Probate Courts Retain Exclusive Jurisdiction Over Estate Counsel Fees Despite Parallel Civil Actions – A Detailed Commentary on Golub v. Werren (2025-Ohio-2950)

I. Introduction

In Golub v. Werren, the Supreme Court of Ohio confronted a recurring tension between probate-court authority over estate administration and attempts by counsel or beneficiaries to litigate related matters in other divisions of the common pleas court. The case arose from four interrelated estates, an attorney’s unilateral withdrawal of fees before final accountings, and successive attempts to obtain extraordinary relief in prohibition when the probate judge sought to examine those fees.

Key parties and procedural milestones:

• Gerald Golub – Long-standing Ohio attorney who represented four Shurman estates, later terminated.
• William & Tiffany Sharrard – Fiduciaries/beneficiaries who replaced Golub with new counsel, Laura Mills.
• Judge Dixie Park (now retired) and successor Judge Curt Werren – Judges of the Stark County Probate Court.
• Central Dispute – Whether the probate court could compel Golub to attend a “citation hearing” and order return of $43,560 in attorney fees taken without court approval, notwithstanding Golub’s separate tort action pending in the general division.

II. Summary of the Judgment

Affirming the Fifth District’s grant of summary judgment, the Supreme Court held:

1. The Stark County Probate Court possessed clear statutory jurisdiction under R.C. 2101.24(A)(1)(c) to examine and order return of attorney fees pertaining to ongoing estate cases.
2. A writ of prohibition is improper where the underlying court (here, probate) acts within its subject-matter jurisdiction, and where the relator (Golub) enjoys an adequate remedy—ordinary appeal—from any alleged procedural or constitutional errors.
3. Claims directed at non-judicial actors (the fiduciaries, successor counsel, and her firm) are not cognizable in prohibition because only judicial or quasi-judicial actions can be enjoined.
4. Miscellaneous motions filed by Golub (to strike, suggest mootness, compel judicial notice, etc.) were meritless or procedurally defective and therefore denied.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Distinguished

• R.C. 2101.24 & 2101.24(A)(1)(c) – The statutory cornerstone delineating probate-court exclusive jurisdiction “to direct and control the conduct and settle the accounts of executors and administrators, including counsel fees.”
• In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) – Cited by Golub for due-process notice in contempt; the Court distinguished it because Oliver concerned a contempt conviction before a judge sitting as a secret grand jury, whereas the probate hearing here aimed only to inquire about fees, not summarily punish.
• State ex rel. Wilkinson v. Reed, 100 Ohio St.3d 126 (2003) – Authorizes prohibition to correct past jurisdictional excesses, yet only when the lower court’s lack of jurisdiction is “patent and unambiguous,” which was absent here.
• State ex rel. Mason v. Burnside, 117 Ohio St.3d 125 (2007) and Berthelot v. Dezso, 86 Ohio St.3d 257 (1999) – Clarify that prohibition cannot supervise trial-court discretion; cited to reject Golub’s procedural-error arguments.
• State ex rel. Save Your Courthouse Comm. v. Medina, 157 Ohio St.3d 423 (2019) – Reiterates that prohibition lies only against judicial actors, justifying dismissal of claims against the fiduciaries and lawyers.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Is Key. The Court began with a textualist approach: R.C. 2101.24 confers “exclusive jurisdiction” over estate administration issues—including attorney-fee approval—to the probate court. Consequently, even though Golub’s tort claims were pending in the general division, questions of prematurely taken attorney fees remained firmly within probate.
2. No “Patent and Unambiguous” Lack of Jurisdiction. A writ of prohibition demands such a showing. Because the statute expressly empowered the probate court to act, Golub failed at the first hurdle.
3. Adequate Remedy by Appeal. Any alleged due-process infirmities (e.g., short notice, judge’s brief ex parte colloquy, courtroom seating) are classic trial-level complaints reviewable on direct appeal—indeed, Golub had already filed those appeals. That alternative remedy defeats prohibition.
4. Mootness regarding the completed hearing did not salvage the petition because (a) any ongoing restraint sought by Golub would interfere with probate jurisdiction, and (b) the hearing’s results were subject to ordinary appellate review.
5. Non-Judicial Respondents Dismissed. The Court emphasized that prohibition cannot issue against private parties; therefore, the fiduciaries and their counsel were proper appellees in the tort action but not proper respondents in prohibition.

C. Anticipated Impact of the Decision

1. Re-affirmation of Probate Primacy. By reiterating that probate courts alone approve and police attorney fees connected to estate administration, the Court bolsters fiduciary accountability and deters counsel from “self-help” fee withdrawals. Expect probate judges statewide to invoke Golub when compelling counsel or fiduciaries to disgorge unauthorized payments.

2. Sharper Boundaries for the Writ of Prohibition. The opinion clarifies that prohibition is not a catch-all tool to contest procedural grievances. Lawyers and litigants must channel such objections through direct appeal or mandamus (where applicable) rather than prohibition.

3. Strategic Considerations for Estate Counsel. Attorneys representing estates should:

• Seek explicit court approval for compensation—even when client agreements seem clear;
• Recognize that premature fee collection may trigger immediate probate scrutiny;
• Understand that parallel civil litigation does not immunize counsel from probate-court oversight.

4. Litigation Efficiency. The ruling discourages tactical filings of “emergency” prohibition petitions that re-package matters suitable for appeal, thereby conserving appellate and probate-court resources.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Writ of Prohibition – An extraordinary order barring a lower court from acting outside its jurisdiction. It is preventive, not corrective, unless jurisdictional error is obvious and ongoing.
• Subject-Matter Jurisdiction – The court’s statutory or constitutional power to hear a type of case. Parties cannot waive or confer it by agreement.
• Probate Court Exclusive Jurisdiction – Ohio probate courts exclusively manage estate administration: appointment of fiduciaries, inventory approval, creditor claims, distribution, and attorney-fee oversight.
• Citation Hearing – A probate-court proceeding requiring a person to appear and explain why certain property (including funds) should not be returned to the estate.
• Adequate Remedy at Law – A standard appellate path (e.g., appeal, motion for reconsideration) sufficient to address alleged errors. If such a remedy exists, extraordinary writs usually fail.
• Patent and Unambiguous Lack of Jurisdiction – A clear statutory/constitutional bar leaving no room for judicial discretion—e.g., a divorce decree issued by a traffic court. Without this clarity, prohibition is unavailable.

V. Conclusion

Golub v. Werren delivers a forceful reminder: Ohio probate courts wield exclusive, non-delegable authority over the financial mechanics of estate administration, including counsel fees. Attorneys may not circumvent that authority by initiating related tort actions elsewhere or by invoking extraordinary writs to stall probate inquiry. The decision also narrows the misuse of prohibition, insisting that aggrieved parties pursue conventional appellate relief for procedural or constitutional grievances. Overall, the ruling strengthens probate-court oversight, protects estate assets, and clarifies litigation pathways—an outcome likely to influence estate practice and appellate strategy across Ohio for years to come.