authority on state law, but as a contextual reminder:

• Texas professional boards have recently pushed into the realm of campaign speech.
• At least one federal appellate court has been skeptical of such restrictions when they target political, not professional, contexts.

The TMB itself acknowledged this case as the first time it had disciplined someone for campaign speech. The Court’s decision to flag Serafine early signals that the First Amendment stakes of Gonzalez’s challenge are serious, even though the Court ultimately does not reach those issues.

2. Patel v. Texas Department of Licensing & Regulation, 469 S.W.3d 69 (Tex. 2015)

Patel is the key precedent on the redundant-remedies doctrine and UDJA challenges to agency action. There, eyebrow-threading practitioners challenged onerous licensing requirements as unconstitutional. The state argued that their UDJA claims were barred because they could have sought review of enforcement proceedings under the APA. The Supreme Court rejected that argument:

The available remedies on appeal from an administrative finding are limited to reversal of the particular orders at issue.

Because the Patel plaintiffs sought:

• A declaration that the statutes were unconstitutional, and
• Prospective injunctive relief against future enforcement,

the Court held that the APA did not provide a “redundant remedy” sufficient to bar a UDJA action.

In Gonzalez’s case, the Court relies heavily on Patel to clarify that:

• The focus of the redundant-remedies doctrine is on the scope of the remedy, not the overlap in legal theories.
• A litigant is not barred from pursuing a UDJA claim merely because the same constitutional or statutory issues could have been raised in a timely APA review.

3. City of Corpus Christi v. Public Utility Commission, 51 S.W.3d 231 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam)

The Court cites City of Corpus Christi primarily to illustrate that constitutional claims—including facial constitutional challenges—may be raised in the context of APA judicial review of contested cases. Under Tex. Gov’t Code § 2001.174(2)(A), a court may reverse or remand an agency decision that is “in violation of a constitutional or statutory provision.”

This is important because it undercuts the court of appeals’ rationale. If the mere ability to raise constitutional arguments in an APA proceeding were enough to trigger the redundant-remedies doctrine, then:

• Gonzalez’s facial challenge would have been barred as well, since it too could have been asserted in an APA petition, and
• The court of appeals’ own rationale for remanding the facial challenge would collapse.

The Supreme Court uses this to illustrate the error in focusing on “could-have-raised-the-issue” rather than whether the APA affords the same breadth of relief.

4. Jones v. Turner, 646 S.W.3d 319 (Tex. 2022)

Jones is cited to underscore the remedial focus of the redundant-remedies doctrine. The Court notes that plaintiffs might seek relief that would render a declaratory judgment “redundant and thus improper,” reinforcing that redundancy is assessed at the level of remedy rather than claims.

5. King Street Patriots v. Texas Democratic Party, 521 S.W.3d 729 (Tex. 2017)

Cited in a footnote, King Street Patriots articulates the usual judicial practice of resolving as-applied challenges before facial challenges. The Court notes that the court of appeals’ limited remand of only the facial challenge would have put the district court in an awkward procedural posture, forcing it to decide a facial challenge without first considering how the statute operates in the plaintiff’s particular circumstances.

By remanding both the as-applied and facial challenges, the Court restores the usual sequence and avoids premature broad constitutional rulings.

6. City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366 (Tex. 2009)

Heinrich governs ultra vires suits in Texas. It holds that:

• Ultra vires claims may be brought to restrain state officers from acting beyond their lawful authority, but
• They must be brought against state actors in their official capacities, not against the state or agency itself.

The Court cites Heinrich to make a practical point: because TMB did not file a cross-petition for review, the case is already returning to the district court, where Gonzalez:

• Will be free to amend his petition, and
• Can add ultra vires defendants in their official capacities, as Heinrich requires.

7. Continental Casualty Insurance Co. v. Functional Restoration Associates, 19 S.W.3d 393 (Tex. 2000)

Continental provides the core jurisdictional rule:

[T]here is no right to judicial review of an administrative order unless a statute provides a right or unless the order ... violates a constitutional right.

It also makes clear that:

[A]n agency's rulemaking power cannot validly expand or create district court jurisdiction beyond that given in the Legislature's own enactments.

Gonzalez attempted to ground his substantial-evidence challenge in an administrative rule (former 22 Tex. Admin. Code § 187.83(f)) that referred to judicial review of cease-and-desist orders in Travis County. By invoking Continental, the Court holds that:

• A rule cannot be the source of subject-matter jurisdiction,
• Gonzalez needed to identify a statute authorizing judicial review, and
• Because he did not—and expressly disclaimed reliance on the APA—the district court lacked jurisdiction over the substantial-evidence claim.

8. Chemical Bank & Trust Co. v. Falkner, 369 S.W.2d 427 (Tex. 1963)

The Court notes that it need not consider whether Gonzalez might have some inherent constitutional right to judicial review of the order because Gonzalez did not raise that argument. It cites Chemical Bank as one of the foundational authorities on the possibility of constitutionally compelled review, but explicitly leaves that doctrine untouched here.

9. Academic Commentary on “Contested Cases”

The Court references an early law review article—Robert W. Hamilton & J. J. Jewett III, “The Administrative Procedure and Texas Register Act: Contested Cases and Judicial Review,” 54 Tex. L. Rev. 285 (1976)—to suggest that the statutory definition of “contested case” under the APA likely refers to:

• Adjudicative hearings that the legislature has required, not merely hearings an agency chooses to hold as a matter of discretion.

The Court stops short of deciding whether TMB’s cease-and-desist proceeding here was, in fact, a “contested case,” because that question becomes unnecessary once it holds the claim fails for lack of statutory authorization independent of the APA.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. The Redundant-Remedies Doctrine: “Not the Redundant-Claims Doctrine”

The central doctrinal move of the opinion is to correct the court of appeals’ misapplication of the redundant-remedies doctrine.

Under Texas law, the UDJA cannot be used to obtain a declaration that merely duplicates the relief available through a statutory review scheme such as the APA. The doctrine prevents parties from:

• Evading procedural limits (like deadlines) in a specific review statute by repackaging the same challenge as a UDJA claim; or
• Multiplying litigation unnecessarily where a single statutory review path suffices.

The court of appeals reasoned that because Gonzalez could have raised his as-applied and ultra vires arguments in a timely APA petition (within 30 days), his later UDJA action was barred. The Supreme Court responds that this:

misapprehends the nature of the redundant-remedies doctrine. ... [I]t doesn’t matter whether Gonzalez could’ve brought the same claims. What matters is whether the APA would've afforded him the same remedy—that's why we call it the redundant-remedies doctrine, not the redundant-claims doctrine.

This is the key doctrinal clarification—and the best candidate for the “new” or sharpened legal principle in the case:

• Redundancy is about remedies, not legal theories. A later declaratory or injunctive action is barred only if the statutory review scheme provides relief of comparable breadth and effect.
• The APA is narrow in remedy. Under Tex. Gov’t Code § 2001.174, APA review of a contested case allows a court to:
  • Affirm,
  • Reverse, or
  • Remand
  a specific agency order. It does not provide broad prospective relief insulating the plaintiff from future enforcement.

Because Gonzalez’s UDJA action seeks:

• Declarations about TMB’s authority to regulate him at all (ultra vires), and
• Declarations that enforcing § 104.004 against his campaign speech would violate his constitutional rights (as applied),

those remedies extend beyond the mere reversal of a single cease-and-desist order. They would define and limit TMB’s future conduct toward Gonzalez and, potentially, others similarly situated.

2. Interpreting Gonzalez’s Petition: Beyond the Single Order

The Court also disagrees with the court of appeals’ narrow reading of Gonzalez’s pleadings. The lower court viewed all but the facial challenge as attacks on the particular cease-and-desist order. The Supreme Court reads the petition more broadly:

[Gonzalez] also sought declaratory and injunctive relief on the grounds that the agency lacked statutory authority to regulate non-licensees and that even if the relevant statutes empowered TMB to act as it did, those statutes are unconstitutional as applied to him. The plain thrust of both claims is that TMB could not legally take any adverse action based on Gonzalez's describing himself as a "physician" and "doctor" in the course of his campaign.

And further:

A declaration that the statutes do not apply to Gonzalez would protect him from future sanctions, not just from the cease-and-desist order. The same is true of a declaration that it would violate Gonzalez's constitutional rights for TMB to punish him for calling himself a doctor or physician.

Thus, his ultra vires and as-applied claims—like his facial challenge—are inherently prospective. They seek to define the permissible scope of TMB’s future regulation of his campaign speech, not only to undo a single past enforcement decision.

3. Substantial-Evidence Claim and the Limits of Agency-Created Review

For the substantial-evidence challenge, the Court takes a more formal jurisdictional route. Gonzalez:

• Insists that he is not invoking the APA, and
• Instead relies on a former TMB rule, 22 Tex. Admin. Code § 187.83(f) (since repealed), which stated that a person aggrieved by a cease-and-desist order could seek judicial review in Travis County District Court.

He argues that this rule created a right of judicial review with no applicable deadline. The Court rejects that position:

• Under Continental, judicial review exists only if:
  • A statute expressly authorizes it, or
  • The constitution requires it.
• An agency rule has no independent power to confer or expand a district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.
• Because Gonzalez:
  • Disclaims the APA as the source of jurisdiction, and
  • Does not argue for an inherent constitutional right to review of this order,
  his substantial-evidence claim has no jurisdictional foundation.

Consequently, the district court properly dismissed the substantial-evidence claim for want of jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court affirms that portion of the court of appeals’ judgment—albeit on a simpler ground than the lower court employed.

4. “Contested Case” and the Unanswered Question

The court of appeals went through a detailed analysis to classify the TMB proceeding as a “contested case” under the APA, largely because the Board in fact held a hearing. The Supreme Court notes that:

• There is some evidence—supported by scholarly commentary—that “contested case” should be limited to proceedings where the legislature requires an adjudicative hearing, not where an agency voluntarily chooses to provide one.
• The parties disagreed below on this point.

But the Court deliberately sidesteps the issue:

While the parties here disagree whether the cease-and-desist proceedings constituted a "contested case," we need not resolve this issue for the reasons discussed below.

Once it concludes that no statute outside the APA authorizes judicial review, and Gonzalez has disclaimed the APA, the question whether the proceeding was a “contested case” becomes moot for purposes of his substantial-evidence claim.

5. Pleading Flexibility and Amendment on Remand

At oral argument, TMB contended that Gonzalez’s live petition contained no explicit request for prospective constitutional relief (e.g., a specific prayer for injunction against future enforcement based on his speech).

The Court responds in a measured way:

• It notes that under Texas practice, a general prayer for “such other and further relief” may support whatever relief the pleadings and evidence warrant.
• It emphasizes that because TMB did not cross-petition, at least the facial challenge is already headed back to the district court.
• It agrees with the State that Gonzalez will be free to amend his petition on remand to:
  • Clarify his claims for prospective relief, and
  • Add appropriate defendants in their official capacities for an ultra vires suit, as Heinrich requires.

This signals a practical, plaintiff-friendly approach: the Supreme Court is willing to ensure that the procedural gatekeeping doctrines (like redundant remedies and jurisdiction) do not bar a litigant from having his constitutional and ultra vires claims heard on the merits, so long as the basic UDJA/ultra vires framework is followed.

C. Likely Impact on Future Cases and Areas of Law

1. Administrative Law and the UDJA

Clarification of the redundant-remedies doctrine is the most immediate and concrete impact:

• Litigants who missed an APA deadline or choose not to invoke the APA now have clearer guidance on when they may still seek declaratory and injunctive relief:
  • If they only want reversal of a specific order, the APA is likely exclusive (and time-bound).
  • If they seek broader, prospective relief—such as a declaration that a statute is invalid, unconstitutional, or inapplicable, and an injunction against future enforcement—UDJA and ultra vires claims are not automatically barred just because the same issues could have been presented in an APA appeal.
• Agencies can still invoke redundant-remedies as a defense, but they must show that:
  • The statutory review scheme offers relief that is essentially coextensive with what the UDJA/ultra vires suit seeks, not merely that similar arguments could have been raised earlier.

As a result, one should expect:

• More UDJA and ultra vires suits that:
  • Challenge the scope of agency authority, and
  • Seek forward-looking, structural relief rather than only reversal of individual orders.
• Increased judicial scrutiny of whether agencies may use procedural doctrines to foreclose constitutional challenges by pointing to missed APA deadlines.

2. Agency Power to Create Judicial Review

The reaffirmation of Continental is significant in its own right:

• Agencies sometimes promulgate rules referencing “judicial review” without explicit legislative authorization, or with unclear interaction with the APA.
• This opinion makes clear that such rules:
  • Cannot themselves grant jurisdiction to the courts that the legislature has not provided, and
  • Cannot circumvent statutory deadlines and conditions (like the APA’s 30-day filing requirement) unless grounded in statute or constitutional mandate.

Practically, agencies must ensure that any references to judicial review in their rules are:

• Firmly anchored in statutes, and
• Consistent with the APA and other jurisdictional provisions.

3. Free Speech and the Regulation of Professional Titles in Political Campaigns

Although the Court declines to decide the First Amendment and Texas free-speech issues, its framing is notable:

• The opinion begins and ends by emphasizing that this is, fundamentally, a case about campaign speech, not traditional doctor–patient interactions or deceptive medical practice.
• It highlights that TMB has never before disciplined a candidate for statements on the campaign trail.
• It cites Serafine, a federal case that invalidated a similar restriction on a campaign-use professional title.

These signals collectively suggest that:

• The Court is skeptical of professional boards extending their regulatory reach into core political speech, especially when the individual:
  • Holds the academic or professional degree referenced (here, an M.D.), and
  • Is candidly speaking about background and calling, rather than offering clinical services.
• On remand, the free-speech claims (both under the First Amendment and Article I, Section 8 of the Texas Constitution) will likely face searching scrutiny, with Serafine as a powerful analog for Gonzalez’s position.

The opinion thus lays the groundwork for a potentially important substantive ruling on the intersection of professional regulation and political expression, though that ruling will come, if at all, from the district court and any subsequent appeals.

4. Litigation Strategy and Pleading Practice

The opinion also has practical implications for how lawyers plead and structure challenges to agency action:

• Plaintiffs should:
  • Explicitly request prospective relief (declaratory and injunctive) when they seek to reshape or limit an agency’s future enforcement posture, and
  • Name appropriate officials in their official capacities for ultra vires claims.
• Agencies defending such suits will need to:
  • Argue that the statutory review mechanism is not only adequate to address the issues, but adequate in the scope of relief as compared to what the UDJA action seeks, and
  • Demonstrate that a UDJA judgment would truly be redundant, not merely analogous.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Redundant-Remedies Doctrine

The redundant-remedies doctrine prevents a plaintiff from using the UDJA to obtain relief that is:

• Functionally the same as relief available through a more specific statute’s review mechanism (like APA review), and
• Thus “redundant” in terms of judicial outcome.

Key points:

• It is not about whether the same legal arguments could be raised; it is about whether the same legal relief is available.
• If statutory review can only reverse or remand a particular order, but the plaintiff seeks:
  • A declaration that the statute is unconstitutional, or
  • An injunction against future enforcement,
  then the UDJA suit is not redundant.

2. Facial vs. As-Applied Constitutional Challenges

A facial challenge argues that a statute is unconstitutional in all (or almost all) of its applications. The statute is said to be invalid “on its face,” regardless of how it is applied in a particular case.

An as-applied challenge accepts that the statute may be valid generally but asserts that, under the specific facts and circumstances of the plaintiff’s situation, its application violates constitutional rights.

Courts usually:

• Resolve as-applied challenges first, because they are fact-specific and narrower,
• Turn to facial challenges only if necessary and appropriate, given the broader and more disruptive impact of facial invalidation.

3. Ultra Vires Claims

“Ultra vires” is Latin for “beyond the powers.” An ultra vires suit alleges that a state official is acting outside the bounds of authority granted by statute or constitution.

In Texas:

• Ultra vires suits can proceed despite sovereign immunity because they are treated as suits to compel officials to comply with existing law, not as suits against the State itself.
• They must be brought against state officers in their official capacities, not the agency as such.
• They typically seek declaratory and injunctive relief to stop or prevent unauthorized conduct.

4. Substantial-Evidence Review

Substantial-evidence review is a deferential standard courts use when reviewing certain agency decisions. The question is not whether the agency made the “best” decision, but whether there is:

• More than a scintilla of evidence that reasonably supports the agency’s findings and conclusions, and
• A rational connection between the evidence and the decision.

Even if the court might have weighed the evidence differently, it will uphold the decision if it is supported by substantial evidence in the record.

5. “Contested Case” Under the APA

The Texas APA defines a “contested case” as:

a proceeding, including a ratemaking or licensing proceeding, in which the legal rights, duties, or privileges of a party are to be determined by a state agency after an opportunity for adjudicative hearing.

Whether a hearing is “adjudicative” in the APA sense—and whether the legislature requires that hearing—matters because:

• Only “contested cases” are entitled to full APA procedural protections and judicial review, and
• APA judicial review comes with specific deadlines and standards.

6. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction and Agency Rules

Subject-matter jurisdiction refers to a court’s power to hear a certain type of case. Under Texas law:

• Only the constitution and statutes can confer subject-matter jurisdiction on courts.
• Agencies cannot, by their own rules, enlarge or create jurisdiction.
• If a lawsuit lacks a statutory (or constitutional) basis for judicial review of an agency action, the court must dismiss for want of jurisdiction.

VI. Conclusion

Gonzalez v. Texas Medical Board is, at this stage, a procedural decision with significant substantive implications. The Supreme Court of Texas did not decide whether Texas’s restrictions on the use of “doctor” and “physician” by non-licensed candidates violate free-speech protections or exceed the Medical Board’s statutory powers. Instead, it ensured that those questions can be fully litigated.

The opinion’s enduring contribution is twofold:

1. It sharpens and reinforces the principle, rooted in Patel, that the redundant-remedies doctrine focuses on the remedies available, not merely on the overlap of issues. A UDJA action is not barred simply because the same claims could have been aired in an APA appeal; it is barred only when the statutory scheme provides equally broad relief.
2. It reaffirms that agencies cannot manufacture judicial review by rule. Absent statutory authorization or a constitutional mandate, a court has no jurisdiction to undertake substantial-evidence review of an agency order, no matter what an administrative rule says.

These holdings preserve an important avenue for Texans to challenge the constitutionality of regulatory schemes and the legality of agency actions, particularly where those actions intersect with fundamental rights like free speech in elections. The case now returns to the district court, where Gonzalez’s facial and as-applied constitutional challenges and his ultra vires claim will test the limits of the Texas Medical Board’s authority to “police campaign speech”—a matter with implications well beyond this single congressional race.