The Third Court of Appeals had remanded only the facial challenge to § 104.004, creating the danger that a district court would have to adjudicate the broader issue while being precluded from considering the narrower as-applied claim. The Supreme Court implicitly corrects that distortion by sending back both, aligning remand procedure with the usual as-applied-then-facial sequence.

D. City of Corpus Christi v. Public Utility Commission, 51 S.W.3d 231 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam)

The Court cites City of Corpus Christi to show that even facial constitutional challenges can be raised in an APA proceeding. There, the Court considered a facial constitutional challenge during judicial review of a contested-case proceeding.

This citation is strategically important: it undercuts the notion that a claim is “non-redundant” merely because it is a facial challenge. Since even facial challenges can be litigated in APA appeals, the real distinction must lie in the remedy sought, not in the type of constitutional theory asserted. That supports the Court’s move from a “redundant-claims” to a “redundant-remedies” analysis.

E. Jones v. Turner, 646 S.W.3d 319 (Tex. 2022)

Jones is cited for the proposition that a declaratory judgment action is improper only when “plaintiffs could be awarded relief that would render a declaratory judgment redundant and thus improper” (emphasis added).

This reinforces the remedial focus: redundancy is about whether another avenue already provides equivalent relief, not about hypothetical overlap in legal theories.

F. City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366 (Tex. 2009)

Heinrich is the leading Texas case on ultra vires suits and sovereign immunity. It holds that:

• Ultra vires claims challenging a state official’s actions beyond statutory authority must be brought against the official in his or her official capacity, not against the state or agency as such.
• Sovereign immunity does not bar suits seeking to restrain state officials from acting without legal authority.

In Gonzalez, the Court cites Heinrich to:

• Clarify that ultra vires suits remain a viable mechanism to challenge agency overreach.
• Signal that, on remand, Gonzalez may need to amend his pleadings to name appropriate officials rather than the Board as an entity.

This emphasizes that the ultra vires pathway is one of the key vehicles through which Gonzalez can contest TMB’s authority to regulate his campaign speech.

G. “Contested Case” Precedent: Vazquez and Heat Energy Advanced Tech., and the Hamilton & Jewett Article

The court of appeals had reasoned that the TMB proceeding was a “contested case” under the APA simply because the agency chose to provide an adjudicative hearing, relying on:

• Vazquez v. Health & Human Servs. Comm’n, No. 03‑20‑00075‑CV, 2021 WL 3176031 (Tex. App.—Austin 2021, pet. denied); and
• Heat Energy Advanced Tech., Inc. v. W. Dallas Coalition for Environmental Justice, 962 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, pet. denied).

Those decisions stand for the proposition that a proceeding may be a “contested case” if the agency in fact provides an adjudicative hearing, even if not statutorily required.

The Supreme Court notes contrary evidence in the academic commentary by Hamilton and Jewett, who argued that “contested case” likely referred to hearings mandated by statute, not voluntarily provided hearings. By referencing this debate but declining to resolve it, the Court leaves open the doctrinal question of what counts as a “contested case” under Tex. Gov’t Code § 2001.003(1). It ultimately does not need to decide the issue because it resolves the substantial-evidence claim on pure jurisdictional grounds (no statutory authorization independent of the APA).

H. Continental Casualty Ins. Co. v. Functional Restoration Associates, 19 S.W.3d 393 (Tex. 2000), and Chemical Bank & Trust Co. v. Falkner, 369 S.W.2d 427 (Tex. 1963)

These cases establish that:

• There is no inherent right to judicial review of an administrative order.
• Such review must be grounded either in a statute or in constitutional compulsion.
• An agency cannot, by rule, create or expand district-court jurisdiction beyond what the Legislature has provided.

Continental is cited to refute Gonzalez’s reliance on a TMB rule as a purported grant of jurisdiction. The Court underscores that rulemaking power cannot enlarge judicial power: if the Legislature has not authorized review, an agency cannot do so on its own initiative.

Chemical Bank is invoked to note that Gonzalez did not argue for a constitutionally compelled right to judicial review in this setting, so that potential avenue remains unaddressed.

I. Starr v. Ferguson, 166 S.W.2d 130 (Tex. 1942) and Tex. R. App. P. 53.1

The Court briefly cites Starr for the familiar proposition that under a general prayer for relief, a court may award whatever relief the pleadings and evidence support. This is relevant because:

• Gonzalez’s live petition included a broad request for “such other and further equitable relief” without a specifically labelled prospective constitutional claim.
• The Court notes it need not decide whether that generic prayer sufficed to plead a claim for prospective relief, because on remand Gonzalez will have the opportunity to amend his petition.

Tex. R. App. P. 53.1 is mentioned to explain that TMB’s failure to file a cross-petition for review means that the part of the court of appeals’ judgment remanding the facial challenge stands. That procedural detail locks in the facial challenge’s return to district court and sets the stage for Gonzalez to refine his pleadings in light of Heinrich and related doctrines.

IV. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Reframing the Redundant-Remedies Doctrine: Remedies vs. Claims

At the heart of the opinion is a conceptual shift: the Court explicitly rejects a “redundant-claims” approach in favor of a “redundant-remedies” approach.

1. The Court of Appeals’ Error

The Third Court of Appeals held that Gonzalez’s ultra vires and as-applied constitutional claims were barred because:

• He could have brought them in a timely APA proceeding.
• Therefore, his UDJA and ultra vires actions sought “redundant” relief.

It allowed his facial challenge because that claim, in its view, necessarily went “beyond reversal” of the cease-and-desist order.

2. The Supreme Court’s Recharacterization of the Petition

Justice Sullivan first corrects what he calls the court of appeals’ “unfairly cramped interpretation” of Gonzalez’s live petition. The lower court read all non-facial claims as challenging only the order itself. The Supreme Court reads the petition more broadly:

• The ultra vires claim asserts that TMB lacks statutory authority to regulate non-licensees like Gonzalez in this context at all.
• The as-applied constitutional claim asserts that any attempt by TMB to sanction his truthful use of “doctor” or “physician” in campaign speech would violate his free-speech rights.

Under that reading, these claims seek:

• Prospective protection for Gonzalez’s ongoing and future campaign speech, not just invalidation of a single past order.
• Declaratory relief that would bind TMB’s future conduct, protecting him from future sanctions if he continues to use the titles.

On this view, the ultra vires and as-applied claims are materially indistinguishable in scope from the facial claim in terms of their forward-looking effect. All three go “beyond reversal” of the cease-and-desist order.

3. The Remedy-Based Test

Having re-characterized the claims, the Court then refocuses the redundant-remedies inquiry:

• The key question is not whether Gonzalez could have pressed the same arguments in an APA appeal.
• The relevant question is whether APA review could have afforded him the same relief he now seeks under the UDJA and ultra vires doctrines.

Citing Patel, the Court underscores that APA judicial review remedies are “limited to reversal of the particular orders at issue.” An APA court cannot, in that proceeding:

• Issue broad prospective injunctions against future enforcement.
• Enter general declarations about the statute’s scope as applied to future conduct, separate from the agency order under review.

Therefore, an APA proceeding could not have afforded Gonzalez the same remedy—ongoing declaratory and injunctive relief insulating future campaign speech—that he now seeks. The remedies are not redundant, even if the legal arguments substantially overlap.

B. Ultra Vires and As-Applied Claims as Structural Checks on Agency Overreach

By reviving the ultra vires and as-applied challenges, the Court reinforces the role of these doctrines as systemic checks on agency exercise of power:

• Ultra vires claims test whether the agency acts within the bounds of its statutory mission and authority. Here, whether TMB can regulate titles used by a non-licensee engaged solely in political campaigning.
• As-applied constitutional claims test whether the statute, even if valid on its face, is unconstitutional in the specific way it is enforced against the plaintiff’s actual conduct.

If successful, these claims would yield relief that:

• Prevents TMB from asserting comparable authority over Gonzalez in future campaigns.
• Potentially clarifies the permissible limits of TMB’s enforcement power with respect to non-licensees and political speech more generally.

C. Jurisdiction and the Limits of Agency Rulemaking

1. Gonzalez’s Strategy and Its Consequences

On the substantial-evidence claim, Gonzalez took an unusual tack: rather than arguing that the APA governed and that his petition for judicial review was timely under its 30-day deadline, he disclaimed the APA altogether. He contended instead that:

• TMB had promulgated a rule (since repealed) expressly granting a right of judicial review of cease-and-desist orders in Travis County district court.
• That rule contained no deadline for seeking review, so his petition was timely.

This strategy was likely designed to avoid the APA’s 30-day filing deadline, which had clearly passed.

2. The Court’s Jurisdictional Analysis

The Court sidesteps the intricate question whether the cease-and-desist proceeding was a “contested case” for APA purposes. Instead, it rests on the solid jurisdictional ground that:

• Judicial review of agency decisions exists only when:
  • A statute expressly provides for review; or
  • Review is constitutionally required.
• An agency rule by itself cannot grant or expand subject-matter jurisdiction.

Because Gonzalez:

• Did not premise jurisdiction on the APA or any statute;
• Relied solely on the TMB rule; and
• Did not claim that the Constitution itself compelled judicial review of the order,

the Court holds that the district court lacked jurisdiction over his substantial-evidence claim. The attempted end-run around statutory deadlines via agency rule is rejected as a matter of separation of powers.

D. Recognition of Free-Speech Stakes Without Deciding the Merits

While the opinion is ostensibly procedural, its framing is unmistakably attentive to the First Amendment context:

• It foregrounds the novelty of TMB’s attempt to reach political campaign speech.
• It references Serafine, a case invalidating a similar campaign-title restriction on First Amendment grounds.
• It emphasizes the importance of giving Gonzalez a chance to obtain prospective relief to continue his political speech without threat of sanctions.
• It closes with a pointed statement that if TMB believes it can police campaign speech, it must defend that position “on the merits.”

The Court thus ensures that the constitutional contest over campaign speech and professional titles will not be short-circuited by procedural doctrines like redundant remedies or APA deadlines, so long as plaintiffs seek genuinely broader, forward-looking relief.

V. Impact and Implications

A. Administrative Law and the UDJA: Broader Avenues for Prospective Relief

The most immediate doctrinal impact is on the relationship between:

• The Texas Administrative Procedure Act’s scheme for judicial review of “contested cases”; and
• The UDJA and ultra vires actions as alternative means to challenge state agency conduct.

After Gonzalez, the following principles are reinforced or sharpened:

• Availability of APA review does not automatically bar UDJA suits. The redundant-remedies doctrine bars UDJA actions only when the APA actually affords an equivalent remedy.
• Prospective, system-wide relief is distinct. When a plaintiff seeks forward-looking declarations or injunctions governing future enforcement, APA review of a past order typically is not a redundant remedy.
• Missed APA deadlines are not fatal to all forms of judicial redress. Although a late APA petition cannot be revived via UDJA, plaintiffs may still pursue prospective relief aimed at restraining future unconstitutional or ultra vires enforcement, so long as they do not simply seek to repackage an untimely attempt to reverse a specific order.

This creates a clearer doctrinal path for litigants who:

• Have been subject to an agency order but failed to timely invoke APA review; and
• Are still at risk of future enforcement based on the same statutory or regulatory interpretation.

They may no longer attack that past order directly, but they can still seek prospective relief under the UDJA and ultra vires doctrines to clarify the legality of future conduct.

B. Sovereign Immunity and Ultra Vires Claims

The decision also strengthens the role of ultra vires suits as a mechanism to test the limits of agency authority:

• By allowing Gonzalez’s ultra vires claim to go forward, the Court affirms that sovereign immunity does not shield state officials from suits alleging that they are acting beyond statutory authority.
• This is particularly salient where an agency extends its regulatory reach to novel contexts, such as political campaigns by non-licensees.

On remand, the district court will need to:

• Determine the precise scope of TMB’s statutory authority under the Medical Practice Act and related statutes.
• Decide whether that authority legitimately extends to regulating the use of titles by a person with an M.D. who is not licensed and is not practicing or attempting to practice medicine, but is instead running for Congress.

A ruling in Gonzalez’s favor could significantly constrain TMB’s jurisdiction over non-licensees and clarify that campaign speech lies outside its enforcement orbit, at least where no actual practice of medicine is involved.

C. Professional Licensing Boards and Political Speech

Substantively, although the Court does not reach the First Amendment merits, its framing and remand posture have important consequences for professional licensing boards:

• Agencies should anticipate heightened judicial scrutiny when their enforcement actions target political campaign speech rather than commercial or professional practice contexts.
• The decision, read alongside Serafine, underscores that restrictions on truthful statements about one’s education and professional background made during campaigns may be particularly vulnerable under the First Amendment and Article I, § 8 of the Texas Constitution.
• Any regulatory attempt to impose disclaimers or prohibit the use of titles (such as “Dr.” or “physician”) in campaign materials may face substantial constitutional headwinds.

Moreover, professional boards will likely be more cautious about:

• Extending their enforcement jurisdiction to non-licensees based on campaign speech alone.
• Relying on occupational statutes designed for consumer protection in clinical or commercial settings to police political discourse in electoral campaigns.

D. Litigation Strategy: Drafting Petitions and Choosing Remedies

For practitioners, Gonzalez has several practical lessons:

• Plead prospectively, and plead clearly. To avoid redundant-remedies dismissals, a plaintiff should clearly articulate that the relief sought extends to future enforcement (e.g., declarations about ongoing conduct, injunctions against future sanctions).
• Distinguish between attacking the order and attacking the statute or authority. A direct challenge to an order (substantial-evidence review) is time-limited and must follow the APA where applicable; a broader ultra vires or constitutional challenge may proceed independently, especially if it seeks prospective protection.
• Name proper parties for ultra vires relief. Following Heinrich, suits must typically be brought against the state officials in their official capacity, not solely the agency as an entity.
• Be wary of overrelying on agency rules. Counsel should not assume that an agency rule can create jurisdiction; a statutory basis or constitutional rationale is required.

E. The Unresolved “Contested Case” Question

Because the Court declined to decide whether TMB’s cease-and-desist hearing was a “contested case” under the APA, a significant question remains open:

• Does an agency’s voluntary decision to hold a hearing convert a matter into a contested case, triggering APA judicial-review provisions?
• Or must the hearing be mandated by statute to qualify?

This unresolved issue will continue to affect how agencies design enforcement procedures and how courts assess the availability and timing of APA review. The Court’s citation of the Hamilton & Jewett article suggests some skepticism about equating every voluntary hearing with a contested case, but the doctrine remains unsettled.

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. The Redundant-Remedies Doctrine

The redundant-remedies doctrine is a judicial policy that prevents plaintiffs from using the UDJA or similar devices when the Legislature has already provided a specific, adequate, and exclusive avenue for relief.

In simple terms:

• If one statute (like the APA) already gives you a way to get the relief you want, you generally cannot use a separate declaratory-judgment action to get the same thing.

Gonzalez clarifies that courts must ask:

• “Does the alternative route (here, the APA) give the same remedy?” not just
• “Could I have raised the same legal issue there?”

If the remedies are materially different—for example, if the UDJA action seeks broad, ongoing protection for future conduct—then the remedies are not redundant, and the declaratory-judgment action can proceed.

B. Ultra Vires Actions

“Ultra vires” is Latin for “beyond the powers.” An ultra vires suit alleges that a government official is acting outside the legal authority granted by statute or constitution.

• If an official does something she has no legal power to do, courts can enjoin that conduct even though the official would normally be shielded by sovereign immunity.

In this case, Gonzalez argues that TMB exceeded its statutory authority by:

• Trying to regulate a non-licensed individual,
• Who is not practicing medicine,
• Based solely on his use of “Dr.” and “physician” in a political campaign.

If the district court ultimately agrees, it could declare that TMB has no authority to enforce its statutes in this manner against Gonzalez (and, by implication, similarly situated individuals).

C. Facial vs. As-Applied Constitutional Challenges

A facial challenge asserts that a statute is unconstitutional in every or almost every application—for example, “Section 104.004 is unconstitutional because it always prohibits truthful speech about one’s academic degrees.”

An as-applied challenge asserts that even if the statute might be valid in some settings, it is unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiff’s particular conduct—for example, “Section 104.004 is unconstitutional as applied when TMB uses it to punish a candidate who truthfully says he has an M.D. and calls himself ‘Dr.’ on the campaign trail.”

Courts generally:

• Prefer to resolve as-applied challenges first, because they are narrower and more tailored.
• Turn to facial challenges only if necessary, to avoid invalidating statutes more broadly than required.

D. Substantial-Evidence Review and “Contested Cases”

In Texas administrative law, a “contested case” is a type of proceeding that:

• Is typically required by law (statute) to be determined after an opportunity for an adjudicative hearing.
• Results in an “order” that can be reviewed under the APA.

“Substantial-evidence review” is the standard used by courts in APA appeals. It asks whether:

• The agency’s decision is reasonably supported by evidence that a reasonable person might accept as adequate,
• Even if the court might have reached a different conclusion as an original matter.

In Gonzalez, the Court does not decide whether the TMB proceeding was a “contested case.” Instead, it holds that:

• Because Gonzalez did not rely on the APA as his jurisdictional basis, and
• Because no statute otherwise authorized substantial-evidence review of this order,

the courts lack jurisdiction to entertain his substantial-evidence claim.

E. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction and Agency Rules

“Subject-matter jurisdiction” is the court’s legal authority to hear a particular type of case. In Texas:

• Only the Constitution or statutes can grant subject-matter jurisdiction.
• Administrative agencies, created by statute, cannot expand court jurisdiction by adopting rules.

Thus, even if an agency rule says, “You can appeal our orders to district court,” that promise is meaningless unless some statute also authorizes such an appeal. Gonzalez reinforces that principle by rejecting Gonzalez’s reliance on the TMB rule as a jurisdictional hook.

F. Cease-and-Desist Orders and Civil Penalties

A “cease-and-desist order” is an administrative command directing a person or entity to stop engaging in specified conduct, often under threat of penalties.

Here, TMB ordered Gonzalez to stop using the titles:

• “doctor,”
• “physician,” and
• “Dr.” (as in “Dr. Gonzalez”)

unless he disclosed the “authority” underlying those titles—effectively, that he has an M.D. but is not licensed to practice medicine. Noncompliance exposed him to civil penalties of $5,000 per violation.

The opinion leaves open whether such an order, when directed at political campaign speech, is consistent with free-speech guarantees. That question awaits resolution on remand.

VII. Conclusion

Gonzalez v. Texas Medical Board is, on its face, an administrative-law decision about jurisdiction and procedural doctrines. But its deeper significance lies in how it:

• Clarifies that the redundant-remedies doctrine turns on remedies, not merely overlapping claims.
• Preserves robust avenues—via the UDJA and ultra vires suits—for regulated individuals to seek prospective relief against agency overreach, even when APA review was available and not invoked in time.
• Reaffirms the constitutional and statutory limits on agency power: agencies cannot bootstrap judicial review into existence by rule, and they must defend novel expansions of their authority—especially in the politically sensitive domain of campaign speech—on the merits.

The decision ensures that Gonzalez will have his day in court to argue that:

• TMB lacks statutory authority to regulate his campaign references to himself as “Dr.” and “physician,” and/or
• Texas Occupations Code § 104.004, as applied to his truthful campaign speech, violates the First Amendment and Article I, § 8 of the Texas Constitution, and perhaps is invalid on its face.

Beyond the immediate parties, the ruling will influence:

• How Texas courts evaluate challenges to agency actions where statutory schemes intersect with constitutional rights.
• How professional licensing boards approach enforcement when their mandates cross into political and expressive domains.
• How litigants structure their pleadings and choose remedies in order to navigate sovereign immunity, the UDJA, and the APA effectively.

In sum, Gonzalez stands for the principle captured in its implicit subtitle: it is about “redundant remedies, not redundant claims.” That reframing both preserves legislative control over judicial-review schemes and safeguards the judiciary’s role in ensuring that agencies do not, under cover of professional regulation, impermissibly regulate core political speech.