“Reasonable, Not Specialized”: West Virginia Affirms that Child-Welfare Agencies Need Not Provide Specialized ADA Training When Accommodating Parents with Autism

Introduction

In In re E.K., S.C., and R.K., No. 24-63 (W. Va. June 26, 2025), the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia confronted the intersection of child-abuse/neglect law and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The petitioner–mother (O.K.), newly diagnosed with Level 1 Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), challenged the circuit court’s decision that:

• Adjudicated her for neglect of her three young children;
• Terminated her post-adjudicatory improvement period;
• Ultimately terminated her parental, custodial, and guardianship rights.

Central to her appeal were claims that (1) she should have been considered a “battered parent” and exempt from liability, and (2) the Department of Human Services (DHS) failed to make reasonable ADA accommodations—primarily because service providers lacked specialized ASD training. The Supreme Court affirmed every aspect of the lower court’s ruling, articulating a new, explicit principle: the ADA requires “reasonable” accommodations, not specialized or expert-level services, and parents must specify what additional accommodations they need; mere allegations of insufficient training are inadequate.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court issued a memorandum decision that:

1. Upheld O.K.’s adjudication for neglect, emphasizing her own failure to provide adequate housing, supervision, and care irrespective of the domestic violence perpetrated by the children’s father.
2. Found no abuse of discretion in terminating her improvement period after ~12 months because she made minimal progress and routinely endangered the children during supervised visits.
3. Affirmed the final termination of parental rights, concluding there was “no reasonable likelihood” the conditions of neglect could be substantially corrected in the near future, satisfying W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6).
4. Rejected the argument that DHS violated the ADA, noting the agency had already slowed instruction, used visual cues, repeated demonstrations, and granted extended time—reasonable steps given Level 1 ASD.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89 (2011)
  • Provides the standard of review (clearly erroneous for facts, de novo for law).
  • Cemented that appellate courts owe deference to circuit-court fact-finding in neglect cases.
• In re Lacey P., 189 W. Va. 580 (1993)
  • Recognizes circuit-court discretion to terminate an improvement period when progress stalls.
  • Court quoted Syllabus Pt. 2 to justify early termination after repeated safety incidents.
• In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va. 558 (2011)
  • Allows direct termination of rights when no reasonable likelihood of correction exists; no need to exhaust less-restrictive alternatives.
  • Important because petitioner requested post-dispositional opportunities; court said none were required.
• State ex rel. Waldron v. Scott, 222 W. Va. 122 (2008)
  • Sets forth harmless-error doctrine; used to dismiss petitioner’s claim that the circuit court “ignored” her disability because error, if any, was harmless.
• In re B.W., 244 W. Va. 535 (2021)
  • Petitioner tried to analogize, but Court distinguished B.W. because that case involved a (c)(5) disposition (temporary guardianship) rather than termination (c)(6).

2. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

a. Neglect Adjudication
• The statute defines a “neglected child” as one whose health is harmed by the parent’s failure to supply basic needs (W. Va. Code § 49-1-201).
• Despite father’s violence, the mother’s own shortcomings—living in a storage building with no utilities, inability to feed or diaper correctly, and leaving the two older children with grandparents in similar conditions—constituted neglect.
• “Battered parent” defense failed because that doctrine protects a non-abusive parent when another household member both abuses the parent and perpetrates the child abuse. Here, mother’s neglect was independent.

b. Termination of the Improvement Period
• Circuit court applied Lacey P.: progress was “minimal to nonexistent” and the children (ages 3, 2, and infant) needed immediate safety and stability.
• Numerous incidents (marker-cap ingestion, floor-cracker choking) demonstrated persistent endangerment despite 15 months of services.

c. ADA Accommodations
• The ADA requires public entities to make reasonable modifications—not to guarantee success (Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985) implicitly cited).
• Services already slowed pace, broke tasks into visual steps, repeated lessons, extended time—satisfying “reasonableness.”
• Court noted no authority compelling DHS to supply trainers with specialized ASD credentials. The burden lies on the requesting party to identify necessary, reasonable modifications and demonstrate how existing measures are inadequate. Petitioner offered only conclusory assertions.

d. Dispositional Choice
• The statutory test under § 49-4-604(c)(6) (termination) was satisfied:

• No reasonable likelihood of correction: 15+ months of intensive services failed; ASD counselor conceded concern about lack of improvement.
• Best interests: Children in foster placement for 14 months, thriving, and adoptive plan in place.

3. Likely Impact on West Virginia Child-Welfare Jurisprudence

• Clarifies ADA Expectations: Sets a practical threshold—agencies meet ADA duties when they individualize and adapt existing services. They need not hire experts or design bespoke curricula absent specific, evidenced requests.
• Battered-Parent Doctrine Narrowed: Confirms that neglect rooted in the parent’s own conduct defeats the defense, even when domestic violence exists concurrently.
• Emphasizes Early Disclosure of Disabilities: Parents who delay diagnostic evaluation risk losing arguments that services were inadequate. Courts may view late diagnoses skeptically when assessing additional improvement periods.
• Reinforces Deference to Circuit Courts on Improvement Periods: Affirms willingness to terminate periods early in cases involving toddlers and recurring safety issues.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Adjudication vs. Disposition: “Adjudication” is the finding that neglect/abuse occurred. “Disposition” is the remedy (e.g., improvement period, guardianship, termination).
• Improvement Period: A court-monitored window (3–12 months) where parents receive services to correct deficiencies. Failure to progress allows early termination.
• “No Reasonable Likelihood” Standard: A statutory threshold (§ 49-4-604(c)(6)) meaning the parent is unlikely to fix problems promptly enough to meet the children’s needs.
• Level 1 ASD: The mildest support-level on the autism spectrum—individual may live independently but has social-communication challenges requiring minimal supports.
• Reasonable Accommodation (ADA): Modifications or services enabling a person with disabilities to access benefits/programs without imposing undue burdens or fundamentally altering the program.
• Battered Parent Defense: Statutory defense for a non-offending parent who, due to being abused, cannot prevent another’s abuse of the child. Limited to situations where the parent neither condoned nor perpetrated neglect.

Conclusion

In re E.K., S.C., and R.K. weaves together family-law policy, disability rights, and procedural safeguards. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reinforces that:

1. Child safety and timely permanency remain paramount—even when a parent has a newly discovered disability.
2. The ADA’s “reasonableness” standard does not escalate to “specialized training” absent specific, demonstrably necessary requests.
3. Parents bear the responsibility to identify and timely pursue evaluations or accommodations that might aid reunification.

By drawing clear boundaries around the scope of required accommodations and solidifying discretion to end stagnating improvement periods, the decision will influence both agency practice and judicial analysis statewide. Practitioners should view the ruling as confirmation that reasonable—yet practical—modifications suffice; conversely, parents and counsel must proactively articulate concrete accommodations early or risk forfeiting those arguments on appeal.