“Progressive-Discipline Deviations and Imperfect Investigations Are Insufficient to Prove ADA Pretext”
A Detailed Commentary on Christina Grasty v. DaVita Inc., United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, No. 24-2584 (Aug. 18 2025)

1. Introduction

The Third Circuit’s unpublished decision in Christina Grasty v. DaVita Inc. addresses three Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) claims—discriminatory termination, retaliation, and failure to accommodate—brought by a dialysis technician discharged after an on-the-job injury. Although designated “not precedential,” the opinion is doctrinally significant because it clarifies (1) what does not suffice to establish pretext at summary judgment and (2) how courts treat deviations from progressive-discipline policies and allegedly one-sided investigations.

Central Facts:

• Parties: Christina Grasty (“Appellant”)—former patient-care technician; DaVita, Inc. (“Appellee”)—national dialysis provider.
• Injury: Back injury in January 2020; light-duty restrictions on lifting/pushing/pulling patients.
• Discharge: Terminated 23 days after injury, 11 days after a staff-meeting altercation for “unprofessional conduct.”
• Claims: (i) Discriminatory termination, (ii) Retaliatory termination for requesting accommodation, (iii) Failure to accommodate.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Applying de novo review, the Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment for DaVita on all three ADA theories. The Court held:

1. DaVita articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason—Grasty’s repeated unprofessional conduct—allowing the court to skip directly to McDonnell-Douglas pretext analysis.
2. Grasty’s evidence (her own testimony, temporal proximity, criticism of the investigation, and the employer’s deviation from progressive discipline) was insufficient for a reasonable jury to disbelieve DaVita’s stated reason.
3. The accommodation claim failed because Grasty’s own testimony showed DaVita informally accommodated her lifting restrictions.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) – Classic burden-shifting framework for circumstantial discrimination cases; expressly adopted for ADA disparate-treatment and retaliation claims (Shaner v. Synthes, 204 F.3d 494 (3d Cir. 2000)).
• Shaner v. Synthes – Clarifies burden-shifting sequence under ADA.
• Keller v. Orix Credit Alliance, 130 F.3d 1101 (3d Cir. 1997) – Allows courts to proceed to step three (pretext) where employer’s reason is credible.
• Watson v. SEPTA, 207 F.3d 207 (3d Cir. 2000) – “Determinative factor” instruction for pretext jury questions; mixed-motive vs. single-motive differentiation.
• Willis v. UPMC Children’s Hosp., 808 F.3d 638 (3d Cir. 2015) – Standard for showing “weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies” in employer’s explanation.
• Out-of-Circuit Persuasion: Rodriguez-Cardi v. MMM Holdings, 936 F.3d 40 (1st Cir. 2019); Nelson v. Lake Elmo Bank, 75 F.4th 932 (8th Cir. 2023); Markley v. U.S. Bank, 59 F.4th 1072 (10th Cir. 2023) – Collectively instruct that imperfect internal investigations rarely equal pretext.

These authorities shape a consistent through-line: courts will not second-guess an employer’s decision process when robust, contemporaneous evidence of misconduct exists, absent direct proof of discriminatory motive.

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Step-Jump to Pretext: Because DaVita’s justification was well-documented (written warnings, corroborating witnesses, policy language allowing discretionary discipline), the panel bypassed the prima-facie/legitimate-reason steps and focused on whether Grasty could show “implausibilities” or contradictions.
2. Pretext Insufficiency:
   • Sole reliance on self-serving testimony. Two coworkers’ contradictory testimony + documented history undercut Grasty.
   • Inadequate Investigation Allegation. Even accepting flaws (failure to interview Grasty), she offered no specific evidence those flaws masked discriminatory intent.
   • Departure from Progressive Discipline. Policy language explicitly allowed deviations; absence of proof that others similarly situated but non-disabled received progressive steps defeated comparator inference.
   • Temporal Proximity. A “legitimate intervening event” (the staff-meeting altercation) severed any inference from the 23-day gap between injury/accommodation request and discharge.
3. Mixed-Motive Clarification: Because no direct evidence existed, the Court confirmed the claim could not proceed under Price Waterhouse’s mixed-motive framework.
4. Failure-to-Accommodate Claim: Plaintiff bears burden to show requested accommodation was denied. Grasty’s admissions—that coworkers helped and tasks were swapped—proved accommodation occurred.

3.3 Impact of the Decision

Although non-precedential, the opinion will likely be cited by litigants and district courts within the Third Circuit (and persuasive elsewhere) for several propositions:

• Deviation ≠ Discrimination. Where an employer’s policy itself permits discretion, skipping progressive steps does not by itself establish animus.
• “Imperfect Investigation” Defense. Employees must articulate specific evidence showing investigative failings conceal bias; generic allegations won’t survive summary judgment.
• Temporal Proximity Limitation. Intervening misconduct can break causal chains in both retaliation and discriminatory termination contexts.
• Self-Contradictory Testimony. A plaintiff’s lone denial, when “impeached by a well-supported showing to the contrary,” is inadequate under Gonzalez v. DHS standards.
• Informal Accommodations Count. Employers need not create formal light-duty positions if they effectively modify duties in practice.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• McDonnell-Douglas Burden Shifting: A three-step evidentiary dance:
  1. Plaintiff shows basic case of discrimination (“prima facie”).
  2. Employer offers a facially legitimate reason.
  3. Plaintiff must prove the reason is a sham (“pretext”).
• Pretext: Evidence that would let a jury think the employer’s stated reason is so weak or implausible that it is covering the real, unlawful reason.
• Mixed-Motive vs. Single-Motive:
  • Mixed-Motive: Both lawful and unlawful reasons influenced the decision; requires direct evidence in the Third Circuit when relying on Price Waterhouse.
  • Single-Motive (Pretext): Employer’s sole stated reason is false and the real reason is unlawful.
• Temporal Proximity: A short time gap between protected activity (e.g., asking for an accommodation) and adverse action can suggest causation—but can be neutralized by subsequent legitimate misconduct.
• Progressive Discipline: A company’s step-by-step escalation of penalties (verbal warning → written warning → suspension → termination). Yet many policies, like DaVita’s, retain discretion to skip steps.

5. Conclusion

Grasty v. DaVita teaches that ADA plaintiffs must marshal more than proximity, procedural quibbles, and self-serving denials to reach a jury. Concrete, contradictory evidence is required to discredit an employer’s legitimate rationale, especially where the employer can show contemporaneous documentation and witness corroboration. At the same time, employers gain a roadmap: document misconduct, reserve disciplinary discretion in written policies, and implement even informal accommodations. The decision thus reinforces a pragmatic, evidence-focused approach to ADA summary-judgment contests—one likely to echo in district court briefing and rulings well beyond the parties to this case.