“Reinforcing Objectivity”: Eleventh Circuit Clarifies the “Substantial-Evidence” Standard for Aesthetic Denials under the Telecommunications Act

Introduction

In Gulfstream Towers, LLC v. Brevard County (11th Cir. Aug. 13, 2025), the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit revisited the thorny question of how far local governments may rely on aesthetic concerns when denying zoning approval for wireless communications facilities. Gulfstream sought a conditional use permit (“CUP”) to construct a 120-foot monopole that complied with every objective siting criterion in Brevard County’s code. The County Board, swayed by citizen testimony describing the tower as an “eyesore,” unanimously rejected the application. Gulfstream sued under § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii) of the Federal Telecommunications Act of 1996 (“TCA”), which requires that denials be “in writing and supported by substantial evidence.”

The district court granted summary judgment to Gulfstream, invalidated the County’s resolution, and ordered permit issuance. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that generalized aesthetic objections, unaccompanied by objective or expert evidence, cannot satisfy the TCA’s substantial-evidence requirement. The decision tightens the evidentiary screws on localities and clarifies that courts may not rummage through an administrative record to salvage a defective written decision.

Summary of the Judgment

• Issue: Whether Brevard County’s denial, based solely on aesthetic compatibility, was supported by “substantial evidence” under 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii); and whether the district court improperly confined its review to the Board’s stated reasons.
• Holding: The County’s denial failed the substantial-evidence test because the record contained only subjective aesthetic opinions and un-interpreted photo simulations. The Eleventh Circuit also rejected the County’s invitation to uphold the decision on alternative grounds not articulated in its written resolution.
• Disposition: Affirmed. The district court properly ordered approval of the CUP.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Preferred Sites, LLC v. Troup County, 296 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2002) – Set the Eleventh Circuit benchmark that “mere generalized concerns regarding aesthetics” cannot constitute substantial evidence. Gulfstream re-affirms and applies this rule.
• Michael Linet, Inc. v. Village of Wellington, 408 F.3d 757 (11th Cir. 2005) – Clarified that aesthetics may matter when paired with objective proof (e.g., property-value studies). The court distinguished Linet, finding none of those objective indicia here.
• T-Mobile South, LLC v. City of Roswell, 574 U.S. 293 (2015) – Requires localities to give written reasons sufficient for judicial review and prohibits post-hoc rationalizations. The panel borrowed Roswell’s rationale to reject Brevard County’s bid to rely on uncited record snippets.
• Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938) – Classic definition of “substantial evidence,” adopted again as the governing yardstick.
• SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943) – Forbids appellate courts from validating administrative action on grounds not invoked by the agency. Reinforced the court’s refusal to comb through the record.

2. Legal Reasoning of the Court

1. Defining the Evidentiary Threshold
   The court reiterated that “substantial evidence” under the TCA demands “more than a mere scintilla” but may be less than a preponderance. Crucially, the evidence must be “objective and fact-based.” Citizen remarks characterizing a tower as ugly do not cross that threshold.
2. Evaluating the County’s Two Proffered Grounds
   • Citizen Testimony – The panel equated bare assertions of ugliness to “generalized aesthetic concerns,” explicitly disallowed by Preferred Sites.
   • Photo Simulations – While photographic evidence can be objective, it becomes probative only when accompanied by expert analysis or comparative data. Here the simulations were never analyzed or relied upon by the Board, so they remained “silent pictures” incapable of bearing evidentiary weight.
3. Prohibition on Post-Hoc Rationalization
   Citing Roswell and Chenery, the court stressed that judicial review is confined to the reasons actually given by the decisionmaker. Because Resolution 23-144 identified only compatibility and aesthetics, the County could not resurrect the denial by pointing to other portions of the administrative file.
4. Standard of Review
   The court conducted de novo review of the district court’s summary judgment rulings but applied “substantial evidence” as a deferential test to the County’s findings. Even under that deferential lens, the record failed.

3. Impact of the Decision

The decision cements a bright-line within the Eleventh Circuit: local governments must marshal objective, quantified, or expert evidence linking a proposed wireless facility to concrete harms beyond mere displeasure of the eye. Consequences include:

• Local zoning boards must augment aesthetic concerns with data—e.g., property-value studies, expert visual-impact analyses, or safety testimony.
• Written resolutions must clearly cite the supporting evidence; silence or boilerplate assertions will not survive judicial scrutiny.
• Telecommunications providers are armed with a clearer litigation roadmap, likely reducing forum shopping and promoting faster deployment of 5G/6G infrastructure.
• The ruling may influence other circuits wrestling with similar TCA disputes, contributing to a national trend toward stricter objectivity requirements.
• Practically, municipalities may opt for negotiated design solutions (stealth structures, alternative siting) rather than risk litigation they are now more likely to lose.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Substantial Evidence: Think of it as the “Goldilocks amount” of proof—not too little (a mere hunch) and not a full-blown jury-worthy case. It must be reliable enough that a reasonable person would accept it.
• Generalized Aesthetic Concerns: Subjective complaints (“It’s ugly” or “It ruins the view”) without measurable data (e.g., surveys, expert reports).
• Post-Hoc Rationalization: Arguments invented after the fact to defend a decision. Courts won’t allow agencies to change their story on appeal.
• Conditional Use Permit (CUP): A zoning permission granted for land uses that are conditionally allowed if they meet specified standards.

Conclusion

Gulfstream Towers v. Brevard County fortifies the jurisprudential wall separating legitimate, evidence-based zoning denials from those grounded in subjective taste. By aligning itself closely with Preferred Sites and Roswell, the Eleventh Circuit underscores that the Telecommunications Act’s substantial-evidence mandate is not a formality but a substantive safeguard for nationwide wireless deployment. Going forward, local governments in the Eleventh Circuit must furnish empirical support—be it expert testimony, property-value analyses, or safety studies—whenever aesthetics are invoked. The case thus stands as a cautionary tale: if a tower is to be rejected, the evidence must stand taller than the tower itself.